英文

人生理想之比較研究

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LIFE IDEALS

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

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英文人生理想之比較研究

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LIFE IDEALS

THE WAY OF DECREASE AND INCREASE
WITH INTERPRETATIONS AND ILLUSTRATIONS FROM THE
PHILOSOPHIES OF THE EAST AND THE WEST

BY

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TO MY

FATHER AND MOTHER

PREFACE

Croce said that Hegel was one of those philosophers who made not only the immediate reality but philosophy itself the object of their thought, and that with his "logic of philosophy" he made contributions to the solution of particular problems and to the conception of life ("The Philosophy of Hegel," Ainslie's translation, p. 1). I am not so pretentious as to compare myself with Hegel. I only wish to say that in the present work, I have made philosophy itself the object of my thought. Although I do not think that there is any special logic of philosophy, I am not without hope that this preliminary survey of man's life of reason may lead me in the future to some constructive work for the solution of particular problems and for the conception of life. In the treatment of the history of philosophy, I have drawn material from various sources. It is hoped that by so doing the present work may at least help make clear the similarity of human nature, the uniformity of human experience, the common problems that have faced all humanity, and the common methods of solving these problems.

All who philosophize have their visions and at the same time their blindnesses. Their vision makes known to them certain aspects of reality, but at the same time excludes other aspects. It is exactly their vision that causes them to be blind. In the present work I am going

to tell people facts as I see them. I do not pretend that I am not blind. But how far I am blind is a question for the critics to answer, rather than for the author of the work.

In publishing this work I take the opportunity to acknowledge my obligation to Professor John Dewey, under whose guidance the present work was done. I should also thank Professors F. J. E. Woodbridge, W. T. Bush, J. J. Coss, L. C. Porter, and Doctors Irving Edman and W. H. Schneider for their help and encouragement; especially do I thank Professor Porter, Doctor Schneider, and Dr. H. L. Hargrove, former Professor in George Peabody Teachers College, now my colleague in Chung Chow University, Kaifeng, who read the manuscripts and corrected some grammatical mistakes that are difficult for a foreigner to avoid. Among my Chinese friends I should thank Mr. K. S. Wang and Mr. C. F. Lieu, who read the manuscript and made suggestions.

YU-LAN FUNG.

Kaifeng, Honan, China,
October, 1923.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

(1) Philosophy and Life

In "The Spirit of Modern Philosophy," Josiah Royce said:

> "Philosophy, in the proper sense of the term, is not a presumptuous effort to explain the mysteries of the world by means of any superhuman insight or extraordinary cunning, but has its origin and value in an attempt to give a reasonable account of our own personal attitude towards the more serious business of life. You philosophize when you reflect critically upon what you are actually doing in your world. What you are doing is of course, in the first place, living. . . . Such a criticism of life, made elaborate and thoroughgoing, is philosophy."[1]

No doubt this gives a fair account of the origin of philosophy, but, perhaps it may not be a fair account of philosophy itself. It is true that man philosophizes only when he begins to criticize life, for otherwise he will simply make what Chuang-tse called the "Happy Excursion" in the universe like "the fishes that forget each other in the great river and great lake," with consciousness neither of the environment, nor of himself. It is only when life is not quite satisfactory that he begins to be self-conscious and to ask why; to ask why is to criticize existing conditions and thus to philosophize. He does all these because he must, not because he will.

[1] Royce, Josiah, "The Spirit of Modern Philosophy," New York, 1910, pp. 1, 2.

But although this is true, there is still a question: Is philosophy criticism itself? It seems better to say that philosophy is not criticism as such, but the standard of criticism. It is obvious that the criticism of a thing presupposes a standard, ideal or actual, which the thing criticized is either different from or opposed to, otherwise the criticism would be meaningless. Lao-tse said:

"When all the world knows the beautiful is beautiful, it is already ugly; when all the world knows the good is good, it is already bad."[1]

But it may be equally said that when all the world knows the ugly is ugly, it is already beautiful; when all the world knows the bad is bad, it is already good; for, as Plotinus said:

"It is impossible to say, 'that is not the good,' without having some sort of knowledge of the good or acquaintance therewith."[2]

So in order to criticize the ugly, we need the beautiful, ideal or real, as the standard; to criticize the bad, we need the good, ideal or real. In the same way, to criticize actual beauty we need as a standard an ideal absolute beauty; and to criticize the good, we need an ideal absolute good. Now to criticize actual life, do we not need an ideal life as a standard? Philosophy is the concrete picture of the ideal life; and a philosopher is one who draws this picture. Here is the difference between literature and philosophy. Literature criticizes life by

[1] Lao-tse, "Tao Teh Ching." Sec. II.
[2] Plotinus, "Complete Works," tr. by K. S. Guthrie, 1918, Vol. III, p. 748.

taking some standard of criticism for granted. So the contribution of literature toward life is often more negative than positive; its purpose is rather to point out the wrong and the false than to tell the right and the real. But the business of philosophy is precisely to build a system of the right and the real. Plato said:

"In heaven, I replied, there is laid the pattern of such a city, and he who desires may behold this, and in beholding, govern himself accordingly. But whether there really is or ever will be such an one is of no importance to him; for he will act according to the laws of the city and of no other."[1]

Philosophy is to give the pattern not only of a city, but of life. If philosophy needs any definition, it may be defined as the ideal.

(2) The Idealization of Nature and the Idealization of Art

But the ideal is not, and cannot be created or discovered, independent of the actual, by the philosopher in his inspired moment. As shown by Royce, philosophy is not to explain any mystery, and a philosopher is not one who has any superhuman insight and extraordinary cunning. The philosopher may build a city in Heaven, but the stones and the bricks he must draw from earth. His ideal pattern after all must be constructed with the material of actual experience. As William James said:

"We can invent no new forms of conception, applicable to the whole exclusively, and not suggested originally by facts. All philosophers, accordingly, have conceived of the whole

[1] Plato, "Republic," 592, tr. by B. Jowett.

world after the analogy of some particular feature of it, which has particularly captivated their attention."[1]

If philosophy is defined as the ideal, to philosophize may be said to idealize, that is, to idealize some feature of the world as we actually experience it, so that it may become the ideal pattern for life as a whole.

What are the more conspicuous features of the world, that we actually experience? There are two features or contrasting states of experience, the distinctiveness of which is universally the most obvious. Aristotle said:

"The things we see can be divided into two classes: those which are the product of nature, and those which come from causes other than nature. Thus, it is nature that produces the animals and the varied parts of which their bodies are composed; it is also nature that produced the plants, and the simple elements such as earth, fire, and water; for we speak of these things and others like them as existing solely by the fact of nature. For all the things which we indicate present a great difference in relation to those which are not the product of nature. All the natural beings carry with themselves the principle of movement and rest. Some may be endowed with the movement of locomotion in space, others may have the internal movement of growth and decay, and finally some may have the simple movement of alteration and modification in the qualities they possess. About these motions it is not the same with those things which we call the product of art."[2]

Huxley said:

"It may be safely assumed that, two thousand years ago, before Cæsar set foot in southern Britain, the whole country-

[1] James, William, "The Pluralistic Universe," New York, 1912, p. 8.

[2] Aristotle, "Physics," II, I, tr. from J. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire's French translation, Paris, 1862, Vol. I, pp. 39, 40.

side visible from the window of the room in which I write, was in what is called 'the state of nature.' Except, it may be, by raising a few sepulchral mounds, such as those which still here and there, break the flowing contours of the downs, man's hands had made no mark upon it; and the thin veil of vegetation which overspread the broad-backed heights and the shelving sides of the coombs was unaffected by his industry. It is as little to be doubted, that an essentially similar state of nature prevailed, in this region, for many thousands of years before the coming of Cæsar; and there is no assignable reason for denying that it might continue to exist through an equally prolonged futurity, except for the intervention of man." [1]

"Three or four years have elapsed since the state of nature to which I have referred was brought to an end, so far as a small patch of the soil is concerned, by the intervention of man. . . . In short, it was made into a garden. At the present time, this artificially treated area presents an aspect extraordinarily different from that of the land as remains in the state of nature, outside of the wall. . . . That the 'state of art,' thus created in the state of nature by man, is sustained by him, would at once become apparent, if the watchful supervision of the gardener were withdrawn, and the antagonistic influences of the general cosmic process were no longer sedulously warded off, or counteracted. . . . It will be admitted that the garden is as much a work of art, or artifice, as anything that can be mentioned. The energy localized in certain human bodies, directed by similarly localized intellects, has produced a collocation of other material bodies which could not be brought about in the state of nature. The same proposition is true of all the works of man's hands, from a flint implement to a cathedral or a chronometer; and it is because it is true, that we call these things artificial, term them works of art, or artifice, by way of distinguishing them from the products of the cosmic process working outside man, which we call natural, or works of nature. The distinction thus drawn between the works of nature and those

[1] Huxley, "Evolution and Ethics and Other Essays," London and New York, 1914, pp. 1, 2.

of man, is universally recognized; and it is, as I conceive, both useful and justified."[1]

It is easy to see that what Aristotle and Huxley called nature and art, are exactly what the Chinese philosophers called the natural and the human. As Chuang-tse said:

"What is nature? What is human? That the ox and the horse have four feet is nature; to halter the head of a horse or to pierce the nose of an ox is human."[2]

Thus, the ancient Oriental thinker made the same distinction between nature and art that Aristotle and Huxley did. This helps to show that it "is universally recognized." As one of the characteristics of man is to make tools,[3] so as soon as he was introduced to this world, he began to make them. And as soon as some of them were made, there was art as over against nature. It is no wonder that the two states of the world are universally experienced, and their distinction "is universally recognized." Who has not seen the difference between the state inside the garden and that outside it? Who does not know the fact that the horse and the ox are "born free, but are everywhere in chains"? If the common people are not consciously aware of the two

[1] Huxley, "Evolution and Ethics, and Other Essays," pp. 9–11.

[2] "Works," tr. by H. A. Giles, London, 1889, p. 211.

These three quotations have been given simply to show the clear contrast between the state of nature and the state of art. They have nothing to do with the evaluations of the three authors concerning the two states. Chuang-tse's philosophy is an idealization of nature; Huxley's philosophy is an idealization of art; Aristotle's philosophy is a reconciliation of nature and art.

[3] Bergson, "Creative Evolution," tr. by A. Mitchell, New York, 1911, p. 137.

contrasting states in the world, it is only because they are too familiar with them.

Since philosophy is the idealization of certain features of the world as we experience them, and since the most conspicuous features of the world are the state of nature and the state of art, it is only reasonable to expect that the history of philosophy will prove that some philosophers have idealized nature and others have idealized art. The history of philosophy shows that no philosopher is so blind as to be completely unable to see the bare fact that man's present condition is a mixture of good and evil, of happiness and suffering.[1] In fact, as shown in the above quotations, men begin to philosophize only when they feel that the world is not so good as they wish. So philosophers do not differ in seeing the facts, but only in the way of criticizing them. Some attribute the present goodness of man to his original nature, and consider the present evil as due to his artificial change. According to them, man is originally happy, but he suffers through his own " original sin, " his own mistake. The best way to avoid evil is not to go away from nature, but to return to it. Others attribute the present badness of man to his original nature, but consider the present good as due completely to his power of control. According to them, man suffered much more in the past ; and it is only through his own efforts that he has

[1] As we shall see, even those who said that evils are " appearances " must see the "appearances." That there are evils is a fact; that they are " appearances " is the philosopher's interpretation of the fact.

succeeded in making the bad world better. If it is still not the best and there are still evils, it is only because the artificiality is not yet complete, and either his nature has not yet been wholly adapted to the alien world, or the alien world has not yet been wholly adapted to him. How can their ways of criticizing life be so different, if it is not because their standards of criticism are different? What is the difference between their standards of criticism, if not that the one is the idealization of nature, while the other is the idealization of art?

If this is so, it is no wonder that in the history of philosophy, philosophers were often unable to understand each other. It is no wonder that Suen-tse accused Chuang-tse of being one who is "blinded by nature and does not know art," while he himself was exactly blinded by art and did not know nature. It is no wonder that, as Pascal said somewhere,

> "one half of the philosophers ignore the greatness of man; and the other half ignore his baseness."

In the history of philosophy there has been an issue as to whether human nature is good or bad; that is, whether the virtues are innate and absolute, or simply for convenience or utility. There has been an issue as to whether the universe is good or bad, that is, whether the cosmic principle is something akin to our high ideal, or nothing but a blind force. It seems that all these are but the ancient philosophical issues discussed between Plato and the Sophists as to whether the justification of

virtue is nature or convention, and whether there are absolute truth, absolute beauty, and absolute good, or whether "man is the measure of all things." Why did philosophers contend so earnestly about these issues, if not because some of them idealize nature too much, while others idealize art too much?

(3) The Way of Decrease (or Retreat) and the Way of Increase (or Advance)

If there are two such diametrically opposing patterns of life, it is obvious that there must be two ways of life no less opposing for him who "may behold this, and in beholding, govern himself accordingly." According to one pattern described above, art is certainly superfluous and what Huxley called "the horticultural process" is a mistake. We are astray in establishing what is called our civilization and feeling proud of it without knowing that it is precisely this very civilization that is the cause of our present suffering. We suffer because our paradise is lost through our own mistakes. If this view is true, it is a matter of course that the right way of life is to undo the present artificial civilization and perhaps even life itself as Plotinus, quoting from Homer, advised: "Let us fly unto our dear fatherland."[1]

But according to the other pattern, although the present is far from the ideal, anyway it is much better than the past. At present we may not be able to live well, but still we are able to live. If we still suffer, it

[1] Plotinus, "Works," Vol. I, p. 52.

is only because, as was said above, we are not very progressive and our civilization is not yet perfect. Surely we have not yet reached our goal, but we are already on the right track. Go ahead, our happiness is in the promising future, but not in the dead past. If this view is true, it is also a matter of course that the right way of life is not negatively to undo something, but positively to do all things. We must work and struggle so that the future paradise may be built by our own hands, and the "City of God" may be turned into the "Kingdom of Man."

Lao-tse said:

"He who devotes himself to knowledge seeks from day to day to increase. He who devotes himself to Tao seeks from day to day to diminish."[1]

Chuang-tse said:

"There are the way of nature, and the way of art (or the way of human). Inaction and dignity are the way of nature; action and entanglement are the way of art. The way of nature may be compared to that of sovereign; the way of art to that of minister. The distance which separates them is great. We must investigate the matter earnestly."[2]

Truly, between the two ways of life described above, the one is to decrease, the other to increase; the one is the way of nature, the other, the way of art. Yes, "the distance which separates them is great; we must investigate the matter earnestly."

[1] Lao-tse, "Tao Teh Ching," Sec. 48.
[2] Cp. H. A. Giles' translation, p. 134.

(4) The Third View

Needless to say, both these lines of thought are too one-sided and too extreme. It is natural to expect that there should be philosophers who either originally held the position of the mean state, or who, seeing the reasonableness and the extremeness of both views, and the desirability of both the ways of life, try to modify them. The history of philosophy shows that there are many. Who they are and what their teachings are we need not say here. We shall examine in detail all these three lines of thought in the following chapters of our work.

PART I

THE IDEALIZATION OF NATURE AND THE WAY OF DECREASE

Let us first consider what we may call the "nature" line of thought. The common presupposition of this line of thought is that the present world, or the present state of the world, is the consequence of some original mistake, something that fundamentally ought not to be. The Christian myth that the first two ancestors of mankind were most happy in the heavenly garden which was lost afterwards through their own "sin" of eating the forbidden fruit of wisdom, is after all a statement true to this line of philosophy, if it is taken symbolically, not literally and historically. It is because of this fact that some of these philosophies are often considered as "religious." In fact, religion is itself a kind of "nature" philosophy plus dogma, convention, superstition, and myth. In the influence of every religion that has caused mankind to prefer Heaven to earth, this kind of philosophy has certainly played the most important rôle.

But although all of the philosophies belonging to this line of thought agree that we had a paradise but lost it, and although they agree that now we should retreat so that we may return to it, yet they are far from agreeing as to what that paradise is, and how far we should retreat.

Some thought that this world was right, but that the present state of this world was wrong, so that we should retreat from civilization to primitivity ; from the state of art to that of nature. Some thought that we should retreat from the nature in space and time to the realm of the supreme and the ideal. Some thought further that we should retreat from all that is thinkable to that which is unthinkable and seems, therefore, to be " nothing " to our human intellect and human will. Thus the " decrease " is complete and life is thoroughly negated. These are the three main types of what we call the " nature " line of thought. The first type we call romanticism, the second idealism, and the third, nihilism.

In this the first part of this book we have chosen three systems of philosophy that seem to us in one way or another to be typical, to illustrate these three views, and therefore three ways of life.

CHAPTER II

ROMANTICISM: CHUANG-TSE

If our thesis that the "nature" line of thought has its origin in the idealization of the state of nature is well founded, it is natural to expect that there should be philosophies that naïvely consider the state of nature as such to be really good. The history of philosophy justifies this expectation. In the history of philosophy there are what is known as the romantic philosophies that consider original human nature as absolutely good, and the state of nature as the norm; philosophies that favor anarchistic individualism, and revolt against conventions and institutions; philosophies, in short, that exaggerate the self-sufficiency of the state of nature, the dexterity of savages, and the skill of animal instincts, and deny the profits produced by civilization and the expertness acquired by education and practice. To represent this type we have chosen the Chinese philosopher, Chuang-tse, whom we consider the most consistent and the most thoroughgoing expounder of this type of thinking.

(1) His Conception of "Tao"

In order to understand Chuang-tse's philosophy, we need first to see what he meant by the word "Tao." He said:

"Tao has its reality and evidence, but no action and form. It is transmitted in all things, but nothing can be said to

have and own it. It is obtained by all things, but nothing can be said to have seen it. It exists by and through itself. It exists before heaven and earth, and indeed for all eternity. It causes the gods to be divine and the world to be produced. It is above the zenith, but is not high. It is beneath the nadir, but is not low. It is prior to heaven and earth, but is not ancient. It is older than the most ancient, but is not old."[1]

It sounds very much like a description of the Christian God as some of the scholastic philosophers saw Him. But one would go far astray in trying to understand this passage, if one considered Tao as something like the God of Christianity, who created the world with conscious design and conscious will. This is a human interpretation of the universe and an explanation of nature with the analogy of art. In fact, Tao did not and could not create things. As one of Chuang-tse's best commentators, Kuo Hsian, said:

"How can Tao cause the gods to be divine and the world to be produced? Tao did not cause the gods to be divine, but they are divine themselves; this means that Tao causes them to be divine by not causing them. Tao did not produce the world, but the world produced itself; this means that Tao produced it by not producing it."

So when we say Tao produces all things, we mean nothing more than the plain fact that all things produce themselves, naturally and spontaneously. Tao is the totality of the spontaneity of all things in the universe. "Tao" means the English word "Nature" in the sense of spontaneity, of freedom from artificiality. Since all things in nature produce themselves spontaneously

[1] Cf. H. A. Giles' translation, p. 77.

and instinctively, so ought they to go on spontaneously, and instinctively. This is the basis of Chuang-tse's theory of returning to nature and of "letting alone." In fact, his conception of Tao is not very different from Spinoza's conception of God, nor does his conception of the genesis of the world differ greatly from Spinoza's. The difference between these two philosophers is that what Spinoza considered as necessity and mechanism, Chuang-tse considered as spontaneity and freedom. It may be due to this difference that Chuang-tse saw only the good aspect of human nature somewhat like Rousseau, while Spinoza saw its bad aspect somewhat like Hobbes.

(2) His Conception of Happiness

Passing from Chuang-tse's conception of Tao, let us now consider his conception of happiness. The totality of the spontaneity of all things in the universe is called "Tao," or "Nature"; the totality of the spontaneity of each thing is called "Te," or "Virtue." According to Chuang-tse, each and everything is most happy, if only it lives according to its natural virtue, that is, its native disposition, or instincts. This is the only royal way to what he called the "Happy Excursion." In the chapter that bears this title, he said:

"In the Record of Marvels we read that when the great bird Rukh flies southwards, the water is smitten for a space of three thousand *li* around, while the bird itself mounts a typhon to a height of ninety thousand *li* for a flight of six months' duration. . . . A cicada laughed and said to a

dove: 'Now when I fly with my might, it is as much as I can do to get from tree to tree. And sometimes I do not reach, but fall to the ground midway. What, then, can be the use of going up ninety thousand *li* in order to start for the south?'"[1]

It shows clearly that both the great Rukh and the small cicada are perfectly satisfied, each with its own excursion. As the above-mentioned commentator said:

"Everything is self-sufficient in its instinct. The great Rukh has nothing to be proud of in comparison with the small cicada; nor has the small cicada anything to be desired in the Celestial Lake [the place where the Rukh flies to]. Both of them are satisfied. Therefore, although their size is different, their happiness is the same."

If this theory is true of all things, mankind is no exception. In the state of their primitivity, humanity lived according to nothing but its own instinct and thereby enjoyed the most. Chuang-tse said:

"The people have certain natural instincts;—to weave, and clothe themselves; to till, and feed themselves. These are common to all humanity, and all are agreed thereon. Such instincts are called 'Heaven-sent.' So in the days when natural instincts prevailed, men moved quietly and gazed steadily. At that time, there were no roads over mountains, nor boats, nor bridges over water. All things were produced, each for its own proper sphere. Birds and beasts multiplied; trees and shrubs grew up. The latter might be led by hand; men could climb up and peep into the raven's nest, for then men dwelt with birds and beasts, and all creation was one. There were no distinctions between good and bad men. Being all equally without knowledge, their virtue could not go astray. Being all equally

[1] Cf. H. A. Giles' translation, pp. 1, 2.

without evil desires, they were in a state of natural integrity, the perfection of human existence." [1]

" But when the sages came to worry them [the people] with ceremonies and music in order to rectify their bodies, and hung up, as it were, benevolence and justice for all to gaze at, in order to satisfy their mind, then the people began to develop a taste for knowledge and to struggle one with the other in their desire for gain. This was the error of the sages." [2]

This is Chuang-tse's story of the " fall " of mankind. Mankind lost its paradise through eating the fruit of wisdom, which was presented to it, not through the deception of the serpent, but through the " error of the sages." With their power of intellect and their ingenuity of discovery and invention, the sages were chiefly responsible for bringing art into the state of nature. But what is the purpose of art ? It is either to imitate nature or to modify it. If it is to imitate nature, it is simply useless. We here quote a passage from "Lieh-tse": [3]

" There was once a man in Sung who carved a mulberry leaf out of jade for his prince. It took three years to complete it, and it imitated Nature so exquisitely in its down, its glossiness, and its general configuration from tip to stem, that, if placed in a heap of real mulberry leaves, it could not be distinguished from them. This man was subsequently pensioned by the Sung State as a reward for his skill. Lieh-tse, hearing of it, said : ' If it took the creator three years to make a single leaf, there would be very few trees with

[1] Cp. H. A. Giles' translation, pp. 107, 108.

[2] *Id.*, p. 109.

[3] For justification in quoting Lieh-tse see Chap. VI.

leaves on them. The Sage will rely not so much on human science and skill as on the evolution of Tao.'"[1]

If it is to modify nature, it is harmful. Chuang-tse said:

"A duck's legs, though short, cannot be lengthened without pain to the duck, and a crane's legs, though long, cannot be shortened without misery to the crane, so that which is long in nature cannot be cut off, nor that which is short lengthened."[2]

According to Chuang-tse the purpose of art is precisely to cut the long and to lengthen the short. Thus when art is introduced into the state of nature, there is no more happiness, but suffering; nay, no more life, but death.

The following story will serve for further illustration:

"The Lord of the Southern Sea is called Change; the Lord of the Northern Sea is called Uncertainty; and the Lord of the center is called Primitivity. Change and Uncertainty often met on the territory of Primitivity, and being always well treated by him, determined to repay his kindness. They said: 'All men have seven holes—for seeing, hearing, eating, and breathing. Primitivity alone has none. We will bore some for him.' So every day they bored one hole; but on the seventh day Primitivity died."[3]

(3) Social and Political Philosophy

If the meaning of this story is clear, it is not difficult to see why Chuang-tse went further to teach the abolition of culture and the practice of non-government. According to Chuang-tse, primitivity and anarchism are

[1] Giles, Lionel, "Taoist Teaching from the Book of Lieh Tzŭ," London and New York, 1912, p. 108.

[2] Cp. H. A. Giles' translation, p. 101.

[3] Cp H. A. Giles' translation, p. 98.

the essentials of a Golden Age. Culture is bad, because it is intended to modify man's original nature. Chuang-tse said :

" An old tree is cut down to make sacrificial vessels which are then decorated with beautiful colors. The stump remains in the ditch. The sacrificial vessels and the stump are very differently treated as regards honor and dishonor, but equally, as regards the destruction of their original nature. Similarly, the acts of Robber Che [a bad man] and that of Tseng and Shih [two good men] are very different, but the loss of their original nature is in each case the same. Now the causes of the loss of man's original nature are five in number. The five colors confuse the eyes and cause them to fail to see clearly. The five sounds confuse the ears and cause them to fail to hear accurately. The five scents confuse the nose and obstruct the sense of smell. The four tastes cloy the palate and vitiate the sense of taste. Finally, likes and dislikes disturb the mind and cause dispersion of the original nature. These are all the banes of life ; yet Yang and Mo regarded them as the *summum bonum*. They are not what I consider the *summum bonum*, for if men who are thus fettered can be said to have *Summum bonum*, the pigeons and owls in a cage may also be said to have attained the *summum bonum!*"[1]

Therefore, we must abolish all these things that fetter mankind. He said again :

" There was once a sea bird which alighted outside the capital of Lu. The Prince of Lu was delighted, went out to receive it, escorted it to the temple, and ordered the best meal to be served and the best music to be played for a banquet in its honor. The bird, however, was timid, sad, and dazed, and dared not eat or drink ; in three days, it was dead. This was treating the bird as the Prince would treat himself, not treating the bird as a bird. Had he treated it as a bird,

[1] Cp. H. A. Giles' translation, p. 155.

he would have let it roost in dense forests, wander over open land, swim in the river and lake, feed upon fishes, fly in order, and rest in peace."[1]

This story shows that the most tragic phenomenon in this world is the imposition of one's own idea of good upon others who do not consider it as good. But the chief function of government is not only to impose what it considers as good upon its subjects, but also to coerce them to behave accordingly. It is tragic ; it is intolerable. So Chuang-tse said :

"There has been such a thing as letting mankind alone ; there has never been such a thing as governing mankind. Letting alone springs from the fear lest men's native dispositions be perverted and their natural virtue laid aside. But if their native dispositions be not perverted and their natural virtue be not laid aside, what room is there left for government?"[2]

Clearly, according to Chuang-tse's conception of Nature and happiness, there is certainly no more room for government than for culture.

(4) Individual Cultivation and the Ideal Man

So much for Chuang-tse's social ethics ; now let us consider his suggestions for individual cultivation, or his art of life. Just as civilized society should abolish its civilization and return to the state of primitivity, so the mature individual should eliminate his intellect and return to the state of childhood. Just like the primitive state of society, the childhood of the individual

1 Cp. H. A. Giles' translation, p. 227.
2 *Id.*, p. 119.

is also characterized by spontaneity and naturalness. Both belong to times when instinct was not yet disturbed by intellect, and nature was not yet confused by art. So Chuang-tse said :

"'The method of life,' said Lao-tse, 'consists in being able to preserve the unity of mind, to lose nothing, to know good and evil without conscious will, to stop, to be satisfied with what is enough, to leave others alone and to attend to one's self, to be without cares and without knowledge,—to be in fact a child. A child will cry all day without getting hoarse, will keep its fist tightly closed without the hand becoming cramped, and will gaze all day without the eyes becoming dulled. This is so, because the child does these things from its native disposition or natural virtue, not from conscious will. The child moves, but does not know whither ; it sits, but does not know why. It is not conscious of anything but freely adapts itself to the suggestions of the environment. This is the art of life.'"[1]

The picture of Chuang-tse's ideal man is as follows :

" The supreme man of the ancients slept without dreaming and awaked without anxiety. He ate without discrimination and breathed deep breaths. . . . He did not know how to love life or to hate death. Living, he experienced no elation ; dying, he offered no resistance ; unconsciously he came, unconsciously he went, that is all. He forgot the past and sought no information about the future.[2] He received anything that came to him, with delight, and left anything that he did not want, without consciousness. In short, he did not let the mind [intellect] substitute [become a substitute] for the instinct, nor [did he let] the human help nature. This is the supreme man." [3]

[1] Cp. H. A. Giles' translation, p. 300.

[2] The text reads: " he did not forget, " but the Commentary of Kuo Hsian shows that the text he used reads: "he forgets."

[3] H. A. Giles' translation, p. 73.

(5) The World of Pure Experience

Put in modern language, the supreme man is one who has no will, no consciousness, no knowledge. He is simply in what William James called " the world of pure experience."[1] He simply takes the pure experience, the immediate presentation, " the *that* in short (for until we have decided *what* it is, it must be a mere *that*)."[2] He simply takes " the *that* at its face value, neither more nor less ; and taking it at its face value means, first of all, to take it just as we feel it, and not to confuse ourselves with abstract talk *about* it, involving words that drive us to invent secondary conceptions in order to mentalize their suggestions and make our actual experience again seem rationally possible."[3] So Chuang-tse said:

" The knowledge of the ancients is perfect. How perfect ? At first, they did not yet know that there were things. This is the most perfect knowledge; nothing can be added. Next they knew that there were things, but they did not yet make distinctions between them. Next they made distinctions between them, but they did not yet pass judgments upon them. When judgments were passed, the Whole (Tao) was destroyed. With destruction of the Whole, individual bias arose. Are there really construction and destruction ? Are there really no construction and destruction ? That there are construction and destruction is like the fact that one plays the lute. That there are no construction and destruction is like the fact that one does not play the lute."[4]

[1] James, William, "Essays in Radical Empiricism," New York, 1910, p. 39.
[2] *Id.*, p. 13.
[3] *Id.*, pp. 48, 49.
[4] Cp. H. A. Giles' translation, p. 21.

The above-mentioned commentator said :

" All the tunes cannot be played at once. When playing a piece of music, no matter how many hands take part in it, there must be some tunes left. To play music is to make the tunes known. But by making it known, one gets only a part ; by not making it known, one gets the whole. Therefore, that there are destruction and construction is like the fact that one plays the lute ; that there are no destruction and construction is like the fact that one does not play the lute."

This shows that when we give " abstract talks " about pure experience, we do not make it *more*, but *less*. According to the following quotation " construction is the same as destruction, " so we must take every experience at its " face value. " Chuang-tse said :

" The possible is possible, the impossible is impossible. Tao evolves and sequences follow. Things act and they are what they are. What are they ? They are what they are. What are they not ? They are not what they are not. Everything is what it is, and does what it can do. There is nothing that is not what it is, and cannot do what it can do. Therefore, a beam and pillar are identical ; so are ugliness and beauty, greatness, wickedness, perverseness, and strangeness. Separation is the same as construction ; construction is the same as destruction. But all things, without regard to their construction and destruction, may again be comprehended in the whole. This only the truly intelligent can see. They, therefore, give up prejudice, arguments, words and concepts, but follow the common and the ordinary. The common and the ordinary are the natural function of all things, which expresses the common nature of the whole. Following the common nature of the whole, they are joyous. Being joyous, they are near perfection. Perfection is for them to stop. That they stop without knowing that they stop is the identification with the Whole (Tao)."[1]

[1] Cp. H. A. Giles' translation, pp. 19, 20.

Thus in the world of pure experience, what is known as the union of the individual with the whole is finally reached. In this state there is an unbroken flux of experience, but the experiencer does not *know* it. Like the man of the ancients he does not know that there are things, to say nothing of making distinctions between them. There is no separation of things, to say nothing of the distinction between the subject, and the object, between the "me" and the "non-me." So in this state of experience, there is nothing but the One. This is the mental state of the primitive man of ancient times, of the child, and of the sages.

(6) The Happiness of the Union of the Individual with the Whole

In this state one would have the feeling of the union of the individual with the whole. One would have the happiness of safety, peace, evenness, and serenity. Chuang-tse said:

"If you hide a canoe in the crevice of a mountain which is surrounded by a lake, this is safe enough. But at midnight a strong man may come and carry away the canoe on his back. The blindness of men does not see that no matter how you conceal things, small ones in large ones, there will always be a chance of losing them. But if you conceal the whole universe in the whole universe there will be no room left for it to be lost. This is an eternal fact. Men consider the attainment of human form as a source of joy. But the human form is only one of the countless forms in the universe. If one identifies one's self with the universe, one will undergo all the transitions, and attain all the forms, with only the infinite and eternity to look forward to. What incomparable bliss is that! Therefore, the supreme man makes

excursion in that which can never be lost, but endure always. Those who can deal well with death, old age, beginning and end, are already considered as teachers of mankind. How much more supreme to this is he who identifies himself with that which is the supporter of all things and the condition of the whole evolution?"[1]

"Such a man will bury gold in the hillside and cast pearls into the seas. He will not struggle for wealth, nor strive for fame. He will not rejoice at long life, nor grieve over early death. He will find no pleasure in success, nor grieve over pain in failure. He will not account a throne as his private gain, nor the empire of the world as glory personal to himself. His glory is to have the insight that all are one and that life and death are the same."[2]

This is the happiness of the union of the individual with the whole.

(7) Concluding Remarks

We shall see as we go on that the union of the individual with the whole is the common aspiration and inspiration of all the systems which we include in the "nature" line of thought. The difference between Chuang-tse and other philosophers is that Chuang-tse did not reject this world. In fact, "Tao" is but the total spontaneity of this world. This world is after all full of harmony, beauty, and happiness, if only men can appreciate and enjoy them. His philosophy is by no means "passive" in the sense that men should sit down really "doing nothing" except contemplating the ideal and the eternal. In fact, the spontaneous flight

[1] Cp. H. A. Giles' translation, pp. 75, 76.
[2] *Id.*, p. 137.

of the Rukh and the cicada, as well as the crying and gazing of the child, are all activity and doing. They are to be preferred, because all of them are consoquences of the native disposition, but not the result of the conscious will. So Chuang-tse's antithesis is not action versus contemplation, but the action of conscious design versus that of spontaneity and instincts. His philosophy taught that we should only abolish the present state of the world, that destroys natural spontaneity with human art. So, in the "nature" line of thought, Chuang-tse is the philosopher who asked mankind to make the least "decrease" or retreat. His philosophy is certainly an expression of a kind of human desire and an exposition of a kind of happiness. The happiness of union of the individual with the whole will be discussed later. Here we need only to notice that when we follow our instincts and leave them in the state of nature, there is a kind of happiness unique in itself. This happiness is what William James called the "felicity of the sensorial life."[1] To quote from William James, those who fail to appreciate the philosophy of Chuang-tse must be

> "the boys and girls, or man or woman, who has never been touched by the spell of this mysterious sensorial life, with its irrationality, if so you like to call it, but its vigilance and its supreme felicity."[2]

It is to this mysterious sensorial life, with its irrationality, its vigilance, and its supreme felicity that Chuang-tse and all the other romantic philosophers ask us to go back.

[1] James, William, "Talks to Teachers on Psychology and Life Ideals," New York, 1921, p. 257.
[2] *Id.*, p. 263.

CHAPTER III

IDEALISM: PLATO

But it is not difficult to see that Chuang-tse's philosophy presupposes too much the good nature of man and the harmony of the Universe. The state of nature is certainly good for excursion, but may not be good for residence. It certainly gives men happiness, but may also give them trouble. There is no question about the fact that the real state of nature is far from the ideal. The reason that the Taoists should take so naïve a view of the state of nature is that up to the time of Chuang-tse, the general philosophic tradition in China was the belief that human nature was intrinsically good. Suen-tse, the Chinese philosopher who first systematically took the opposite view, and who accused Chuang-tse of being one who was "blinded by nature but did not know art," flourished rather too late for Chuang-tse to take into consideration his argument for the defects of the state of nature and the importance of the state of art.

(1) Plato and the Problem of His Time

But Plato, the next philosopher we are going to consider, did have the chance to hear the arguments both for nature and for art. During his time there was a great controversy known as "nature versus convention." In this controversy, the question was whether virtue

was natural or conventional; that is, whether the world was originally good or bad. Most of the pre-Socratic philosophers seemed to maintain that virtue was natural and did not change with the opinions of man. Even Heraclitus and Parmenides, who were usually considered the representatives of two opposing schools, seemed to agree on this point. Heraclitus said:

"Even he who is esteemed knows and cherishes nothing but opinions, and yet justice shall surely overcome forgers of lies and false witnesses." [1]

Parmenides said:

"Neither destruction doth justice permit, ne'er slackening her fetters." [2]

The Pythagoreans identified justice, soul, and reason with the eternal numbers. [3] Anaxagoras said "that reason was present—as in animals and throughout nature—as the cause of the world and of all its order." [4]

Among the Sophists themselves, who were usually considered as radicals against tradition, there were also some who held the traditional view. Prodicus, in his "Education of Heracles" as reported by Xenophon, represents virtue by the woman who

"was fair to look upon; frank and free by gift of nature, her limbs adorned with purity and her eyes with bashfulness; sobriety set the rhythm of her gait, and she was clad with white apparel."

[1] Bakewell, C. M., "Source Book in Ancient Philosophy," New York, 1907, p. 29.
[2] *Id.*, p. 15.
[3] Aristotle, "Metaphysics," 985 b, tr. by W. D. Ross, p. 23.
[4] *Id.*, 984 b, p. 15.

He represented happiness or "vice and naughtiness, as it is sometimes called" by the woman who

"was of a different type; the fleshly softness of her limbs betrayed her nurture, while the complexion of her skin was embellished that she might appear whiter and rosier than she really was, and her figure that she might seem taller than nature made her; she stared with wide-open eyes, and the raiment wherewith she was clad served but to reveal the ripeness of her bloom. With frequent glances she surveyed her person, or looked to see if others noticed her; while ever and anon she fixed her gaze upon the shadow intently."[1]

The meaning of this symbolism is clear. Virtue is natural and has the excellence of simplicity, spontaneity, and naturalness. Artificial pleasure is against nature and therefore is bad. There was also Hippias, who was reported by Plato as having said:

"All of you who are here present I reckon to be kinsmen and friends and fellow citizens, by nature and not by law; for by nature like is akin to like, whereas law is the tyrant of mankind, and often compels us to do many things which are against nature."[2]

The meaning here is also clear. Nature was originally good. It is law or convention that is responsible for the evils of this world.

The main body of the Sophists, however, seemed to hold the opposite view. Not nature, but man, said Protagoras, is the "measure of all things." Law, justice, and all the other virtues are but human arrangements, the productions of art, to improve the barbarian

[1] Xenophon, "Memorabilia," II, I, 21, in "Works," tr. by H. G. Dackyus, London, 1890.
[2] Plato, "Protagoras," 337 c.

state of nature. They are all to be taught through education. He was reported by Plato to have said:

"In like manner I would have you consider that he who appears to you to be the worst of those who have been brought up in laws and humanities, would appear to be a just man and a master of justice, if he were to be compared with a man who had no education, or courts of justice, or laws, or restraints upon them which compelled them to practice virtue."[1]

Thus he was very confident of civilization and progress. Besides Protagoras, there was also Gorgias. According to Benn, Georgias's three theses in his work "On Nature or Nothing" are to be applied to the great controversy of his time. They are simply the extreme form of the following statement:

"First, the state of nature does not exist; for such a state must be either variable or constant. If it is constant, how could civilization ever have arisen? If it is variable, what becomes the fixed standard appealed to? Second, supposing such a state ever to have existed, how could authentic information about it have come down to us through the ages of corruption which are supposed to have intervened? Third, granting that a state of nature accessible to inquiry has ever existed, how can we reorganize society on the basis of such discordant data as are presented to us by the physiocrats, no two of whom agree with regard to the first principle of natural order; one saying that it is equality, another aristocracy, and a third despotism?"[2]

This is certainly strong dialectic artillery brought against the state of nature.[3] Besides these two great Sophists,

1 Plato, "Protagoras," 327 d.
2 Benn, A., "The Greek Philosophers," Vol. I, p. 96.
3 Han Fei-tse, a disciple of Suen-tse, used the same arguments against those who admired the ancients.

we learn from Plato that Thrasymachus considered justice as the invention of the stronger,[1] while Callicles considered it as that of the weaker.[2] Although they did not agree as to who in particular invented justice, they did agree that it was the invention of man. It is nothing but human convention artificially made by man for his own expedience, and for his own expedience only. Whether they are right or not, these Sophists had the merit of pointing out the defects of the state of nature and the importance of the state of art. Plato, as a lover of nature, was alarmed by these radical propositions of the Sophists. He did not like them, but at the same time he was fully aware of the force of their arguments. At that time he simply could not consider the state of nature as such as our lost paradise. He was bound to put it still one step further in the past.

(2) How Plato Solved the Problem

We shall see the way in which Plato avoided trouble by analyzing two of his dialogues: the "Protagoras" and the "Meno." In the "Protagoras" we first meet the problem as to whether virtue can be taught or not. In the "Meno" the same problem appeared again, but in a different form. It was now in the following form:

> "Whether virtue is acquired by teaching or by practice; or if neither by teaching nor by practice, then whether it comes to man by nature, or in what other way?"[3]

[1] Plato, "The Republic," 338.
[2] Plato, "Gorgias," 483.
[3] Plato, "Meno," 70 c.

Or, more simply:

"Whether virtue comes by instruction, or by nature, or is gained in some other way?"[1]

Here we should notice that what comes by instruction is something that is alien to human nature, something that is to be acquired. So in the "Meno" Socrates spoke of the boy:

"If he has acquired knowledge he could not have acquired it in this life, unless he has been taught geometry."[2]

So what is acquired and what is to be taught amount to the same thing. What comes by nature needs not to be taught. At most it needs only to be brought into consciousness by the method of midwives, which Socrates exemplified in the "Meno," and of which he was always proud. Thus the problem as to whether virtue can be taught or not was at bottom the main problem as to whether virtue is natural or conventional. In the "Protagoras" no definite solution was reached. Plato was not willing to join Protagoras in declaring that virtue is nothing but the result of human convention; but he also could not say with Hippias that it comes to us by nature as such. This can be considered as Plato's attitude toward this problem of his time before he stated what is known as his theory of ideas. But in the "Meno" he succeeded in finding one way to solve the problem. In the "Meno," to the above question he answered:

[1] Plato, "Meno," 86 d.
[2] *Id.*, 85 d.

"To sum up our inquiry—the results seem to be, if we are at all right in our view, that virtue is neither natural nor acquired, but an instinct given by God to the virtuous. . . . Then, Meno, the conclusion is that virtue comes to the virtuous by the gift of God." [1]

Thus by this "some other way" the problem was at last solved. Under this solution, virtue still comes by nature, but not in the sense of *natura naturata*. It comes by nature in the sense of *natura naturans*. It does not come by the "nature" of modern or even of Aristotelian philosophy, but by nature conceived as some supreme and absolute reality which transcends the limit of space and time, and of which the governor is God Himself or the Good itself.

(3) The Theory of Previous Knowledge and the Theory of Ideas

The evidence of the existence of this ideal world is proved for Plato by his theory of previous knowledge. Before Plato developed his theory of ideas we know there was Socrates who, with what Aristotle called the method of "induction and universal definition," succeeded in giving a universal character and permanent basis to morality. Plato, in his early years, followed this method faithfully. In his early dialogues, he occupied himself exclusively with the definition of temperance, friendship, courage, etc. But in the "Phædo," he began to doubt whether the universal ideas could come from mere induction. The Platonic Socrates began

[1] Plato, "Meno," 99 c.

to point out that the same pieces of wood or stone appear at one time equal and at another time unequal, but the equals can never be unequal, nor can the idea of equality ever be unequal. How can the idea of absolute equality be gathered from the particular material things which are always "changing and hardly ever the same, either with themselves or with another?"[1] So it was concluded:

"We must have known absolute equality previous to the time when we first saw the material equals, and reflected that all these apparent equals aim at this absolute equality, but fall short of it."[2]

"We are not speaking only of equality absolute, but of beauty, good, justice, holiness, and all which we stamp with the name of essence in the dialectical process, when we ask and answer questions. Of all this we may certainly affirm that we acquired knowledge before birth?"[3]

So in the other world there must exist, not only absolute equality, but also absolute beauty, absolute good, absolute justice, absolute holiness, and all other things to which the term "many" is applied here in this world.[4] Thus the supreme world of which Good itself is the ruler, is in every way analogous to this world. The difference between them is that what here are many, there is one; the many are seen but not known, the one is known but not seen;[5] and the seen is the changing, and the unseen is

1 Plato, "Phædo," 78 d.
2 *Id.*, 75 a.
3 *Id.*, 75 d.
4 Plato, "The Republic," 507 a.
5 *Ibid.*

the unchanging.[1] Thus by projecting the Socratic essence into nature Plato succeeded in rediscovering our lost paradise, our "fatherland." Of all the states of this world, even the state of physical nature, not one is as good as we wish, because this world itself is a dreaming image of the waking reality, an imitation of the real. It is only the ideal world that contains all the perfect patterns, which all things in this world aim at, but fall short of. It is thither that we should return.

(4) The Two Worlds System

Thus Plato established the sharp distinction between the two worlds, the intellectual and the visible, the eternal and the temporal. So far as the written record of Western philosophy is concerned, Plato is credited with being the first to make this distinction. In "The Republic," Plato represented the two worlds by the following diagram:

The Visible World (Opinion)		The Intellectual World (Intellect)	
Images (Knowledge of the Shadows)	Sensible Things (Faith or Passion)	Scientific Notions (Understanding)	Absolute Ideas (Reason)

By images in the first section he meant "in the first place, shadows, and in the second place, reflections in water or in solid, smooth and polished bodies"; by

[1] Plato, "Phædo," 79 a.

sensible things in the second section, he meant "ourselves and animals and everything in nature, and everything in art."[1] There is no question about the meaning of these passages. But we may wonder as to whether in the world there are actually people who are really interested in the mere shadows of things or the knowledge of them. If, however, we compare these passages with others in the same dialogue, we see there is reason to suppose that by the shadows of things, Plato meant something more serious. In the latter part of "The Republic," Plato considered the production of fine art as the shadow of things. He said:

> "Here are three beds; one is natural, which, as I think we may say, is made by God. There is another which is the work of the carpenter. And the work of the painter is the third."[2]

The bed of the painter is not the real bed, but only its appearance. The painter, therefore,

> "is thrice removed from the king and the truth."[3]

Thus in the diagram the first section is really the place for productions of art, that is, the artificial things made by man. These passages show clearly that the productions of fine arts, literature, and poetry belong to this class. As to the productions of industrial or useful art, these passages show that in the sensible world they have the same standing as the natural things. Plato

[1] Plato, "The Republic," 510 a.
[2] *Id.*, 597 b.
[3] *Id.*, d.

now supposed that in the ideal world there are the ideas of even the table and the bed.

"And the maker of either of them makes a bed or he makes a table for our use in accordance with the idea."[1]

They have in the sensible world the same standing as the natural things, because they are all after the pattern of the eternal idea. But in another part of "The Republic," Plato did speak of "arts in general" and put them in the same category; for instance, he said:

"For the arts in general are referable to wants and opinions of men, or are cultivated for the sake of production and construction, or for the care of such productions or constructions; and as to the mathematical arts which, as we were saying, have some apprehension of true being—geometry and the like—they only dream about being, but never can they behold the waking reality so long as they leave the hypothesis they use undisturbed, and are unable to give an account of them. For when a man knows not his own first principle, and when the conclusion and the intermediate steps are also constructed out of he knows not what, how can he imagine that such an arbitrary agreement will ever become science"?[2]

This shows that arts in general and what we now call the scientific notions are all human creations. They are either human constructions or arbitrary agreements. The difference between them is that the one deals with things, while the other with ideas,—that is all. For this reason, in the diagram the relation between scientific notions and absolute ideas is just the same as that

[1] Plato, "The Republic," 596 b.
[2] *Id.*, 533 b.

between the images and sensible things. For this reason the painter is *only* "*thrice* removed from the king and the truth."

Of course, we do not claim that Plato thought of his two worlds system always in this way. Like William James of our own time, Plato was after all anything but self-consistent. Our interpretation would be justified, if only sometimes he did think in this way. But whether our interpretation is correct or not, the sharp distinction of the two worlds is clear. On the one hand, there is the world of sense, full of the sensible things, with the sun as the author of sensibility, nourishment, and growth. On the other hand, there is the world of intellect, full of ideas, essences, with the idea of Good as the author of knowledge and of the essences, although the Good itself "is not essence, but far exceeds essences in dignity and power."[1] Thus, all things in that world must be as perfect as they should be, since by definition they are the very essences. The power that governs that world can never be bad, since by definition, it is the Good. Consequently that world can never fall short of our ideal, since by definition it is the ideal. So there is not the smallest room left for any one to doubt the perfection of our lost paradise.

(5) Soul and Body

As the macrocosm consists of these two distinct parts, in the same way the microcosm consists also of two parts: the soul and the body.

[1] Plato, "The Republic," 509 b.

"The soul is the very likeness of the divine, and immortal, and intelligible, and uniform, and indestructible and unchangeable, and the body is the very likeness of the human, and mortal, and unintelligible, and ununiform, and destructible and changeable."[1]

According to this passage, the relation between the soul and the body is exactly like that relationship existing between the intelligible and the sensible world. Soul is pure and divine, and is always ready to fly to its "fatherland." This is the general idea expounded in the "Phædo." But if we compare the "Phædo" with other dialogues, there are certain difficulties in ascertaining the exact nature of the soul. According to Archer-Hind, "the difficulties are two: (1) in the 'Phædo' soul is simple, in the 'Phædrus,' 'The Republic,' and 'Timæus,' it is triform." These difficulties Archer-Hind solved in the following manner:

(1) "The apparent discrepancy between the 'Phædo' and the 'Philebus' is reconciled. In the one, desires are ascribed to body, because arising from the conjunction of soul and body; in the other they are more accurately ascribed to soul, because they are affections of soul through body. (2) The argument of the 'Phædo' is entirely unaffected by the threefold division. All soul is simple, uniform, and indestructible; but in connection with body it assumes certain phases which are temporary and only exist in relation to the body. Thus though the desire and the appetite as such are not immortal, because they depend for their continuance upon body, which is mortal, yet the vital principle, which under such conditions assumes these forms, is immortal and continues to exist, though not necessary in the same mode. For the mode in which vital force acts

[1] Plato, "Phædo," 80 b.

under temporary conditions are transitory, but the acting force itself is changeless and eternal."[1]

Thus " the soul when it enters into union with matter is forced more or less to operate through matter,"[2] and the names given to this combined action of soul and matter are " desire " and " appetite."

This solution seems to be very satisfactory, but is not so in fact. If soul is really uniform in itself, and if desires and appetites are but forms of the operation of soul through body, it follows that when death, which is " the natural separation and release of the soul from body, "[3] comes, the desire and appetite will automatically cease to be, since there is no longer body for the soul to operate through. But this is not Plato's idea. According to him, only those souls that have been purified and released from evils by philosophy[4] can " depart to the indivisible; to the divine and immortal and rational,"[5] but the impure soul that " is engrossed by the corporeal, which the association and constant care of the body have made natural to her," is different.[6] By virtue of the " heavy, earthly element of sight, such a soul is depressed and dragged down again into the visible world, because she is afraid of the invisible and of the world below. " So these souls continue " to

1 "The Journal of Philology," Vol. X, London, 1882, pp. 130, 131. The Greek words which Archer-Hind quoted in this passage are here changed into their English equivalents.
2 *Id.*, p. 127.
3 Plato, " Phædo " 67 b.
4 *Id.*, 84 d.
5 *Id.*, 81 a.
6 *Id.*, b.

wander until the desire which haunts them is satisfied and they are imprisoned in another body."[1] Thus, death, though it may be the natural separation of soul from body, is far from the natural release of the soul from desire. Only through philosophy, which is somewhat ascetic, can the soul be free and pure. It follows that the soul does have desires itself before it joins the body. Indeed, if she has no desires at all, there is no reason why she must join the body. According to the "Phædrus" it is exactly through the misbehavior of the "dark horse" that the soul "drooping in her flight at last settles on the solid ground—there, finding a home, she receives an earthly frame which appears to be self-moved, but is really moved by her power, and this composition of soul and body is called living and mortal creature."[2]

That the soul has three parts before she joins the body is thus obvious. It is possible that when Plato spoke of the soul as simple, he meant the soul as a whole, just as we say a man is a man. When he spoke of the soul as consisting of three parts, he meant the fact that she has three parts, just as we say a man has one head and two arms. Here we should remember that Plato's ideal world is in every way analogous to this world. The only difference between them is that there everything is ideal; here everything falls short of the ideal. The inhabitants in this world are men; those in the ideal

[1] Plato, "Phædo," 81 b.
[2] Plato, "Phædrus," 246 b.

world are gods and the pure souls; gods and souls are ideal men, while men are short of the ideal. Now the ideal man, according to Greek ideas, is not he who has no desires, but rather he who can subordinate them under the control of reason or mind that is not only the lord of the body, but also the lord of the soul.[1] Therefore, the gods and the pure souls, besides the charioteer, do have a pair of winged horses. Only that "the winged horses and the charioteer of the gods are all of them noble, and of noble breed, while ours [the souls] are 'mixed.'"[2] But the souls that are most like the gods can keep the "self-balance,"[3] and manage to follow the gods in the great review of absolute beauty and absolute good. But those souls which fail to keep the "dark horse" in balance, thereby fall short of the ideal, and therefore "gravitate and incline and sink toward the earth, and this is the hour of great agony and extreme conflict of the soul."[4] This is the story of the "fall" of mankind. The antithesis of soul and body in the "Phædo" is still valid, because body itself is the realization or the objectification of the soul's "dark horse." As long as the "dark horse" gains the upper hand, the soul always "is in love with and fascinated by the body, and by the desires and the pleasures of the body, until she is led to believe that the truth exists only in a bodily form, which a man may touch and see and taste and use for the purposes

1 Plato, "Phædrus," 247 b.
2 *Id.*, 246 a.
3 *Id.*, 247 a.
4 *Ibid.*

of his lusts."[1] In this state the bodily desires and pleasures may be said to belong both to the body and to the soul; so there is no contradiction between the "Phædo" and the "Philebus." In this state the soul is bound to be born again and again "beneath the throne of necessity."[2] "Those who have chosen the portion of injustice, and tyranny, and violence, will pass into wolves, or hawks, or kites.[3] There is no end of this evolution or revolution, until the souls receive their purification and release from philosophy and are thus enabled to return to their old place in the company of the gods. This seems to be the meaning of the myths described in the end of the "Phædo" and "The Republic." Although the myths themselves are not exactly true, yet "something of that kind is true."[4] What is that something, if not what has been said above?

(6) Love and Philosophy

So, Plato, in the first part of "The Republic," considered the harmonization of the three parts of mind as its best state, because it *is* the best state of the soul when she is in company with the gods. It should be striven for, because it *is* the ideal. But since the body is itself the self-realization or the objectification of the "dark horse," so, as long as the soul is imprisoned in the body, the ideal harmonization of the horses and their ruler can

1 Plato, "Phædo," 81 b.
2 Plato, "The Republic," 621 a.
3 Plato, "Phædo," 82 a.
4 *Id.*, 114 d.

never be fully realized. The man, as long as he is the combination of soul and body, must always strive for the ideal, but always falls short of it and does not attain it. This is the eternal law of this world.

For everything existent here in this world, even justice and virtue, are after all but the dreaming image of waking reality. Therefore, Plato, after expounding his theory of justice in the first half of "The Republic," said: "There is a knowledge still higher than these, higher than justice and other virtues."[1] Thus the moral qualities as exhibited in self-cultivation or social relations in this world, no matter how perfect they are, are but the appearance or imitation of the absolute ideas just as other things in this world. But what the souls like to behold and to feed upon is "justice, temperance, and knowledge absolute, not in the form of generation or of relation, which men call existence, but knowledge absolute in existence absolute."[2] To those who have "seen the absolute justice," the human virtue and the law of the courts are but "images or shadows of images of justice."[3] Therefore those who are "intelligent" and have "the recollection of those things which our soul once saw when in company with god,"[4] can never be satisfied with the beings of this world, at which they were "looking down from above,"[5] during that time.

[1] Plato, "The Republic," 504 d.
[2] Plato, "Phædrus," 247 d.
[3] Plato, "The Republic," 517 d.
[4] Plato, "Phædrus," 249 b.
[5] *Ibid.*

"And therefore the mind of the philosopher alone has wings: and this is just, for he is always, according to the measure of his abilities, clinging in recollection to those things in which God abides, and in beholding which He is what He is. And he who employs aright these memories is ever being initiated into perfect mysteries and alone becomes truly perfect. But, as he forgets the earthly interests and is rapt in the divine, the vulgar deem him mad, and rebuke him; they do not see that he is inspired."[1]

This striving for the eternal is the spirit called love. This is the spirit that "intermediates between the divine and the mortal," the "power that spans the chasm which divides them, and in this all is bound together."[2] In fact, this is the spirit that Plato devised to connect his two eternally separated worlds.

The soul, when she is "dragged by the body into the region of the changeable,"[3] is always craving for return to herself.

"When returning to herself she reflects; then she passes into the realm of purity, and eternity, and immortality, and unchangeableness, which are her kindred, and with them she ever lives when she is by herself and is not let or hindered; then she ceases from her erring ways, and being in communion with the unchanging is unchanging. And this state of the soul is called wisdom."[4]

Wisdom is the best and also the original state of the soul. Philosophy is the love of wisdom.

[1] Plato, "Phædrus," 249 c.
[2] Plato, "Symposium," 202 d.
[3] Plato, "Phædo," 79 c.
[4] *Ibid.*

(7) Conversion

Wisdom and philosophy are not things; the former is a state, the latter is a process. Philosophy is "the process" which "is not the spinning round of an oyster shell, but the conversion of a soul out of darkness visible to the real ascent of the true being."[1] "The sort of knowledge that has the power of affecting this"[2] includes all the sciences that can "excite thought,"[3] and turn the soul from the sensation concrete to notions abstract. These sciences are after all but the handmaids and helpers of the soul in the work of conversion.[4] Only with the power of the dialectic, is the whole soul "turned from the world of generation into that of being, and becomes able to endure the sight of being, and of the brightest and the best of being—that is to say, of the good."[5] Then, and not until then, are the absolutes not only known, but actually "seen by the eyes of the soul."[6] "This is conversion."[7]

(8) The Difficulties of the Theory of Ideas

But exactly how the logical notion of science can be transformed into the insight or intuition of the objective ideas, Plato did not make clear. Even if scientific notions can excite thought and can thus refresh our memory and recall the ideas that we had when our souls

1 Plato, "The Republic," 521 c.
2 *Ibid.*
3 *Id.*, 523 b.
4 *Id.*, 533 c.
5 *Id.*, 518 c.
6 *Id.*, 517 d.
7 *Id.*, 518 c.

were in company with the gods, yet the memory of a thing is still far from the actual insight or intuition of it. Having projected Socrates' definition into a world of ideal reality, Plato thought they could still be reached with the Socratic method of induction and definition, that is, the method of science, but he forgot that his ideas were no longer merely logical notions or the definitions or the general characters of things. With the method of science, the ideas may be known, but can never be seen. So he was compelled to fall back on another method which he called dialectic. But how are we able to transfer from scientific method to the dialectic method? In the "Parmenides," Parmenides said:

> " And the subjective notions in our mind, which have the same name with them [ideas], are likewise only relative to one another and not to the ideas which have the same name with them, and belong to themselves and not to the ideas. "[1]

This criticism seems to be fatal to the theory in " The Republic " that the study of science can lead man to conversion. But this is only one of the many difficulties that confound Plato's theory of ideas. According to the " Parmenides," the difficulties are threefold: first, in regard to the ideal world itself; second, to the relation between the ideal and the phenomenal world; third, to the possibility of knowing the ideas. Having mentioned the third difficulty above, we will now discuss the first and the second. Plato, being disappointed by the sensible world, tried to project the notions of science

[1] Plato, "Parmenides, " 133 d.

into heaven and thereby establish the ideal world. According to the "Phædo" and "The Republic," in the ideal world there are ideas of all things, of which we have general notions and general names. In fact, the existence of the general name of a thing in this world is the very proof of the existence of the idea of that thing in the ideal world. But if this is so, it follows that in the ideal world there are not only absolute beauty and absolute good, but also absolute ugliness and absolute bad, since in this world we have the general notion of both of them. It follows also that the ideal world is even worse than this world, since the absolute ugliness and the absolute bad must be much more ugly and much worse than the particular things in this world, and must be eternal and unchangeable. If we say in the ideal world there is no ugliness or badness, on what ground are they denied the privilege of being there? How can we have the general notions and general names of these qualities if our souls have no previous experience of them? These are the difficulties in regard to the ideal world itself. In the "Parmenides," Socrates is represented as being sure about the existence of the ideas of the just, the beautiful, and the good, but doubtful about that of the ideas of human creatures, or of fire and water, and felt it absurd to assume an idea of hair, mud, dirt, or anything else that is foul and base.[1] Socrates said that this confusion and uncertainty always caused him to be "disturbed" and to "run away." How can the

[1] Plato, "Parmenides," 130 b.

ideal world be ideal, if there are still things that are foul and base? But on what ground can we exclude them from the ideal world, since in this world we do have the general notions just as well as those of the beautiful and the good?

Granting the existence of the ideal world, we still have to ask: "What is the relation between the ideal and this phenomenal world, or the relation between the one and the many?" If the many are so and so by partaking the one of so and so, then the one is subject to division and is no longer one. If the many are so and so by imitating the one of so and so, then before the many imitate the one, they must first imitate the idea of likeness. In order to imitate the idea of likeness, they must imitate another idea of likeness by virtue of which they can be like the first idea of likeness, and so on *ad infinitum*. Thus with the third difficulty in regard to the possibility of knowing the ideas, the theory of ideas was attacked from three sides. Whether Plato made these criticisms against himself or whether he simply mentioned the opinion of his contemporaries, is a question still to be answered. Anyway, these are the difficulties of the theory of ideas.

Whether or not Plato had any "later theory of ideas" as interpreted by Jackson we need not decide here. But it is significant that Plato, in his later dialogues, became gradually silent about the theory of ideas. In the "Laws" he gave it up altogether, and fell back to find in nature the norm and guidance of human conduct and the justification of moral law. In the "Laws," he employed the

phrases "according to nature" and "follow nature" more frequently than in all the other dialogues put together.[1] He spoke of the conditions of primitive men as simple, brave, temperate, and just, and represented them with a picture not much different from Chuang-tse's. In one place he reiterated the doctrine that he fought against, the doctrine of the Sophists:

"The doctrine that all things which are, or have been, or will be, exist, some by nature, some by art, and some by chance. . . . In the first place, my dear friend, they would say that gods exist neither by nature nor by art, but only by the laws of states, which are different in different places, according to the agreement of those who made them; and that the honorable in one thing by nature and another thing by law, and that the principles of justice have no existence at all in nature, but that mankind are always disputing about them and altering them; and that the alterations which are made by art and by law have no basis in nature, but are of authority for the moment and at that time at which they are made: these, my friends, are the sayings of wise men, poets, and prose writers, which find a way into the minds of young men."[2]

Against this doctrine Plato took a new position. After making a statement of "the nature and power of the soul," he said:

"Then thought and care, and mind and art, and law will be prior to that which is hard and soft, and heavy and light; and the great and primitive works and actions will be works of art; they will be the first, and after them will come nature and the works of nature, which, however, is a wrong word to apply to them; these will follow and be under the government of art and mind."[3]

[1] Benn, "The Idea of Nature in Plato," in "Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie," Vol. IX, 1896, p. 39.
[2] Plato, "Laws," 889, 890.
[3] *Id.*, 892 c.

Thus nature, art, and the laws are all the manufacture of soul, mind, and reason. This position is quite near Kant's theory of the autonomy of practical reason; and by taking this Plato was near what we call the third line of thought, which is the reconciliation of nature and art.

(9) Concluding Remarks

It must be stated again that all the philosophic systems analyzed and criticized in this work are considered, not as something unique in themselves, but rather as representative types of thought. Plato represents one type of thought to which, among others, belongs Christianity; and Schopenhauer, the next philosopher we are going to consider, represents one type, to which belongs Buddhism. Christianity belongs to the type of thought represented by Plato, because the God of Christianity is an idea to which many other absolute ideas are attributed. He is definitely an eternal, all-wise, all-good, and all-powerful God. Besides, the "City of God" is also sharply opposed to the city on earth. The two worlds are so sharply opposed that the chasm between them is even more impassable than that in Plato's system. Thus the difficulties that confound the Platonic system also confound the Christian system. Their ideal world is entirely in the category of reason and thus liable to fall into the antinomy of reason. In the history of Western philosophy, for instance, there is no end to the controversy about the existence and the attributes of

God. There have been the arguments known as the ontological proof, the cosmological proof, and the physico-theological proof. But the ontological proof can be turned to prove that God is a mere concept; the cosmological proof that God himself must have a cause; and the physico-theological proof that God, if He exists at all, must be an artist poor and weak. After the Renaissance, Christianity gradually lost its universal influence which it had in the Middle Ages. In the eighteenth century, which is a time of rationalism, Christianity was much questioned and attacked. Finally came the skepticism of Hume, in which soul was regarded as a mere bundle of sensation and God as a mere word. At this, Kant was greatly alarmed. In the history of Western philosophy, to Kant belongs the merit of pointing out definitely and systematically that immortality, freedom, the existence of God, and the state of the highest good, which is the union of happiness and virtue, can never be proved by pure reason, but can only be indicated to us by the practical reason of morality. But having no other sources of inspiration besides that of the Western world, Kant did not change the nature of the nonphenomenal world, although he had been convinced that that world could not be known by our pure reason. In the Western world it remains for Schopenhauer to introduce the Hindu wisdom and thus to teach that our lost paradise is not only beyond sense, but also beyond thought. It is not only the unseen, but also the unthinkable.

CHAPTER IV

NIHILISM: SCHOPENHAUER

Here is the difference between Buddhism and Christianity. Christianity tries in every way to tell what God is; while Buddhism tries in every way to tell what the "Suchness" is not. The Buddhists spoke much about the phenomenal world. When they said all that could be said about the phenomenal, they told us that the "Suchness" or the nonphenomenal world was not all these things. If one wants to return to the "Suchness," one must first get rid of all these things. When all these things have been got rid of, the "Suchness" will come out itself. As we shall see, this is exactly the procedure adopted by Schopenhauer.

(1) The Origin of His Philosophy

Since we have just discussed the general scheme of Plato's philosophy and the difficulties that confound it, for the sake of convenience we shall here treat Schopenhauer's philosophy as a continuation of Plato's with some improvement gained from Kant and the Hindus. Our doing so is justified by the fact that all these influences played important rôles in Schopenhauer's system. He said himself that, next to the impressions of the world of perception, he owed what is best in his system to the

impression made upon him by the works of Kant, by the sacred writings of the Hindus, and by Plato.[1] We shall see that with the suggestions of the Hindus, Schopenhauer succeeded in finding out the origin and the defects of the world of absolute Ideas ; [2] and with the suggestions of Kant he succeeded in putting into definite terms the relation between the real and the phenomenal world. Of course I do not mean that when Schopenhauer worked on his philosophy, he must have had in mind the solution of the difficulties that confound Plato's theory of Ideas as pointed out in the "Parmenides." But it is peculiar that according to his interpretation of the Platonic theory of Ideas, all the above-mentioned difficulties disappeared immediately. This perhaps shows that the difficulties were real ones, not simply pieces of sophistry manufactured for the sake of argument. So when the theory itself improved, its difficulties vanished as a matter of course.

(2) What the Platonic Ideas Are

We have learned from the above discussions that one of the chief difficulties in maintaining the existence of the world of Ideas is that we shall be compelled to admit into that world the Idea of things that we consider as bad. Besides the absolute bad and the absolute ugliness, the Idea of "lion" must be more fierce than the particular "lion," and the idea of "serpent" must

[1] Schohenhauer, "The World as Will and Idea," tr. by R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp, London, 1909, Vol II, p. 5.

[2] In this chapter the word "Idea" with a capital "I" indicates the Platonic "Idea."

be more terrible than the particular serpent. Consequently the world above is not only not better, but is even worse than the world here below. No wonder that Socrates in the "Parmenides," in thinking of this, became "disturbed" and wanted to "run away." But according to Schopenhauer, it is true that there is the world of Ideas, but it is wrong to consider it as the ideal world. The main thesis of Schopenhauer's philosophy is well represented by the title of his chief work: "The World as Will and Idea." The outside appearance of the world, the phenomenon, is the idea; the inner nature of the world, the thing-in-itself, is will. Will is the always wishing for and the striving after, the "eternal becoming and the endless flux."[1] For it, "every attained end is also the beginning of a new course, and so on *ad infinitum*."[2] In this endless striving the will always objectifies itself. "These grades of the objectification of Will, I say, are simply Plato's Ideas."[3]

From the lowest grades of the objectification of will such as the force of gravity[4] and other forces of nature up to the higher grades, such as plants and animals,[5] every grade is an Idea representing one species. Notwithstanding that the will itself is an endless flux, these different grades of the objectification of will remain

[1] Schopenhauer, "The World as Will and Idea," Vol. I, p. 214.
[2] *Ibid.*
[3] *Id.*, p. 168.
[4] *Id.*, p. 169.
[5] *Id.*, p. 170.

fixed, and are subject to no change; they are always being, but never becoming. They are the unattained types or the eternal forms of the innumerable individuals that arise and pass away, always become, and never are.[1] All the individuals of one species strive for the Idea, and collectively express the whole of the Idea.[2]

All their activities, events, and characteristics, except their individuality and multiplicity, which are the production of the principle of sufficient reason, are all the expression or manifestation of their fixed type, that is, the Idea. They "have significance only so far as they are letters out of which we may read the Idea, but not in and for themselves." Take the case of man, about which Schopenhauer said:

"In the manifold forms of human life and in the unceasing change of the events, he [who can distinguish between the will and the Idea and its manifestation] will regard the Idea only as the abiding and the eternal, in which the will to live has its full objectivity, and which shows its different side in the capacities, the passions, the errors, and the excellences of the human race; its self-interest, hatred, love, fear, boldness, frivolity, stupidity, shyness, wit, genius, and so forth, all of which crowding together and combining in thousands of forms (individuals), continually create the history of the great and the little world, in which it is all the same, whether they are set in motion by nuts or by crowns."[3]

Such is the Idea of man and so are the Ideas of all things. All things in this phenomenal world are full of errors and mistakes because their Ideas are full of errors

[1] Schopenhauer, "The World as Will and Idea," Vol. I, p. 168.
[2] *Id.*, p. 172.
[3] *Id.*, pp. 236, 237.

and mistakes. Their Ideas are full of errors and mistakes, because the will, of which the Ideas are objectifications, is in itself a great error and a fundamental mistake.

(3) The Relation Between the Idea and the Individual

Now we come to the question, What is the relation between the Idea and its expression? or, What is the relation between the one and the many? Is it one of participation, or one of imitation, or neither of them? According to Schopenhauer, the multiplicity of the individuals is only the Idea as it appears to us. They are the phenomena, the representations, the ideas, or objects existing for the knowing subjects. Following the example of Kant, Schopenhauer supposed that there existed the *a priori* forms of knowledge, or what Schopenhauer called the principle of sufficient reason. The most universal forms of these are time and space. Everything to be known must be known through these mediums.

> "For it is only through the mediums of time and space that what is one and the same, both according to its nature and its concept, yet appears as different, as a multiplicity of coexistent and successive phenomena."[1]

> "Multiplicity in general is necessarily conditioned by space and time, and is only thinkable in them. In this respect they are called the *principium individuationis*."[2]

Thus the multiplicity of things is nothing but the manifestations through time and space of Ideas which are

[1] Schopenhauer, "The World as Will and Idea," Vol. I, p. 146.
[2] *Id.*, p. 166.

the objectification of the will. In the lower grades of its objectification, the will acts only as a blind, obscure, striving force. But as it attained to the higher grades, it "kindled for itself a light as a means"[1] to guide itself. This light is consciousness or knowledge. By this means,

"the world as idea comes into existence at a stroke, with all its forms, object and subject, time, space, multiplicity, and causality. The world now shows its second side. Till now mere will, it becomes also idea, object of the knowing subject."[2]

"We may, for the sake of simplicity, regard these different Ideas [the Platonic Ideas] as in themselves individual and simple acts of the will, in which it expresses its nature more or less. Individuals, however, are again manifestations of the Ideas, thus of acts, in time, space, and multiplicity."[3]

Thus to use an expression of Plato, the multiplied individuals are "thrice removed from the king and the truth."

The question may be asked: Why must knowledge have these forms? Following the example of Kant, Schopenhauer considered them as simply *a priori* and gave no clear and definite explanation. But the explanation he would give is not difficult to find. The general trend of his philosophy is to reduce everything, and ultimately the principle of sufficient reason, to will. Knowledge, in general, belongs to the objectification of will at its higher grades. Originally and according to its nature, knowledge is completely subject to will.

[1] Schopenhauer, "The World as Will and Idea," Vol. I, p. 196.
[2] *Ibid.*
[3] *Id.*, p. 202.

Its function is to serve the will, not to discover truth. Consequently it knows nothing but what interests the will. As Schopenhauer said:

"Therefore, the knowledge, which is subject to the will, knows nothing further of the objects than their relations, knows the objects only in so far as they exist at this time, in this space, under these circumstances, from these causes, and with these effects—in a word as particular things; and if all these relations were to be taken away, the objects would also have to disappear for it, because it knows nothing more about them."[1]

From this passage we can see that knowledge must be accompanied by the principle of sufficient reason, because knowledge, in order to serve the striving will, must know things, not in their pure objectivity, but only in their utility to the will on this or that occasion. The fact that they must see things as multiplied individuals is simply for the sake of convenience, and is a matter of practical, rather than logical, necessity.

(4) The Transcendental Knowledge

Anyway, by the very existence of knowledge, we are confined to the phenomenal world. The "Mâyâ," the veil of deception, blinds the eyes of mortals,[2] and makes them behold not the Ideas, but only the ideas, their appearances in time and space. Is there some way by which we can transcend the veil? We have seen that Plato considered the practice of science as the beginning,

[1] Schopenhauer, "The World as Will and Idea," Vol. I, p. 229.
[2] *Id.*, p. 9.

at least, of the royal way to the world of Ideas. But according to Schopenhauer science is but knowledge in its systematic form. What science considers in things is also "their relations, the connections of time and space, the causes of natural changes, the resemblance of forms, the motives of actions—thus merely relation."[1] The utility of science is to facilitate knowledge "by the comprehension of all particulars in universal, by means of subordination of concepts, and the completeness of knowledge which is thereby attained."[2] If it is precisely because of knowledge that we see the original one as the phenomenal many, how can science help us to transcend the "Mâyâ," the deceptive veil? Science and knowledge, in general, are after all but "immanent knowledge."[3] The more complete they are, the firmer and the more permanent is the veil.

But there is one way in which "transcendental knowledge," as opposed to immanent knowledge, can be attained. As shown above, knowledge must view things through the principle of sufficient reason, because only by so doing can it serve the will. It is the will that forces the knowledge to see things through the *principium individuationis*.

"If, raised by the power of mind, a man relinquishes the common way of looking at things, under the guidance of the forms of the principle of sufficient reason, their relation to each other, the final goal of which is always a relation to

[1] Schopenhauer, "The World as Will and Idea," Vol. I, p. 229.
[2] *Ibid.*
[3] *Id.*, p. 224.

its own will; if he thus ceases to consider the where, the when, the why, and the whither of things, and looks simply and solely at the what; if, further, he does not allow the abstract thought, the concepts of the reason, to take possession of his consciousness, but, instead of all this, gives the whole power of his mind to perception, sinks himself entirely in this, and lets his whole consciousness be filled with quiet contemplation of the natural objects actually present, whether a landscape, a tree, a mountain, a building, or whatever it may be; in as much as he *loses* himself in the object (to use a pregnant German idiom), i. e., forgets even his individuality, his will, and only continues to exist as the pure subject, the clear mirror of the object, so that it is as if the object alone were there without any one to perceive it, and he can no longer separate the perceiver from the perception, but both have become one, because the whole consciousness is filled and occupied with one sensuous picture; if thus the object has to such an extent passed out of all relation to something outside it, and the object out of all relation to the will, then that which is so known, is no longer the particular thing as such, but is the Idea, the eternal form, the immediate objectivity of the will at this grade; and, therefore, he who is sunk in this perception is no longer individual, for in such perception the individual man has lost himself; but is pure, will-less, painless, timeless, subject of knowledge."[1]

Thus in this perception the principle of sufficient reason is at last transcended. The principle of sufficient reason is nothing but the connection of the object with its subject.[2] How can there still be that principle, when the distinction between the subject and the object no longer exists? So in this perception, there is but one, — the Idea.

(5) The Works of Love

There is another way, however, through which we can transcend the forms of knowledge, the *principium*

[1] Schopenhauer, "The World as Will and Idea," Vol. I, p. 231.
[2] Schopenhauer, "Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason," tr. by Hillebrand, London, 1910, p. 30.

individuationis. It is by works of love, or in other words, by the enlargement of heart. Both love and heart belong to the category of feeling ; and feeling, according to Schopenhauer, is directly opposite to rational knowledge, which is to serve the will.[1] However closely the veil of "Mâyâ" may envelop the mind of man and thus make him regard his person as absolutely different, and separated by a wide gulf from others,[2] yet he can seldom witness the suffering of others without being moved. That all men have the feeling of sympathy is an established fact. Even the wicked man, in the inmost depths of consciousness, has also an inward horror at his own deeds, at the suffering that he himself has inflicted upon others. This is known as the feeling of remorse.[3] How can this be, if it is not due to the fact that however much time and space may separate him from other individuals and the innumerable miseries which they suffer, yet in the inmost depths of his consciousness, there is a dim foreboding that, apart from the Idea and its forms, it is the one will to live appearing in them all?[4] The bad man, the egoist, is grasped tightly enough by the *principium individuationis* so that he makes the sharp distinction between his own ego and that of others, and, disregarding the sting of conscience, inflicts sufferings upon others for the increase of his

1 Schopenhauer, "The World as Will and Idea," Vol. I, p. 68.
2 *Id.*, p. 471.
3 *Id.*, p. 474.
4 *Id.*, p. 472.

own happiness or pleasure. But to the man who is voluntarily just, that is, just and virtuous, not to obey law or dogma, but to follow the trend of his own inner heart, the distinction between his own ego and that of others is not so significant.

"The *principium individuationis*, the form of the phenomenon, no longer holds him so tightly in its grasp. . . . He sees the distinction between himself and others, which to the bad man is so great a gulf, as only belonging to a fleeting and illusive phenomenon. He recognizes directly and without reasoning, that the in-itself of his own manifestation is also that of others,—the will to live, which constitutes the inner nature of everything and lives in all; indeed, this applies also to the brutes and the whole of nature, and therefore he will not cause suffering even to the brutes. . . . For to him who does works of love, the veil of Mâyâ is transparent, the illusion of the *principium individuationis* has left him. . . . To be cured of this illusion and the deception of Mâyâ, and the works of love, are one and the same. . . . By this the heart is enlarged, as by egoism it is contracted."[1]

Thus by the enlargement of the heart, the *principium individuationis* is transcended, just as by the purification of knowledge. We may also say that the transcendental knowledge gained by the works of love is superior to that gained by the works of art. In the latter we can see only the Idea, but in the former we can further realize that all Ideas are after all but one and the same.

(6) Eternal Justice

As to the happiness that these two kinds of works give us, that which comes through the works of love is

[1] Schopenhauer, "The World as Will and Idea," Vol. I, pp. 481, 482.

also superior to, and more endurable than that which comes through the works of art. The artist, in the contemplation of the pure object, in the representation of it into copies, surely for the time being can get rid of the tyranny of the will, and thus transcend the veil of deception. But that is only for the flashing moment. His work does not become to him a permanent "quieter of will"; it does not deliver him forever from life, but only at moments, and is therefore not for him a path out of life, but only an occasional consolation in it.[1] But he who does the works of love, will be forever free of the *principium individuationis*. Through the diminution of the interest in his own self, the anxious care for self is attacked from the very root. Hence the peace, the evenness, the serenity, the friendly and inner relation between himself and the universe, which he can never fail to possess. This is the happiness that almost all religions claim to produce. Not a few of them consider it as the supreme felicity, as the place to stop. Plato, as we have seen, thought that the ultimate reality had been reached, and the highest happiness gained, when the ascending soul saw no longer the many, but only the one; no longer, for instance, the individual men, but the Idea of Man, of which the phenomenal humanity is the dreaming image.

But according to Schopenhauer, the case is quite different. Although the permanent insight into the fact

[1] Schopenhauer, "The World as Will and Idea," Vol. I, p. 346.

that his own nature is in all beings in this world gives the good man a certain evenness, and serenity of disposition, yet the intuitive knowledge of the common lot of mankind and of the world in general does not make this disposition a joyful one.[1] As pointed out above, the phenomenal world is full of error and mistakes not only because it is phenomenal, but also because the will, the root of the world, is itself a great error and a fundamental mistake. As Schopenhauer said :

"Accordingly with perfect right every being supports existence in general, and also the existence of its species, and its peculiar individuality, entirely as it is, and in circumstances as they are, in a world such as it is, swayed by chance and error, transient, ephemeral, and constant suffering ; and in all that it experiences, or indeed can experience, it always gets its due. For the will belongs to it ; as the will is, so is the world. Only the world itself can bear the responsibility of its own existence—no other ; for by what means could another have assumed it ? Do we desire to know what men, morally considered, are worth as a whole and in general, we have only to consider their fate as a whole and in general. This is want, wretchedness, affliction, misery, and death. Eternal justice reigns. If they were not, as a whole, worthless, then fate, as a whole, would not be so sad. In this sense we may say the world itself is the judgment of the world. If we could lay all the miseries of the world in one scale of the balance, and all the guilt of the world in the other, the needle would certainly point to the center."[2]

Those who are enveloped by the veil of "Mâyâ" may seek comforts and consolation in the happiness and joy that chance or prudence may bring to them. But

[1] Schopenhauer, "The World as Will and Idea," Vol. I, p. 483.
[2] *Id.*, pp. 453, 454.

"a man who recognizes in all beings his own inmost and true self, must also regard the infinite suffering of all suffering beings as his own, and take on himself the pains of the whole world. He knows the whole, comprehends its nature, and finds that it consists in constant passing away, vain striving, inward conflict, and continual suffering. He sees wherever he looks the suffering humanity, the suffering brute creation, and the world that passes away."[1]

"For the knowledge that sees through the *principium individuationis*, a happy life in time, the gift of chance or won by prudence, amid the sorrows of innumerable others, is only the dream of the beggar in which he is the king, but from which he must awake and learn from experience that only a fleeting illusion had separated him from the suffering of his life."[2]

According to Plato, when we reach the world of Ideas we shall see that suffering is relevant only to the world below. But according to Schopenhauer, the transition from the phenomenal to the ideal world only makes us realize that happiness is a real illusion and suffering is a solid reality. The essential of all life is suffering.[3] The justification of the suffering is that the will always asserts itself; and the assertion is justified and balanced by the fact that the will bears the suffering.[4] This is the eternal justice.

(7) The "Nothing"

Now what shall we do for the world? Shall we try to improve it, hoping that the supreme happiness and

[1] Schopenhauer, "The World as Will and Idea," Vol. I, p. 489.
[2] *Id.*, p. 456.
[3] *Id.*, p. 401.
[4] *Id.*, p. 427.

ultimate good may be attained in the future? But, as Schopenhauer said:

"Absolute good is a contradiction in term; highest good, *summum bonum*, really signifies the same thing—a final satisfaction of the will. . . . But . . . the will can just as little cease from willing altogether on account of some particular satisfaction as time can end and begin; for it there is no such thing as a permanent fulfillment which shall completely and forever satisfy its craving."[1]

If there is will, there is want; if there is want, there is suffering. This is the eternal justice. The best way to avoid completely the suffering of the world is the complete denial of the will.

"If we compare life to a path along which we must necessarily run—a path of red-hot coals, with a few cool places here and there; then he who is entangled in delusion is consoled by the cool places, on which he now stands, or which he sees near him, and sets out to run through the course. But he who sees through the *principium individuationis*, and recognizes the real nature of the thing-in-itself, and thus the whole, is no longer thus consoled; he sees himself in all places at once, and withdraws. He will turn around; he no longer asserts his own nature, which is reflected in the phenomenon, but denies it. The phenomenon by which this change is marked, is the transition from virtue to asceticism."[2]

Asceticism, which is common to almost all religions, is the intentional mortification of the will by refusal of what is agreeable, and the selection of what is disagreeable.[3] It is the quieter of the will.

[1] Schopenhauer, "The World as Will and Idea," Vol. I, p. 467.
[2] *Id.*, p. 490.
[3] *Id.*, p. 506.

What is the state after the complete denial of the will? Only he who has experience of it knows. Yet even he who has this experience cannot tell others what his experience is. So this question is unanswerable, because, as we said above, this state is not only the unseen, but also the unthinkable. So we cannot say what it is; at most we can only say what it is not. It is a state, in which there is "no will, no idea, no world."[1]

Then is it nothing, a complete void, an absolute nought? No, as distinctly pointed out later by Bergson, there is nothing which is really nothing. He said:

> "The representation of the void is always a representation which is full and resolves itself on analysis into two positive elements: the idea, distinct or confused, of a constitution, and the feeling, experienced or imagined, of a desire or regret. It follows from this double analysis that the idea of the absolute nought, in the sense of annihilation of everything, is a self-destructive idea, a pseudo-idea, a mere word."[2]

When we say there is nothing, we mean there is something that is not interested by our will. In this sense the lost paradise of Schopenhauer may be fit to be called nothing. Buddhism, however, found out for it a better term, that is, the "Real Suchness." "Real" signifies that it is not nothing; "Suchness," that it is simply such. If one insists on asking what is that "Suchness," Buddhism can answer only negatively:

[1] Schopenhauer, "The World as Will and Idea," Vol. I, p. 531.
[2] Bergson, H., "Creative Evolution," p. 283.

"The nature of the Real Suchness is not being, not non-being, not not being, not not non-being, nor both being and non being. It is not one, not many, not not one, not not many, nor both one and many."[1]

(8) Concluding Remarks

That Schopenhauer, in his chief work, devoted three volumes to the discussion of the will, the idea, and the world, but said very little about the "nothing," is therefore a very significant fact, which few in the Western world appreciate. It is significant, because in doing so he introduced not only the thought, but also the method, of the Hindus into the Western world. Whether this thought is true and whether this method is right are not our problems here. In either case Schopenhauer may be considered the forerunner of the wisdom of the Hindus in the West.

[1] Acvaghosha, "Discourse on the Awakening of Faith"; cp. Suzuki's translation, p. 59.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION OF PART I

Now is the time for us to take a general view of the "nature" line of thought. We have seen much of the difference between the three main types of thought; now we shall see what they have in common. It seems that their common points are at least three in number: (1) asceticism, (2) anti-intellectualism, and (3) mysticism.

(1) Asceticism

Professor Dewey said:

"'Give a dog a bad name and hang it.' Human nature has been the dog of the professional moralist, and consequences accord with the proverb." [1]

This statement is true for all three philosophers we have just considered. But in giving the dog a bad name, they were not without reason. The reason is that they held the dog responsible for the suffering of this world. Chuang-tse considered the suffering of this world as due to the state of art. So he advised mankind to retain only the few instincts that are necessary to the natural man, and to give a bad name to, and to hang the other parts of human nature, for the satisfaction of which we have civilization and progress. Plato considered this world as naturally a place of suffering, of error, and

[1] Dewey, John, "Human Nature and Conduct," New York, 1922, p. 1.

of mistake. So he advised mankind to retain only pure contemplation and pure thought, which he considered as pertaining to soul, but to give a bad name to, and to hang the other part of, human nature, the "dark horse," which he considered as chiefly related to body and as chiefly responsible for dragging the soul into its prison in this world of matter. Finally Schopenhauer considered the suffering, the error, the mistake, of this world as the necessary companions of will itself, of the soul itself. So he advised mankind to retain nothing, but to give a bad name to, and to hang everything in, human nature, both physical pleasure that pertains to the body, and mental thought, that pertains to the soul. Thus asceticism reached its climax and could go no further.

(2) Anti-Intellectualism

Next we come to anti-intellectualism. As the purest felicity cannot be attained in a sensuous way, so the highest truth cannot be attained through an intellectual procedure. We have seen that Chuang-tse decidedly abandoned not only the conceptual world, but the perceptual world as well. Here I may remark in passing that in Chuang-tse's time, intellectualism in Chinese philosophy was at its best. There was the school known as the "School of Logic." Hui-tse, the leading figure of that school, was Chuang-tse's most intimate friend. In the book of Chuang-tse we find many of Hui-tse's arguments with great perfection and sophistry. So,

the main effort of Chuang-tse's philosophy is to protest not only against utilitarianism of Mo-tse and the institutionalism of Confucius, but also as against the intellectualism of the "School of Logic."

Schopenhauer's anti-intellectualism is too obvious to need further comment. His distinction between transcendental and immanent knowledge,[1] and between intuitive and abstract knowledge, was carried through by Bergson who made the distinction between absolute and relative knowledge.[2] The central point of these arguments seems to be that the best way to get the perfect knowledge of a thing is to be one, to identify one's self with that thing. The subject, as Schopenhauer said, must pass entirely into the perceived object and thus become the object itself.[3]

Something must be said about Plato. Plato, as we have seen, was disappointed by this world, and tried to transfer the Socratic ideas which were methodological and scientific in point of view, referring to the world of discourse, to the absolute ideas, which are æsthetic, visible things and referring to the world of contemplation. Höffding said:

"Contemplative natures are bent on gaining a conception of the whole in the light of which the relation between value and reality shall be made clear. Sometimes it is the need of the thought for comprehension, sometimes the need of the imagination for intuitive images which is the predominative

[1] Schopenhauer, "The World as Will and Idea," Vol. I, p. 224.
[2] Bergson, H., "Introduction to Metaphysics," tr. by T. E. Hulwe, New York, 1912, p. I.
[3] Schopenhauer, "The World as Will and Idea," Vol. I, p. 232.

factor. In Plato's doctrine of ideas he found satisfaction for both the needs; his spirit found rest in the contemplation of the eternal ideas which alone had true reality; in comparison with them the ever-changing world of science was finally regarded as mere illusion. . . . This type passed *via* Platonism into the Christian theology, where it may be recognized in Augustine. . . . Many of the representatives of this type believe that in this highest idea, or in the intellectual contemplation, which they regard as the highest, they have the highest science. This rests on an illusion, based on an insufficient inquiry into the conditions and limits of knowledge. When such spirits finally come to rest in philosophy, it is not philosophy as science, but as art."[1]

So Plato's dialectic, although he considered it as the true science, is in reality no longer scientific, but simply æsthetic. Whether his combination of the two methods can satisfy two kinds of human wants, or whether this very combination may not fail to satisfy either of these wants, we shall not discuss here. In any case we are justified in considering anti-intellectualism as one of the common characteristics of the "nature" line of thought.

(3) Mysticism

By mysticism we mean the experience which has been variously denoted by the names: ecstacy, rapture, illumination, revelation, and so forth. Speaking generally, this is an experience of the union of the individual with the whole. This is the experience which asceticism and anti-intellectualism lead to. We have seen that this line of thought talked much about the whole, the one,

[1] Höffding, H., "Philosophy of Religion," tr. by B. E. Meyer, 2d ed., London, 1914, pp. 119, 120.

and the union of the individual with it. We naturally tend to ask: Are these statements true? It seems that whether there is the whole or not, or whether, if there is a whole, the individual can internally unite with it or not, there are people who have had this kind of experience. That this experience to the experiencer is a state of insight into the depth of truth unplumbed by the discursive intellect, and full of significance, importance, and authority,[1] is a matter of fact. Wishing to give it a bad name and hang it, people call this experience phantasy, dream, or neurological disease. But, granting that this experience is due to abnormal mental or physical condition of the subject, we still should not confuse the existential judgment with the spiritual judgment.[2] Our present position is that even if we know that this kind of experience has a low origin, we still should consider its high value; even though we do not consider it as a royal road to truth, we should still consider it as a royal road to happiness, at least to a kind of happiness.

[1] James, Wm., "Variety of Religious Experience," New York, 1910, p. 380.

[2] *Id.*, p. 4.

PART II

THE IDEALIZATION OF ART AND THE WAY OF INCREASE

We have seen that the characteristic of the "nature" line of thought is the common presupposition that in the past man had a paradise of some sort, which he lost through his own mistake. Now we are going to see that the common presupposition of the "art" line is just the opposite. Now the common presupposition is that if there is any paradise at all, it is a paradise-*to-be-gained*, not a paradise *lost*. Fichte said:

> "Even in the mere consideration of the world as it is, apart from the law (that is, the law that commands man to action), there arise within me the wish, the desire—no, not the mere desire, but the absolute demand—for a better and different world. I cast a glance on the present relation of men toward each other and toward nature; on the feebleness of their powers, the strength of their desire and passion, a voice within proclaims with irresistible conviction—it is impossible that it can remain thus; it must become different and better!" [1]

To gain the "different and better" is the purpose of the "art" line of thought. So far all the philosophies belonging to this line agree. But as to what that "different and better" is they are far from agreeing. They

1 Fichte, "The Vocation of Man," Popular Works, tr. by W. Smith, 1st ed., London, 1873, pp. 328, 329.

do not agree as to what the paradise-to-be-gained is, although they agree that there can be and will be one. Some think that it is the state in which we can have the greatest amount of immediate pleasure, of easy-going amusement. Some think that it is a state in which we can have safety for life, wealth, prosperity. Some think that it is a state in which we can have the most kinds of good with the least amount of sacrifice, and that this state is surely attainable if only we have enough knowledge, power, and progress. The first we call hedonism; the second, utilitarianism; the third, progressivism. In the following chapters historic systems have been chosen respectively to represent these three views.

CHAPTER VI

HEDONISM: YANG CHU

The representative we have chosen for hedonism is Yang Chu, whom we consider as the most persistent and thoroughgoing expounder of the supremacy of immediate pleasure. He was reported to be a disciple of Lao-tse, and his doctrine was definitely mentioned in several works of the period of the Warring States. His teaching has been preserved in one chapter in the work of Lieh-tse, which bears the title of "Yang Chu." Although the genuineness of the "Lieh-tse" is still a matter of dispute, the said chapter is usually considered as representing hedonism in the history of ancient Chinese philosophy. In this connection, I shall have something further to say.

(1) Yang Chu's Connection with Taoism

It is a historical fact that the type of philosophy like pantheism is often liable to admit some materialistic interpretation. The similarity between Spinoza's philosophy and Taoism has already been mentioned above (pp. 14–16). Lao-tse, the founder of Taoism, said: "Nature is not benevolent."[1] Obviously, two different interpretations are possible in regard to this statement.

[1] Lao-tse, "Tao Teh King," Sec. VI.

The one is that Nature is spontaneity itself, so it has no desire or wish to be benevolent. It simply lets all things develop themselves. The other is that Nature is not benevolent, because it is a blind physical force. It produces the world not at all by design or will, but simply by necessity or chance. Obviously again, these two interpretations, if sufficiently developed, may lead to two systems of opposite character, both in theory and in practice. In the "Lieh-tse," we find both of these views. Certain chapters contain the same teaching as Chuang-tse's, that is, the first view. In fact, many passages in these chapters are directly copied from Chuang-tse. But other chapters take just the opposite view, the view of materialistic mechanism. For instance, there is a chapter entitled "Effort and Destiny," in which one passage reads:

"Effort said to Destiny: 'Your achievements are not equal to mine.'

"'Pray, what do you achieve in the working of things,' replied Destiny, 'that you would compare yourself with me?'

"'Why,' said Effort, 'the length of man's life, his measure of success, his rank and his wealth, are all things which I have the power to determine.'

"To this, Destiny made reply: 'Pêng Tsu's wisdom did not exceed that of Yao and Shun, yet he lived to the age of eight hundred. Yen Yüan's ability was not inferior to that of the average man, yet he died at the age of thirty-two. . . . If these results are compassed by your effort, how is it that you allotted long life to Pêng Tsu and an untimely death to Yen Yüan; that you awarded discomfiture to the sage and success to the impious, humiliation to the wise man and high honors to the fool, poverty to the good and wealth to the wicked?'

"'If, as you say,' rejoined Effort, 'I have really no control over events, is it not, then, to your management that things turn out as they do?'

"Destiny replied: 'The very name Destiny shows that there can be no question of management in the case. When the way is straight, I push on; when it is crooked, I let be. Old age and early death, failure and success, high rank and humble station, riches and poverty—all these come naturally and of themselves. Of their ultimate causes, I am ignorant; how could it be otherwise?'"[1]

Another passage in the same chapter reads:

"Teng Hsi was a man who made [expounded] paradoxical doctrines and [engaged in] endless arguments. When Tse Chan was the Premier and wrote the criminal laws in book form and enforced them in the State of Chang, Teng Hsi often argued with him about the laws and often annoyed him. Tse Chan then put Teng Hsi in prison and punished him, and later sentenced him to death. Tse Chan wrote the laws in book form and enforced them, not because he could do it, but because he could not fail to do it. Teng Hsi annoyed Tse Chan, not because he *can* do it, but because he cannot not do it. Tse Chan put Teng Hsi to death also not because he can do it, but because he cannot not do it."[2]

Another passage in another chapter reads:

"Mr. Tien, of the Ch'i State, was holding an ancestral banquet in his hall, to which a thousand guests were bidden. As he sat in their midst, many came up to him with presents of fish and game. Eyeing them approvingly, he exclaimed with unction: 'How generous is Almighty God to man! He makes the five kinds of grain to grow, and creates the finny and the feathered tribes, especially for our benefit.' All Mr. Tien's guests applauded this sentiment to the echo; but the twelve-year-old son of a Mr. Pao, regardless of seniority,

[1] Giles, Lionel, "Taoist Teaching from the Book of Lieh Tzŭ," London, 1912, pp. 97–99.

[2] Lieh-tse. This passage is omitted in Lionel Giles' translation.

came forward and said: 'You are wrong, my lord. All the living creatures in the universe stand in the same category as ourselves, and one is of no greater intrinsic value than another. It is only by reason of size, strength, or cunning that some particular species gains the mastery, or that one preys upon another. None of them are produced in order to subserve the uses of others. Man catches and eats those that are fit for food, but how can it be maintained that God creates them expressly for man's use? Mosquitoes and gnats suck man's blood, and tigers and wolves devour his flesh; but we do not therefore assert that God created man expressly for mosquitoes and gnats, or to provide food for tigers and wolves.'"[1]

This is certainly a good illustration of the fact that "Nature is not benevolent." Mechanism reigns in the state of nature as well as in history, the realm of human activity. Free Will, design or purpose, either of God or of man, has no place at all in this view. It is thoroughly deterministic.

Whether this is Yang Chu's view or not, we shall see that his view as shown in the chapter that bears his name is somewhat like it. There is reason to suppose that after the death of Lao-tse, his followers, owing to the different interpretations of the meaning of "Tao," divided into two diametrically opposite schools, the one represented by Chuang-tse, the other by Yang Chu, just as after the death of Socrates, his followers, owing to the different interpretations of the idea of good, divided into three schools, two of which were diametrically

[1] Giles, Lionel, "Taoist Teaching from the Book of Lieh Tzŭ," London, 1912, pp. 119, 120.

opposite: the Cynics and the Cyrenaics. Then came a later Taoist, who, seeing that both schools called themselves Taoists, drew materials from both of them and composed the book, in the name of Lieh-tse, whose existence still lacks historical proof. Without going further into the sphere of higher criticism, I think I am justified in choosing Yang Chu to represent the materialistic aspect of Taoism, which is hedonism.

(2) His View of Life

Now, let us first see what Yang Chu's view of life is. According to his view, life is short, and a great part of it is, strictly speaking, not life. He said:

"One hundred years is the limit of a long life. Not one in a thousand ever attains to it. Yet if they do, still unconscious infancy and old age take up about half this time. The time he passes unconsciously while asleep at night, and that which is wasted though awake during the day, also amounts to another half of the rest. Again pain and sickness, sorrow and fear, fill up about a half, so that he really gets only ten years or so for his enjoyment. And even then there is not one hour free from some anxiety."[1]

Besides, there is absolutely no promise of an after life. He said:

"That in which all things differ is life, that in which they are all alike is death. During life there is the difference of intelligence and dullness, honor and meanness, but in death there is the equality of rottenness and putrefaction. Neither can be prevented. Although intelligence and dullness,

[1] Forke, Anton, "Yang Chu's Garden of Pleasure," London, 1912 pp. 38, 39.

honor and meanness exist, no human power can affect them, just as rottenness and putrefaction cannot be prevented. . . . Some die at the age of ten, some at one hundred. The wise and benevolent die as the cruel and imbecile. In life they are known as Yao and Shun [two sage emperors]; dead, they are so many bones which cannot be distinguished. We ought, therefore, to hasten to enjoy life and pay no attention to death." [1]

This sentence is in fact Yang-tse's whole philosophy. In this life nothing is real but enjoyment, which is indeed the only object and meaning of life.

We have seen that one of the chief characteristics of the "nature" line of thought is asceticism—that is, the suppression of desires. Now we shall see that one of the chief characteristics of the "art" line of thought as here represented by Yang Chu, is just, I may say, anti-asceticism; that is, the satisfaction of desires. According to Yang Chu, we had no lost paradise in the past; we have only to look for the satisfaction of our desires in the future. The more desires are satisfied, the more is life worth living.

(3) Yang Chu's Art of Life

The following passage is an illustration of this point:

"Yen Ping-chung asked Kuan Yi-wu as to cherishing life. Kuan Yi-wu replied: 'It suffices to give it its free course, neither checking nor obstructing it.' Yen Ping-chung said: 'And as to details?' Kuan Yi-wu replied, 'Allow the ear to hear what it likes, the eye to see what it likes, the nose to smell what it likes, the mouth to say what it likes, the body to enjoy the comforts it likes to have, and the mind to

[1] Cp. Forke, Anton, "Yang Chu's Garden of Pleasure," London, 1912, pp. 40, 41.

do what it likes. Now what the ear likes to hear is music, and the prohibition of it is what I call obstruction to the ear. What the eye likes to look at is beauty, and its not being permitted to regard this beauty I call obstruction of sight. What the nose likes to smell is perfume; and its not being permitted to smell I call obstruction to scent. What the mouth likes to talk about is right and wrong; and if it is not permitted to speak I call it obstruction of the understanding. The comforts the body enjoys to have are rich food and fine clothing; and if it is not permitted, then I call that obstruction of the senses of the body. What the mind likes is to be at peace; and its not being permitted rest I call obstruction of the mind's nature. All these obstructions are a source of the most painful vexation. Morbidly to cultivate this cause of vexation, unable to get rid of it, and so have a long but very sad life of a hundred, a thousand, or ten thousand years, is not what I call cherishing life. But to check this source of obstruction and with calm enjoyment to await death for a day, a month, or a year, or ten years, is what I understand by enjoying life.'"[1]

This is what Yang Chu considered as the royal road to happiness. It is a well-known fact that one of the chief difficulties in satisfying desires is that wherever desires are, there are also the conflicts of desires. In order to satisfy desires, the first thing for us to do is to make choice. In this passage Yang Chu seemed to have made no choice, but in fact he had already made one. He had made a choice between the desire for delicious food and the desire for permanent health. He had made a choice between the desire for free expression of passion and opinion and the desire for social approval. In each case, he preferred the desires that can be satisfied im-

[1] Forke, Anton, "Yang Chu's Garden of Pleasure," London, 1912, pp. 43, 44.

mediately to those which can be satisfied only in the long run. In each case he preferred the desires that can be easily satisfied to those which can be satisfied only with careful deliberation and troublesome preparation. In short, he wanted the pleasures that can be immediately realized, but not those which can be realized only with roundabout means. Perhaps the reason for his almost completely identifying enjoyment with physical pleasure is simply that among all kinds of pleasure, the physical one is the most easily available. His choice for the immediate pleasure is itself a means of avoiding pain.

(4) Disregard of Social Regulations

Because of this reason Yang Chu showed great depreciation of social regulations. He thought with the Cyrenaics "that there was nothing naturally and intrinsically just, or honorable, or disgraceful; but that things were considered so because of law and fashion."[1] But law and fashion are the thing, that, as Theodorus said, "owes its existence to the consent of the fools."[2] They may have utility, but utility has meaning only in connection with the remote consequence. Disregard of remote consequence, the different kinds of law and social regulation are really the obstructions of pleasure and the sources of vexation. So Yang Chu attacked them and taught that we should not be fooled by them.

1 Diogenes Laertius, "The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers," tr. by Younge, London, 1915, p. 91.
2 *Ibid.*

"Being warned and exhorted by punishments and rewards, urged forward and repelled by fame and laws, men are constantly rendered anxious. Striving for one glory during life and providing for splendor after death, they go their unpleasant ways, carefully considering what they should hear, should see, should do, and should think. So they lose immediate pleasure and cannot give way to their feelings. How do they differ from chained criminals?"[1]

Thus:

"Po Yi was not without desire, but for wishing people to admire his purity, he was led to death by starvation. Chan Chi was not without sexual passion, but wishing people to admire his chastity, he remained childless. How purity and chastity lead men to miss the real good!"[2]

No doubt real good is the immediate pleasure.

Here we may say that the admiration of others or reputation are themselves sources of pleasure. This Yang Chu did not necessarily deny. But his point was that we should not sacrifice our immediate pleasure for fame or reputation which could come to us only in the remote future or probably after our death. If it does come to us in the remote future time of our life, we surely have pleasure then. But how can that pleasure recompense our immediate sacrifice? If it comes to us only after our death, what would be the use of it? Yang Chu said:

"The world praises Shun, Yu, Duke Chow, and Confucius, and condemns Chieh and Chow. . . . All these four sages,

[1] Cp. Forke, Anton, "Yang Chu's Garden of Pleasure," London, 1912, p. 39.

[2] *Id.*, p. 41.

while alive, had not one day's pleasure, and after their death [had] a reputation lasting many years. Yet reputation cannot bring back reality. You praise them, and they do not know it, and you honor them, and they are not aware of it. There is now no distinction between them and a clod of earth. . . . These two villains [Chieh and Chow] while alive took delight in following their own inclination and desires, and after death were called fools and tyrants. Yet reality is nothing that can be given by reputation. Ignorant of censure and unconscious of praise, they differed in no respect from the stump of a tree or a clod of earth. The four sages, though objects of admiration, were troubled up to their very end, and were equally and alike doomed to die. The two villains, though detested and hated by many, remained in high spirits up to the very end, and they too were equally doomed to die."[1]

Therefore, why should we sacrifice immediate pleasure for unknown future fame ?

(5) Disregard of Any Kind of Consequences

Thus Yang Chu's disregard of virtue and fame is simply an expression of his decisive preference for the immediate instead of the remote pleasure. His main point is that we should choose the immediate pleasure, no matter how bad the remote future consequence. Thus the following passage reads :

"Tuan-mu Shu of Wei was descended from Tse-Kung. He had a patrimony of ten thousand gold pieces. Indifferent to the chances of life, he followed his own inclinations. He does all that human beings want to do. He enjoyed all that human beings desire to enjoy. With his walls and

[1] Forke, Anton, "Yang Chu's Garden of Pleasure," London, 1912, pp. 54–57.

buildings, pavilions, verandas, gardens, parks, ponds and lakes, wine and food, carriages and dresses, women and attendants, he would emulate the princes of Ch'i and Chu in luxury. Whenever his passion desired something, or his ear wished to hear something, his eyes to see or his mouth to taste, he would procure it at all costs. . . . A hundred guests were entertained daily in his palace. In the kitchens there were always fire and smoke, and the vaults and the peristyle incessantly resounded with songs and music. The remains from his expenditure he divided first among his clansmen, then among his fellow citizens, then among the people throughout the kingdom. . . . Within a year he had disposed of all his fortune, and to his offspring he left nothing. When he fell ill, he had no means to buy medicines, and when he died, there was not even money for his funeral. . . . When Ch'in Ku-li[1] heard of this, he said: 'Tuan-mu Shu was a fool. He brought disgrace to his ancestor.' When Tuan Kan-shen heard of this, he said: 'Tuan-mu Shu was a wise man; his excellence was much superior to his ancestor. This conduct shocked the common-sense people, but was in accord with the right reason. The gentleman of Wei only adhered to virture and special regulation, so that they had not his insight.'" [2]

The worst consequence, however, that our human actions can entail, is death. The fear of death is certainly one of the chief factors that causes man to be careful in the present and to be anxious about the future. So one of the teachings of hedonism is that we should not care about death. We should escape from the fear of death

[1] Ch'in Ku-li was a famous disciple of Mo-tse. He is also called Ch'in-tse.

[2] Cp. Forke, Anton, "Yang Chu's Garden of Pleasure," London, 1912, pp. 49-51. From this passage we may also infer that Yang Chu, as well as some of the Cyrenaics and Epicureans, considered friendship as a source of pleasure.

with a kind of self-rationalization and pretended courage. In one of the passages quoted above, after Kuan Yi-wu told Yen Ping-chung about the art of cherishing life, he asked the latter to tell him what to do with death. Then

" Yen Ping-chung said: ' To deal with death is very simple. What shall I say ? ' Kuan Yi-wu replied: 'But I really wish to hear it.' Yen Ping-chung answered: 'What can I do when I am dead? They may burn my body or cast it into deep water, or bury it, or leave it unburied, or throw it wrapped up in a mat into some ditch, or cover it with princely apparel and embroidered garments and rest it in a stone sarcophagus. All that depends on mere chance.' Kuan Yi-wu looked round at Pao-Shu-Huang-tse and said, 'We two have made considerable progress in the doctrine of life and death.'"[1]

Another passage reads :

" Meng-sun Yang asked Yang Chu : ' There are men who take care of their body with the intention of grasping immortality. Is that possible?' Yang Chu replied : ' According to the laws of nature there is no such thing as immortality.' Meng-sun Yang said : ' Yet is it possible to acquire a very long life?' Yang Chu said : ' According to the law of nature there is no such thing as a very long life. . . . All things were the same as they are now. The five passions [likes and dislikes] were of old as they are now. So also the safety and peril of the four limbs. Grief and joy for the things of this world were of old as they are now, and so are the constant change of peace and revolution. Having seen, heard, and experienced all of these things, one would already be awearied of them at the age of one hundred. Why should he desire for more?"[2]

[1] Cp. Forke, Anton, "Yang Chu's Garden of Pleasure," London, 1912, pp. 44, 45.
[2] *Id.*, pp. 51, 52.

These passages remind us of Epicurus, who was reported to have said :

" Accustom yourself also to think death is a matter with which we are not at all concerned, since all good and all evil is in sensation, and since death is only the privation of sensation. On which account, the correct knowledge of the fact that death is no concern of ours, makes the mortality of life pleasant to us, in as much as it sets forth no illimitable time, but relieves us of the longing for immortality. The most formidable of all evils, death, is nothing to us, since when we exist, death is not present to us ; and when death is present, we have no existence. " [1]

Thus there is nothing to be feared in death. If death is not to be feared, why should we fear any consequence of our action, that is not so bad as death ?

As we should seek for immediate pleasure no matter what the bad consequences are in the future, so should we also avoid immediate pain, no matter what the good consequences are in the future.

Thus the following passage reads :

"Ch'in Ku-li asked Yang Chu: 'If by pulling out a hair from your body, you can bring salvation to the world, would you do it?' Yang Chu answered: 'I surely cannot bring salvation to the whole world by simply pulling out a hair from my body. Ch'in Ku-li said: 'But suppose you can, would you do it?' Yang Chu gave no answer. Thereupon Ch'in Ku-li told Meng-sun Yang, who replied : ' I will explain to you the Master's meaning. ' Supposing for tearing off a piece of your skin you were offered ten thousand gold pieces, would you do it?' Ch'in Ku-li said : ' I would.' Meng-sun Yang again asked : ' Supposing for cutting off one of your limbs you were to get a kingdom, would you do it?'

[1] Diogenes Laertius, " The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers, " tr. by Younge, London, 1915, p. 469.

Ch'in Ku-li was silent. 'See now,' said Meng-sun Yang, 'A hair is unimportant compared with skin, and the skin is also unimportant compared with a limb. However, many hairs put together form a skin, many skins form a limb. Therefore, though the skin is one of the ten thousand parts composing the body, how can it be disregarded?'"[1]

Afterwards, Mencius said:

"The doctrine of the philosopher Yang was: each one for himself. Though he might benefit the whole world by plucking out a single hair, he would not do it."[2]

Since that time the above quotation from Yang Chu has been considered as his famous argument for egoism. The fact is that although Yang Chu's doctrine is egoistic, this passage does not necessarily show that effect. The general trend of the argument shows that even if Ch'in-tse (Ch'in Ku-li) would offer the whole world to Yang Chu himself for one of his hairs, Yang Chu still would not make the exchange. Thus this passage is simply an extreme statement of the teaching that we should not inflict any amount of pain upon ourselves, no matter how great the remote future gain is.

(6) The Salvation of the World

Of course this is an extreme theory. But in this Yang Chu saw the salvation of the world. If all people seek immediate pleasure only, then there will be no one so foolish as to struggle for wealth, power, domination, and control, the pleasure of which can be gained only

[1] Cp. Forke, Anton, "Yang Chu's Garden of Pleasure," London, 1912, pp. 53, 54.

[2] Mencius, "Works," Book VII, Ch. XVI.

through troublesome preparation and tiresome means. Then they will need nothing more than what they can possibly enjoy. As Chuang-tse said:

"The tit, building its nest in the mighty forest, occupies but a single twig. The tapir slakes its thirst from the river but drinks enough to fill his belly. . . . So I have no need of the empire." [1]

And Yang Chu said:

"If the ancients by injuring a single hair could have rendered a service to the world, they would not have done it; and had the universe been offered to a single person, he would not have accepted it. As nobody would damage even a hair, and nobody would do a favor to the world, the world was in a perfect state."[2]

Of course, this is too simple a way to solve the complex problems of the world. But seeing that a great part of the confusion of the world is due, not so much to the fact that there are too many people seeking for immediate pleasure as to the fact that there are too many seeking for domination and control, we are inclined to think that there is a certain amount of truth and wisdom in Yang Chu's teaching.

(7) Concluding Remarks

So much for the hedonism of Yang Chu. In comparison with the philosophies of the West, Yang Chu agreed in detail with the Cyrenaics, but with the Epicureans in principle only. The Cyrenaics, as reported by Diogenes Laertius, taught that

[1] "Works," Giles' translation, p. 6.
[2] Forke, Anton, "Yang Chu's Garden of Pleasure," London, 1912, p. 53.

"corporeal pleasures were superior to mental ones, and corporeal sufferings worse than mental ones." [1]

"The banishment of pain, as it is called by Epicurus, appears to the Cyrenaics not to be pleasure; for neither is the absence of pleasure, pain; for both pleasure and pain consist in motion; and neither the absence of pleasure nor the absence of pain is motion."[1]

Thus, according to the Cyrenaics, pleasure must be something positive, something produced by human efforts to satisfy human desires. We have seen that this is exactly what Yang Chu taught. As shown above, one of the chief difficulties in satisfying the desires is that we have to make choice. Although Yang Chu and the Cyrenaics have made a careful consideration and a reasonable choice, yet there are still difficulties. Granted that we should prefer the immediate to the remote pleasure, yet even so there are still conflicts among the desires as well as among the individuals. Yang Chu supposed that if all people sought only the immediate pleasure, they would get all of the pleasures and every one would get them all, and thus the world would be in a perfect, ideal state. He seemed to overlook a most obvious fact. As Chuang-tse's philosophy is a naïve idealization of nature, so Yang Chu's is a naïve idealization of art.

We are not going to criticize the theory that we should seek only the immediate pleasure and should absolutely pay no attention to the remote future consequences,

[1] Diogenes Laertius, "The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers," tr. by Younge, London, 1915, p. 90.
[2] *Ibid.*

for by principle Yang Chu preferred one day's life of pleasure to a hundred years' life of anxiety and care. We simply point out that pleasure, no matter how immediate it is, is an end. In realizing the end, one has to use some means which may at some time be tiresome. He who wants to get some end without any sacrifice, after all but defies himself. Thus, Watson, in criticizing the Cyrenaics, said :

"The theory virtually admits that to obtain the end we must not seek it. We desire pleasure, but when we set about getting it, we are compelled to entertain unwelcome and unexpected guests. Let us 'take the goods the gods provide us' and make the most of them. 'The longest way round is the shortest way home.'"[1]

Thus in the West, Epicurus modified the Cyrenaic doctrine and admitted that the absence of pain and the tranquillity of mind are themselves pleasure. "The state of the pleased enjoyment, which may be made habitual by the man who aims at true pleasure, i. e., at that state of contentment which comes to the man who is free from an unreasoning dread of imaginary evils, and who confines his desires within reasonable limit"[2] is now considered as the best state that man can enjoy. Indeed, Yang Chu incidentally also held this view. Yang Chu said :

"Yuan Hsie lived in mean circumstances in Lu, while Tse Kung amassed wealth in Wei. Poverty galled the one, and riches caused uneasiness to the other. So poverty will

[1] Watson, John, "Hedonistic Theories, from Aristipus to Spencer," London, 1895, p. 42.
[2] *Id.*, p. 67.

not do, nor wealth either. But what, then, will do ? I answer : ' Enjoy life and take one's ease, for those who know how to enjoy life are not poor, and he that lives at ease requires no riches. ' "[1]

This spirit is more Epicurean than Cyrenaic.

But if the Epicurean life were realized, men would be in a state in which they would have no faith in the past, no hope in the future, but would only await, quietly indeed, the natural dissolution of their body, which is death. This may be a good state, but it is already sad. Under the surface of melancholy pleasure, there seems to be a strong undercurrent of genuine pessimism.

[1] Forke, Anton, " Yang Chu's Garden of Pleasure," London, 1912, p. 42.

CHAPTER VII

UTILITARIANISM: MO-TSE

Thus hedonism eventually defies itself. This world is after all a very poor one; for here we must obey the injunction: "In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread." [1] In order to get pleasure, or to avoid pain, in one word, to satisfy our desires, we need the *means*. The supposition that we can satisfy our desires without means is too optimistic a view of this world. Hedonism was closely connected with pessimism in the end, because it had been too closely connected with optimism in the beginning.

We are going to study another type of philosophy, that, in opposition to hedonism, taught that we should sacrifice any kind of immediate enjoyment for the greatest future pleasure. In opposition to hedonism, this type emphasizes the means for realizing and securing the future end. Hence it talks not so much of pleasure as of "benefit," "utility," etc. Hence it is known as utilitarianism.

(1) The Significance of Mo-tse

To represent this type we have chosen Mo-tse's philosophy, which we consider as the most systematic utilitarian-

[1] Gen. 3 : 19.

ism of ancient times. His significance in the general utilitarian philosophy is just that of Bentham as Stephen considered it. About Bentham, Stephen said:

"The writings in which Bentham deals explicitly with the general principle of ethics would hardly entitle him to a higher position than that of a disciple of Hume without Hume's subtlety; or of Paley, without Paley's singular gift of exposition. Why, then, did Bentham's message come upon his disciples with the force and freshness of new revelation? Our answer must be in general terms that Bentham founded not a doctrine, but a method; and that the doctrine which came to him simply as a general principle was in his hands a potent instrument applied with most fruitful results to questions of immediate interest." [1]

"It was not the bare appeal to utility, but the attempt to follow the clue of utility systematically and unflinchingly into every part of the subject. This one doctrine gives the touchstone, by which every proposed measure is to be tested." [2]

It is also in this that consists Mo-tse's excellence. As we shall see, Mo-tse not only gave us an abstract principle of utility, but a complete structure of society, state, and religion, that was built upon that principle. But I must say further that I have chosen him not *only* for his excellence. In his system, there is a strong element of materialism with which most of the old utilitarian systems are connected. We hope Mo-tse may be a good illustration of both the excellence and defects of utilitarianism.

[1] Stephen, Leslie, "The English Utilitarianism," London, 1900, 3 vols., Vol. I, p. 236.

[2] *Id.*, p. 268.

(2) The General Principle of Utility

Bentham said:

"Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, *pain* and *pleasure*. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do." [1]

"The *principle of utility* recognizes this subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of that system, the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and law." [2]

We shall see that this is exactly what Mo-tse did. In his work, however, he did not speak so much of pleasure and pain as of their objective counterparts: benefit and harm. As he said:

"Benefit is what we are pleased to have. Harm is what we dislike to have." [3]

What Bentham called reason, Mo-tse called intellect. Desire is always blind. To guide it in the right direction is the function of the intellect. Mo-tse said:

"If a man desires to cut his finger, and his intellect does not foresee the harm, it is the fault of the intellect. But if the intellect makes a careful consideration and foresees all the harmful consequences, but the desire still wants to cut, then it is the desire that makes the man suffer." [4]

Thus the function of intellect is to foresee the *consequences* of the present action. By foreseeing the consequence,

[1] Bentham, Jeremy, "An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation," Oxford, 1907, p. 7.

[2] *Id.*, pp. 1, 2.

[3] Mo-tse "Works," Chap. XL.

[4] *Id.*, Chap. XLII.

the intellect can lead us to guide and control our desires to struggle for the remote good and to avoid the remote evil. By foreseeing the consequence, the intellect can measure the incompatible benefits and harms in the immediate and remote future and thus lead the desires to an adjustment. Mo-tse said :

"To measure the importance and unimportance of what happened to us is called measurement. Measurement is not necessarily to decide that the one is intrinsically right and the other is intrinsically wrong. Measurement is simply adjustment. To cut off the finger in order to save the arm is to take the greatest of the benefits and the smallest of the harms. To take the smallest of the harms is not to take the harm, but to take the benefit. Because what we now take is not in the control of our own will. For instance, when a man meets a robber, he is compelled to cut his finger in order to save his life. The act of cutting his finger is beneficial ; only the fact that he meets the robber is harmful. . . . In adjusting the incompatible conflicts we take the greatest of the benefits, because we will ; but we take the smallest of the harms, because we must." [1]

Here we see the great difference between hedonism and utilitarianism. Now it is not the immediate, but the greatest benefit, that we should choose ; not the immediate, but the greatest harm, that we should avoid.

(3) The External Standard

We have seen that according to hedonism, the only standard for judging good and evil is subjective feeling. There is no external standard; nor is there any need of it. But according to utilitarianism, a standard of action

[1] Mo-tse, "Works," Chap. XLIV.

must be an external standard; otherwise, it is not a standard at all. As Bentham said:

"What one expects to find in a principle is something that points out some external consideration, as a means of warranting and guiding the internal sentiments of approbation and disapprobation; the expectation is but ill fulfilled by a proposition, which does neither more nor less than hold up each of those sentiments as a ground and standard for itself." [1]

And Mo-tse said:

"For argument we must establish a standard. If we argue without a standard, it is just like calculating the time of morning and night on a constantly shifting dial. We cannot know clearly whether it is right or wrong, beneficial or harmful. For testing an argument there must be three standards. What are these three standards?—They are to trace it, to examine it, and to use it. Where trace it? Trace it in the authority of the ancient philosopher kings. Where examine it? Examine it in the facts which the common people see and hear. Where use it? Put it into practice and see whether it is useful to the benefit of the country and the people. These are the three standards for argument." [2]

These three standards are certainly external and objective enough. The first standard seems to indicate that Mo-tse considered authority as an important factor in determining value. The fact is that ancient authority is a factor, because it represents the experience of the past, just as the second represents the experience of the present, and the third represents the experience of the future. The following quotation may serve as an illustration:

[1] Bentham, "An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation," p. 16.
[2] Mo-tse, "Works," Chap. XXXV.

"In an argument with Cheng-tse, Master Mo-tse quoted from Confucius. Cheng-tse said: 'You are against Confucius. Why do you still quote from him?' Master Mo-tse said: 'This is what agrees with fact and therefore what you cannot change. When a bird feels the weather is hot, it goes upward. When the fish feels the weather is hot, it goes downward. Even Yu and Tang[1] could not advise them to do otherwise. We must admit that the bird and fish are ignorant. But Yu and Tang must follow them. Why cannot I quote from Confucius?'"[2]

Thus Mo-tse went back to authority only when the authority was in agreement with fact. He went back to the past only when it could throw light on the future, as he said:

"When we cannot reach a decision in our deliberation, we examine the past in order to know the future."[3]

(4) The "Pragmatic" Method

Among the three standards, however, the most important is the third. We are going to see that in the construction of his ideal society and state, Mo-tse evaluated everything by its utility for the benefit of the country and the people. Anything that could not pass the test of this standard, he rejected without the least hesitation. Here we have cited a few quotations to illustrate the general application of what may be called his "pragmatic" method. He said:

"I asked the Confucians wherefore they should have music, and they answered: 'Music is an amusement.' I

1 Yu and Tang were two philosopher kings.

2 Mo-tse, "Works," Chap. XLVIII.

3 *Id.*, Chap. XVIII.

said to them: 'You have not answered my question. If I asked you why you should build a house and you said it was built for protection against cold in winter and heat in summer, and for the separate dwelling of persons of different sex, you would then tell me why you built the house. Now I asked you why you should have music, and you said, 'Music is an amusement.' That is equivalent to saying that a house is to be a house." [1]

"The Duke of Ch'i asked Confucius about government. The latter answered that good government is that which draws people from afar and reforms what has become obsolete. Commenting on this conversation Mo-tse said: 'The Duke did not know how to ask the question, nor did Confucius give a correct answer. Could it be that the Duke did not even know that the ideal of government was to draw people from afar and rejuvenate that which has become obsolete? He really wanted to know *how* to accomplish this. Wherefore Confucius told him only what he had already learned, but not that which he wanted to know.'" [2]

"The doctrine that can be put into practice is to be honored. That which cannot be put into practice is but a group of words." [3]

Obviously Mo-tse must have had a very pragmatic theory of the meaning of meaning. The questions, "What is music?" and "What is the use of music?" are to him really the same. When the Confucians told him that music was an amusement, he was not satisfied, because amusement is only an immediate pleasure, but has no use in regard to the future. Therefore music simply had no meaning to him. Again, if a theory or principle is to have any value, it must be practical and must be

[1] Mo-tse, "Works," Chap. XLVIII.
[2] *Ibid.*
[3] *Ibid.*

accompanied by a method of practice. Otherwise it is simply a kind of intellectual exercise, which may produce a kind of immediate pleasure, but, according to Mo-tse, has absolutely no future utility.

(5) What Is the Greatest Benefit of the People

Thus everything, in order to have value, must be useful to the country and the people. But what is that benefit specifically and concretely? According to Mo-tse, it consists of two things: wealth and population. According to Mo-tse, every measure of the government must have the increase of these two in view as its purpose. It is the increase of these two that constitutes the essence of a good government. He said:

"When a philosopher king governs a country, the wealth of the country can be doubled. When he governs the world, the wealth of the world can be doubled. It is doubled not at the expense of others, but by utilizing the country and by cutting off useless expenditure. . . . What is it that is not easy to be doubled? It is the population that is not easy to be doubled. But there is a way to double it. The philosopher king had a law saying: 'When the boy is twenty years old, he must have a home; when the girl is fifteen years old, she must have her man.' This is the law of the philosopher kings. When the philosopher kings disappeared from the world, the people began to act according to their own desires. Those who desire to marry early, marry when they are twenty years old. Those who desire to marry late, marry when they are forty years old. In the average, people marry ten years later than the age fixed by the philosopher kings. In the average, one couple produce one child in every three years; then three children would have to be produced

within this ten years. Therefore, if we make a law that all should marry early, how can the population fail to be doubled?"[1]

This passage is also a good sample of the utilitarian calculation, which hedonism never takes the pains to make. Thus, identifying the increase of wealth and population with the greatest benefit to the country and the people, Mo-tse went on to fight against anything that had no direct utility to it. In the first place he was against any kind of luxury. He said:

"The ancient philosopher kings established the law of the economy of expenditure. It says: 'All the artisans in the world . . . should manufacture articles according to their respective arts. These articles should not be for the purpose of luxury, but only for the use of the people. Those things that increase the expenditure, but not the benefit of the people are not to be tolerated by the philosopher kings. . . . The law in regard to manufacturing clothes says: 'In winter people wear silk, because it is light and warm. In summer, people wear refined grass clothes, because they are light and cool. This is enough. Others that increase the expenditure, but not the benefit of the people, must not be tolerated by the philosopher kings.'"[2]

Mo-tse was also against the Confucian teaching of the luxurious way of burying the dead and the three years' mourning on occasion of the death of parents. He said:

"I calculate the result of the long period of mourning and therefore the long period of the interruption in the people's work is as follows: The wealth that people had in the past was buried with the dead. The wealth that they would have

[1] Mo-tse, "Works," Chap. XX.

[2] *Ibid.*

in the future is impossible to be got because of their inability to work. To use this for increasing wealth is just like asking one to seek a harvest and at the same time forbid him to plow. . . . This also interrupts very much the sexual intercourse between man and woman. To use this for increasing population is just like asking man to seek for long life by committing suicide. . . . Therefore, if those who hold the theory of the luxurious way of burying the dead and of a long period of mourning should govern the country, the country must become poor, the population must become small, and politics must become corrupted." [1]

He was also against music. He said:

"People have three troubles: those who are hungry, but have no food; those who are cold, but have no clothes; and those who are tired, but cannot rest. These are the three great troubles of the people. Even if you for them strike the great bell and beat the drum, . . . can they get the wealth for their food and clothes? I think not. Now the great nations attack the small ones; the great families exploit the small ones. . . . All these confusions no one can stop. Even if you for them strike the great bell and beat the drum . . . can you with this turn the turmoil of the world into peace? I think not. Therefore, music has no value in increasing the benefit, and in avoiding the harm of the world, . . . therefore it is wrong to have music. . . . If the men like music they must lose their time from planting and plowing. If the women like music, they must lose their time from spinning and sewing. If the governors like music, they must play music at the expense of the wealth which should be used for the food and clothes of the people. . . . Therefore it is wrong to have music." [2]

When Mo-tse spoke of music, he meant all that belongs to the same category. He meant to go against all of what we now call the fine arts. This step probably

1 Mo-tse, "Works," Chap. XXV.
2 *Id.*, Chap. XII.

represents Mo-tse's decisive attitude of opposing nature with the cold intellect. From the point of view of intellect, fine arts are really of no value at all, nay, they are simply nonsense. From the point of view of intellect, the mourning for the dead is another example of childish nonsense, as is shown by the following quotation:

"Kung Mung-tse said: 'The three years' mourning is an expression of our infantile feeling, which is the endless longing for the parents.' Master Mo-tse said: 'The child has no other knowledge besides the longing for parents. Therefore, when its parents are absent, it continues to cry. The cause of this fact is its extreme ignorance. The Confucians are not even wiser than a child.'"[1]

According to Mo-tse, the intellect should assume supreme control of our desire as well as our feeling. How different is Mo-tse from Yang Chu who taught that we should give to our desire and feeling absolutely free expression! Here again we meet the chief difference between hedonism and utilitarianism.

(6) The Universal Love

So much for Mo-tse's arguments against all sorts of luxury and all sorts of refinement. These, however, are not yet the greatest harms in the world. The greatest harm to the increase of wealth and population is that there is no peace. Mo-tse said:

"At the present time, what are to be accounted as the greatest harms of this world? They are such as the attacking

[1] Mo-tse, "Works," Chap. XLVIII.

of small states by the great ones ; the inroads on small families by great ones ; the plunder of the weak by the strong ; the oppression of the few by the many. . . . These are the harms of the world. Again, the fact that the prince is not benevolent, that the minister is not loyal, that the father has no parental love, and that the son has no filial piety, are also the harms of the world. Again the fact that the common people rob and injure each other with the sword, poison, water, and fire is also a harm of the world. Let us ask whence all these harmful things arise. Is it from loving others and benefiting others ? It must be replied : ' No ' ; and it must likewise be said : ' They arise clearly from hating others and doing harm to others.' Do those who hate and do harm to others hold the principle of loving all, or that of distinctions between man and man ? It must be replied : ' They make distinctions.' So then it is the principle of making distinctions between man and man, which gives rise to all that are most harmful to the world. On this we conclude that that principle is wrong. . . . There is a principle of loving all, which is able to change that which makes distinctions. . . . If the princes were as much for other states as for their own, which one among them would raise force in his state to attack that of another? He is for that as much as for his own. . . . So then it is the principle of universal mutual love, which gives rise to all that is beneficial to the world. On this account we conclude that that principle is right. . . . Others may say: 'It is good, but it is extremely hard to be put into practice.' If it is really impossible to be put into practice, even I myself will consider that principle as wrong. But how can it be good, and yet incapable of being put into practice ? . . . I apprehend there is no one under heaven, man or woman, however stupid, though he may condemn the principle of universal love, but would at such a time [the most dangerous time] make one who hold to it the subject of his trust. I apprehend there is no one under heaven, man or woman, however stupid, though he may condemn the principle of universal love, but would at such a time [the most dangerous time] prefer the one to be the sovereign who holds to it." [1]

[1] Mo-tse, "Works," Chap. XVI.

Thus Mo-tse found out the chief source of the trouble of the world and also a way to deal with it, which is his famous doctrine of universal love. This principle is not only beneficial to others, but to those as well who hold to it. In Mo-tse's book, three chapters are devoted to describing the harm of war. War is not only harmful to the conquered, but to the conqueror as well. He said:

"Though four or five nations have been benefited by war, that does not make war a practical policy. Let us take an illustration from the profession of medicine. Here is a medicine which cures four or five patients out of ten thousand to whom it has been applied. We cannot, therefore, call it a practical medicine. No dutiful son will apply it to his parents, nor [will] a faithful servant apply it to his master."[1]

The best principle is therefore "the greatest happiness of the greatest number."

(7) Religious Sanction

Although the salvation of the world lies in the principle of universal love, Mo-tse did not consider that men by nature love each other. In his book there is a chapter entitled: "What is Dyed," in which one passage reads:

"Master Mo-tse saw one dyeing silk. He sighed and said: 'Dyed in blue, the silk becomes blue; dyed in yellow, the silk becomes yellow. What it enters changes, it changes its color accordingly. By entering five times, it turned to five colors. Therefore, it is necessary to take care of the dyeing."[2]

[1] Mo-tso, "Works," Chap. XVIII.
[2] *Id.*, Chap. III.

Following this he cited a long list of facts to show how some men become good by associating with good men, and others become bad by associating with bad men. Human nature seems to him to be a *tabula rasa* and its color depends entirely on how it is dyed. People should be "dyed" with the principle of universal love and be told that this is the only road to reach the fulfillment of their own interests. But this is not enough. Men are too shortsighted to see their own interest; they cannot be convinced that loving others is beneficial to themselves and that selfishness can only do harm. So Mo-tse, like Bentham, emphasized the "sanctions," the "binding force,"[1] of the principle of universal love. He embodied the principle in a personified God. He said:

"Those who desire wealth and honor, must obey the will of God. Those who obey the will of God to love each other and to benefit each other, will receive the reward. Those who disobey the will of God in hating each other and doing harm to each other, will receive the punishment."[2]

It is so, because God loves the people, and it is His Will that they should love each other accordingly.

"But how can we know that God loves the people? We know that because He enlightens them all. How do we know that He enlightens them all? We know that because He has them all. How do we know that He has them all? We know that because He receives sacrifices from them all. How do we know that He receives sacrifices from them all? We know that because among all within the four seas

[1] Bentham, "An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation," p. 25.

[2] Mo-tse, "Works," Chap. XXVI.

who eat human food, there is none who does not offer oxen, sheep, dogs and pigs, rice and wine, to honor God the most High and the spirits. All people are the subjects of God; Why does He not love them? Besides, I said that he who kills one innocent must have bad fortune. Who kills the innocent? Man. Who imposes the bad fortune? God. If you say that God does not love the people, why in the case of homicide does God punish the unjust with bad fortune? Therefore, I know that God loves all the people of the world."[1]

This is certainly a very poor argument to prove the existence of God and His benevolence and His power. But Mo-tse, as the most practical philosopher of the world, had no interest at all in pure metaphysical truth. He would be quite satisfied if his religious sanction could induce the people to act in accordance with the principle of universal love.

For this purpose, however, it seemed to him that one God is not sufficient. Besides God there are the spirits who have the same function of rewarding the good and punishing the bad as God He said:

"The philosopher kings disappeared. Now in the world, might is right. The sovereigns are not benevolent; the ministers are not loyal. The fathers have no parental love; the sons have no filial piety. The younger pay no respect to the elder; the elder take no care of the younger. . . . The people become adulterous and cruel. Having turned into thieves and robbers, they kill the innocent on the highways with swords, poison, fire, and water in order to steal their cars, horse, clothes, and furs for their own benefit. What is the cause of this? The cause is that people doubt the existence of ghosts and spirits, and do not know that they reward good men and punish the bad. If all people of the

[1] Mo-tse, "Works," Chap. XXVI.

world believe that ghosts and spirits can reward good men and punish the bad, how can the world be in disorder?"[1]

This passage is a good sample of Mo-tse's pragmatic argument for the existence of anything that he considered as useful. From this passage, however, it does not follow that people should make no effort to struggle for their own happiness, but only bribe the spirits and ask their favor. The following passage is an illustration:

"Master Mo-tse was sick. Ti Pi came and asked: 'You, Master, teach that the spirits are wise and can reward good men and punish the bad. Now, you are a sage; how can you be sick? I suppose that you have done something wrong, or that the spirits are not wise.' Master Mo-tse said: 'Although I am sick, it does not follow that the spirits are not wise. There are many ways through which people can be sick. Some become sick on account of the cold or hot weather; some become sick on account of overwork. The house has one hundred doors. If you shut only one of them, the thieves can still come in easily.'"[2]

Thus in spite of the fact that there are Gods and spirits, men still need to help themselves; and, indeed, God and the spirits help only those who help themselves.

For the same pragmatic reason, Mo-tse also denied the theory of predestination. Reward and punishment either by God or by the state are the results of men's voluntary action. If the world is not free, men will not be responsible for their evil doing, and will not be encouraged to do good. They will think, as Mo-tse said:

[1] Mo-tse, "Works," Chap. XXXI.
[2] *Id.*, Chap. XLVIII.

"He who is punished is predestined to be punished but not because he is bad. He who is rewarded is predestined to be rewarded, but not because he is good. Therefore, if one becomes a prince, he will not be righteous; if one becomes a minister, he will not be loyal."[1]

And Mo-tse said elsewhere:

"Teaching people to learn and preaching the doctrine of fatalism is like letting a man cover his head and at the same time uncover it."[2]

(8) The Political Sanction

The whole force of religious sanction, however, is not sufficient. In order to secure peace and prosperity in the world, we need not only a God and many spirits in Heaven, but also a "Leviathan" on earth. Mo-tse's whole political philosophy really reminds us of that of Hobbes. Mo-tse said:

"In ancient times, when mankind had just begun to enter into the world and had no political association, every one had his own standard of right and wrong. If there was one man, there was one standard; if two, two standards; if ten, ten standards; the more men, the more standards. Every one considered his own standard as right and that of others as wrong. Therefore people were against each other. There were hate and aversion, even among father and son and brothers. There were distinction and separation, but no harmony and unity. The people killed each other with water, fire, and poison. They would not help each other even when they had spare energy. They made no gifts to others, even when they had spared wealth. They would not teach each other, even when they had high wisdom. The world was in great disorder; the people were like birds and beasts. They

[1] Mo-tse, "Works," Chap. XXXVI.
[2] *Id.*, Chap. XLVI.

knew that the reason of the disorder was that there was no leader. Therefore, they elected a wise and able man to be their emperor. . . . Then the emperor ordered the people, saying: 'If you hear what is good and what is not good, tell all of it to your superior. What your superior considers as right, all of you must consider as right; what your superior considers as wrong, all of you must consider as wrong.'" [1]

This shows that in what Hobbes called the "natural condition of mankind,"[2] there were great confusion and great misery. Only through the "social contract" did people surrender their "natural right" to the sovereign in order to secure peace.[3] They surrendered because they had to, not because they would.

Now what is it that the emperor considers as good? Mo-tse said:

"The emperor made a proclamation to the people of the world, saying: 'If you see any one who loves and benefits the world, you must report to your superior. If you do this, that means you also love and benefit the world. The superior will reward you and the doer; the people will admire you and the doer. If you see any one who does harm to the world, you must report to your superior. If you do not do this, that means you also do harm to the world. Your superior will punish you and the doer; the people will blame you and the doer.' Therefore, all the people in the world, wishing to receive the reward and the approval, and to avoid the punishment and the disapproval of the superior, report to him all the good and the bad actions. Then the emperor is in a position to reward all good men and punish all the bad.

1 Mo-tse, "Works," Chap. XI.

2 Hobbes, Thomas, "Leviathan," Everyman's Ed., pp. 63, 64.

3 *Id.*, pp. 67, 68.

If all the good are rewarded and all the bad punished, the world will be in perfect peace." [1]

Since the chief cause of the confusion in the natural world is the fact that there are too many standards of right and wrong, so after the establishment of the state, there should be no other standard of right and wrong except the order of the sovereign; there should be no social sanction except political sanction. The following passage may make this point clearer: Mo-tse said:

"Now in the state why is it that the superior cannot control the inferior, and the inferior do not obey the superior, and they thus fight among themselves? The cause of this is that there is no unity in the standard of right and wrong. . . . If one man receives the reward from his superior, but at the same time also the disapproval of the people, then reward will not be able to encourage him to do good. . . . If he receives the punishment from the superior, but at the same time the approval of the people, then the punishment will not be able to discourage him from doing bad. So I calculate that the cause of the fact that the reward of the superior cannot encourage the good, and that the punishment of the superior cannot discourage the bad is that there are too many standards." [2]

This statement is the same as that of Hobbes when he described "the diseases of the Commonwealth," "that proceed from the poison of the seditious doctrines; whereof one is, that every private man is judge of good and evil actions." [3]

[1] Mo-tse, "Works," Chap. XI.
[2] *Id.*, Chap. XIII.
[3] Hobbes, "Leviathan," Everyman's Ed., p. 172.

Mo-tse's theory is "to agree upward, but not downward or otherwise." He proposed that first of all the members of the family must consider the head of the family as the supreme judge of right and wrong. Then the heads of the family must consider the prince of the state as the supreme judge, and unify the standards of their family to "agree upward" with the prince. Then the princes must consider the emperor as the supreme judge and in turn unify the standards of their state to "agree upward" with the emperor. Then the emperor must again consider God as the supreme judge and unify the standards of the world to "agree upward" with Him. Thus in Mo-tse's ideal state, just as in that of Hobbes, there is uniformity but nothing else. Suen-tse afterwards said:

"Mo-tse had vision in uniformity, but not in individuality."[1]

This criticism seems to be justified.

It is to be noticed that although Mo-tse said that God wants people to be so and so, yet as shown above, through the hierarchy of "agreeing upward," only the emperor is in a position to "agree" with God. The net result is that the emperor governs in the name of God and the people can only obey the emperor. Thus both the social and religious sanctions are subordinated to political sanction. We know that one of the teachings of Hobbes's "Leviathan" is that the church, as a lawmaking or governing body, must be fused with the State; otherwise

[1] Suen-tse, "Works," Chap. XVII.

the sovereignty will be fatally split. He also argued that the fact that the people obey their private inspiration or faith instead of the law is one of the causes of the dissolution of the Commonwealth.[1] In Mo-tse the absoluteness of the Will of God and that of the will of the sovereign are combined and thus reconciled by the teaching that only the sovereign can "agree upward" with God and that God can speak only through the sovereign. Instead of an absolute monarchy, he taught an absolute theocracy. But anyway he was in perfect accordance with Hobbes in that sovereignty must be one and the Leviathan must be all-powerful.

(9) Concluding Remarks

We have seen that one obvious fact overlooked by hedonism is the conflict between the different individuals in seeking for pleasure. It thought, therefore, we can get along without state, law, or virtue. But Mo-tse fully recognized the weakness of man. He first set up an objective standard. But any standard, no matter how concrete and objective it is, if it is only a principle, can always be subjected to different interpretations and applications, and therefore is not objective enough. Besides, it has no force to control the uncertainty of human nature. Therefore, he devised to embody the abstract principle in a personified God in Heaven and a monarchical sovereign on earth, who, with the sanctions

[1] Hobbes, "Leviathan," Everyman's Ed., p. 172.

of pleasure and pain, that is, reward and punishment, can induce the people to take the right way to their own greatest benefit.

Here we see the full significance of the old controversy of nature versus convention in the history of Greek philosophy. According to the convention theory, man came to the world from a low origin, and had no root of virtue in his nature. He was virtuous only when he had faced the sheer necessity that he could not be otherwise. To use the expression of deterministic Taoism, man established state, society, law, and virtue, not because he could do so but because he could not but do so. Mo-tse, in opposition to Yang Chu, gave complete justification to social institutions, because he had a conviction of the iron necessity that drives man from behind; because he considered them as the indispensable means to secure remote future pleasure.

The teaching that we should sacrifice everything for the increase of wealth and population may seem strange at first glance. But if we reflect upon the modern theory of evolution and the recent theory of psychoanalysis, this teaching is not strange at all. What does the theory of evolution teach but that all living beings struggle for the preservation of the individual and the preservation of the race? What does the theory of psychoanalysis teach, but that the chief drives of our life are the egoistic and sexual impulse? Mo-tse taught the simple fact that we should subordinate all to, and sacrifice all for, these two fundamental instinctive desires.

He taught the simple fact that every man should have a full stomach, that he should keep the body warm, and that he should produce children in order that the human race may be preserved.

Mo-tse devised the doctrine of universal love and many other means to enforce this great end of the human race. Of course the fundamental conception of the teaching is not only a truth, but also a truism. But that we should sacrifice every kind of immediate enjoyment for that end only is certainly too utilitarian a theory. I say it is too utilitarian, because it pays too much attention to the future. It is in this sense that Mo-tse's philosophy is the best illustration of the defect of utilitarianism. As Yang Chu paid too little attention to future consequences, Mo-tse had too great anxiety about it. Suen-tse afterwards said:

"Mo-tse was blinded by utility and did not know refinement."[1]

And Chuang-tse said:

"Man will sing, but he [Mo-tse] condemns singing; man will wail, but he condemns wailing; man will express joy, but he condemns such expression. Is this truly in accordance with man's nature? Through life toil, and at death niggardliness; causing man sorrow and melancholy and being difficult to be carried into practice; I fear it cannot be regarded as the way of the sages. Contrary to the mind of man, man will not endure it. Though Mo-tse himself might be able to endure it, how is the aversion of the world to it to be overcome?"[2]

[1] Suen-tse, "Works," Chap. XXI.

[2] Chuang-tse, "Works," Chap. XXXIII.

This was Chuang-tse's prophecy of the failure of Moism, and this prophecy was fulfilled.

Mo-tse, however, did not consider refinement, luxury, and the things that give man immediate pleasure, as intrinsically bad. This was to be expected from a utilitarian philosopher. A passage in a book of the second century made this point very clear. In this passage Mo-tse is represented as holding a conversation with one of his famous disciples, Chin Ku-li [Ch'in-tse]; the conversation reads:

"In a year of famine, one wishes to give you a pearl which cannot be sold but only kept for decoration. Another man wishes to give a bushel of grain. If you take the pearl, you cannot take the grain; if you take the grain, you cannot take the pearl. Which will you choose? Chin Ku-li [Ch'in-tse] said: 'I take the wheat, because it can save me from hunger.' Mo-tse said: 'If so, what is the use of luxury? Those that have no utility are not considered as the most important by the sages. You seek for delicious food only when you have had enough food to fill your stomach. You seek for beautiful clothes only when you have had enough clothes to keep your body warm. You seek for amusement only when you have had a definite means of living that will guarantee your safety. This is the art of life that is practical and lasting. Therefore, the procedure of the sages is to have material goods first, then refinement.'" [1]

This shows that Mo-tse considered refinement as a kind of good. What he insisted on was simply another truism that in order to live well, we must first live. But it did seem to him that for mankind as a whole to make a living is not an easy matter. In order that every member

[1] Liu Hsian, "Stories of the Ancients," Chap. XX.

of humanity should have enough food, clothes, and the means of rearing children, every one should work indeed so hard that one scarcely has any time and energy to seek for immediate pleasure. Mo-tse seemed to have in his mind the presupposition that the natural environment of man is so fixed that what man can do is after all but very little. So the best policy for preserving his race is hard work and economy. Thus in spite of the difference between Mo-tse and Yang Chu they both had the feeling that nature is very difficult to modify according to human will. In the face of iron necessity, man can only adapt himself to nature, but not nature to him.

CHAPTER VIII

PROGRESSIVISM: DESCARTES, BACON, AND FICHTE

Han Fei, a philosopher shortly after Mo-tse, said:

"Mo-tse made a wooden bird in three years. It flew in the air for one day, then fell down and broke to pieces. His disciple said: 'You are so skillful, Master, that you can make a wooden bird fly.' Mo-tse said: 'I am not so skillful as those who manufacture the crossbar of the carriage. They simply make it out of a piece of wood in less than one morning. But it makes the car able to carry a very heavy load to a distant place. It is strong and lasting. Now I made a wooden bird in three years, but it could fly only one day and finally fell and broke to pieces.'" [1]

If this story is true, it may indicate that Mo-tse did make some attempt to control nature, but the failure of his experiment caused him to give up his hope. We may ask the question: Why did he not persist in that and make more experiments? A reasonable answer we can give is that he had no faith that this experiment would succeed, and that although the wooden bird might not have any practical value, yet the success of one experiment might lead man to other discoveries that might be of great utility. I venture to say that this faith has played an important rôle in the history of science. We certainly do not expect that men should

[1] Han Fei, "Works," Chap. XXXII.

spend wealth, time, and energy in some persistent experiment if they have not the faith that some sorts of discovery or invention are possible. In other words, they would not persist in making systematic attempts to enlarge the human empire, if they did not have faith that the human empire could be greatly enlarged.

(1) The Significance of Progressivism

The essence of what I called progressivism is precisely this faith. As we shall see, all the philosophers that we are going to consider start with the presupposition that nature is intelligible and manageable, and that the human empire can be greatly enlarged by the invasion of the art of man into the mystery of nature. With this presupposition these philosophers taught modern European peoples to make persistent and systematic experiments in natural science, which is, as Fichte said, "knowledge of nature" and "power over nature."[1] They experimented so that they have succeeded.

It is not significant that they have succeeded, when they worked according to the original presupposition. But it is significant that they should have gained this presupposition at all. Of course, every group of human beings, as soon as it entered the world, produced a state of art as over against the state of nature. But they usually produced the state of art in a piecemeal way to meet immediate necessity rather than by a systematic plan with the self-consciousness that they are thereby

[1] Fichte, I. G., "The Vocation of Scholar," Popular Works, tr. by W. Smith, London, 1873, p. 156.

going to become the masters of nature. In comparison with the universe, man is after all too small to have easily the persistent idea that he is to become its master. There have been the mystics, who became proud of the greatness of man by identifying all with the One. But that is quite different from the persistent idea that man, although side by side with nature, yet can control her with his mighty intellect. It does not seem strange that man should not have this persistent idea, but it does seem strange that man should have it. Thus, there is the question: Whence did the European people acquire this persistent idea? or, What is the origin of progressivism?

(2) Its Relation to the Christian Middle Ages

The answer is that they acquired the idea from the Christian Middle Ages; the origin of modernism is medievalism. We have seen that most of the philosophies belonging to the "nature" line of thought have the conviction of the superiority of spirit over matter. But Christianity[1] specially emphasized that spirit as an individual personality standing outside the world, yet creating and controlling the world with His infinite knowledge and infinite power. We have seen that most of those philosophies teach that God and man are originally one, or even if not so, that they are originally friends or companions. But in Christianity the relation

[1] Under "Christianity" we include whatever it took over from the Jewish religion.

between God and man is constructed in essentially legal terms. God is creditor, judge, and king; man is debtor, culprit, and subject. God said:

"I am the Lord, and there is none else. . . . I form the light, and create darkness: I make peace, and create evil: I the Lord do all these things."[1]

As to man it is said:

"And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground; and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul."[2]

Comparing these two passages we see how Christianity elevated God at the expense of man. But this is not all. We have seen that all these philosophies belonging to the "nature" line of thought had a conviction of the existence of the "lost paradise." But in Christianity the Garden of Eden is a concrete place with concrete things for concrete individuals. In fact the Garden of Eden is in no way different from the world garden, except that the former is in Heaven, and that in the former one could eat bread without the sweat of the brow. We have seen that according to most of those philosophies belonging to the "nature" line of thought, although there is the antithesis between the world we are now in and the world we came from, yet every one of us has the free will to return to that "fatherland." But according to Christianity, after the fall of man by the condemnation of God, man can never return to the lost

[1] Isa. 45:5–7.
[2] Gen. 2:7.

paradise without God's grace. Augustine held passionately that the nature of man is sinful through and through, and has lost utterly the *liberum arbitrium* to good. Salvation, therefore, comes exclusively through grace. Fearing that people may doubt why God, in view of His infinite benevolence and infinite power, does not give all mankind the divine grace, Augustine said:

"Who will be so foolish and blasphemous as to say that God cannot change the evils of man, whichever, whenever, and wherever He chooses, and direct them to what is good? But when He does it, He does it of mercy; when He does it not, it is of justice that He does it not."[1]

"The whole human race was condemned in its rebellious head by a divine judgment so just, that if not a single member of the race had been redeemed, no one could justly question the justice of God."[2]

Thus God can redeem all, and He will purposely not redeem all. He must redeem some to show His mercy, but at the same time He must condemn some to show His justice. The decision as to whom He will redeem and whom He will condemn is absolutely according to His own arbitrary will. Thus to his people Moses said:

"For thou art an holy people unto the Lord thy God: the Lord thy God hath chosen thee to be a special people unto Himself, above all people that are upon the face of the earth. The Lord did not set His love upon you, nor choose you, because ye were more in number than any people; for ye *were* the fewest of all people. Speak not thou in thine

1 Augustine, Aurelius Saint, "Enchiridion," 98.
2 *Ibid.*

heart . . . saying . . . for my righteousness the Lord hath brought me in to possess this land; but for the wickedness of these nations the Lord doth drive them out from before thee. Not for thy righteousness, or for the uprightness of thine heart, dost thou go to possess their land; . . . for thou art a stiffnecked people."[1]

This shows how arbitrary the "election" of God is. Although there is a "City of God," man can enter it neither by his merits, nor by his virtue, but only by the free gift of God. Just as in an empire of absolute monarchy, although there is a government, the people can never take part in it unless the sovereign shows his mercy. But when the arbitrariness of the sovereign goes to the extreme, the people revolt and establish a government themselves. In the same way when the European peoples despaired of the attempt to return to the "City of God," they gave it up. They wanted no more "City of God"; they wanted a "Kingdom of Man."

Thus the European peoples got the idea of the mastery of man over nature, because they had the idea of an individual personality that stands outside the world, yet can create and control it, with his infinite knowledge and infinite power. They got the idea of the kingdom of man in which men have most of the material goods without much labor, because they had the suggestion of the Garden of Eden, in which men eat bread without the sweat of their face. They wanted to imitate God and build a Garden of Eden on earth, because the City

[1] Deut. 7: 6, 7; 9: 4–6.

in Heaven can be entered only by the permission of God, and God is a "jealous God."

(3) Descartes' Motivation for Knowledge

Thus Descartes said:

"I revered our theology, and aspired as much as any one to reach the heavens, but being given assuredly to understand that the way is not less open to the most ignorant than to the most learned, and that the revealed truths which lead to heaven are above our comprehension, I did not presume to subject them to the impotency of my reason; and I thought that in order competently to undertake their examination, there was need of some special help from heaven, and of being more than man."[1]

This passage seems to show not so much that Descartes dismissed theology with pretended courtesy as that he spoke sincerely of his despair in religion. He aspired to reach heaven, but found that the way was open only to those "elected" who had special help from God. He found one thing, however, that is very fortunate for mankind to have. In the first sentence of his Discourse on Method, he said:

"Good sense is, of all things among men, the most equally distributed; for every one thinks himself so abundantly provided with it that those even who are the most difficult to satisfy in everything else, do not usually desire a larger measure of this quality than they already possess. And in this it is not likely that all are mistaken: the conviction is rather to be held as testifying that the power of judging aright and of distinguishing truth from error, which is properly what is called good sense or reason, is by nature equal in all men."[2]

[1] Descartes, René, "Discourse on Method," Everyman's Ed., pp. 7, 8.
[2] *Id.*, p. 1.

Thus although God did not reveal to all men the "truths which lead to heaven," yet every man has his natural reason by which he can know the truth at least on earth. Why should man not stand on his own feet?

"God is in truth the only being who is absolutely wise, that is, possesses a perfect knowledge of all things; but we may say that men are more or less wise as their knowledge of the most important truths is greater or less." [1]

Then why should not men try their best to struggle for the most important truths? Thus Descartes put aside theology, and, with his natural good sense, he devoted himself to the knowledge of himself and of "the great book of the world." [2]

(4) His Method

Like a boy leaving his parental roof to see the world, Descartes took every care to guard himself against its trick, its deception. He determined to accept nothing as truth which he did not clearly know to be such.[3] He determined to reject as absolutely false all opinions in regard to which he could suppose the least ground for doubt. He doubted his sense and reasoning. He considered all thought entering his mind as having no more truth than an illusion and dream. Finally, however, he found one thing at least that he could not doubt, that is, himself. "I think, therefore I am," or, "I doubt, therefore I am." [4]

[1] Descartes, "The Principles of Philosophy," Everyman's Ed., p. 148.
[2] Descartes, "Discourse on Method," Everyman's Ed., p. 8.
[3] *Id.*, p. 15.
[4] *Id.*, pp. 26, 27.

Thus everything in this world can be doubted, but the "I" cannot be doubted. Everything in this world may be false, but the "I" must be real. This is a self-assertion. The essence of progressivism is the "I" becoming self-conscious. The reason that the "I" becomes self-conscious is clear. According to Christianity, the individual man is only an individual. He has no internal connection with God or the universe. Therefore when he declared independence and started to establish his own empire, he could not but have the feeling that he was alone in an alien world. He dared not *trust* the world. He dared not *trust* even his sense. He thought that if anything is to be trusted, it must show its *credentials*, it must be *proved*. This is the reason why in the history of modern European philosophy, there was a sharp contrast between the subject and the object.[1] This is the reason why, in the history of modern European philosophy, epistemology has become a distinctive philosophical problem.

Returning to Descartes, we see that when he made a conscious assertion of what he had unconsciously presumed all along the way, he faced immediately the problem: Granted that I think, and therefore am, how can I know the outside world? This soon became one of the most important problems in modern European philosophy. Descartes started this problem; but as to its solution, he was at a loss. He was compelled to

[1] Cp. "The Logic of Hegel," tr. from "The Encyclopedia of Philosophic Science," by W. Wallace, Oxford, 1892, p. 43.

go back to God. He first restored God to the throne with his ontological argument, then he said :

" But after I have discovered that God exists, seeing I also at the same time observed that all things depend on him, and that he is no deceiver, and thence inferred that all which I clearly and distinctly perceive is of necessity true : although I no longer attend to the grounds of a judgment, no opposite reason can be alleged sufficient to lead me to doubt of its truth, provided only I remember that I once possessed a clear and distinct comprehension of it. My knowledge of it thus becomes true and certain. "[1]

Thus the boy, having failed to deal with the world, came back again to his father's house, and said again : " A thing is so and so, because father says so and so, and father is no deceiver ! "

(5) His Aim

Whatever the result of Descartes' research might be, his spirit certainly had far-reaching consequences. His aim was to give man a new philosophy. He said :

" The word ' philosophy ' signifies the study of wisdom, and that by wisdom is to be understood not merely prudence in the management of affairs, but a perfect knowledge of all that man can know, as well for the conduct of his life as for the preservation of his health and the discovery of all the arts, and that knowledge to subserve these ends must necessarily be deduced from first causes ; so that in order to study the acquisition of it (which is properly called philosophizing), we must commence with the investigation of those first causes which are called *Principles.* "[2]

" We ought to believe that it is by it [philosophy] that we are distinguished from the savages and barbarians, and

[1] Descartes, " Meditations on the First Philosophy," Everyman's Ed., pp. 125, 126.

[2] Descartes, " The Principles of Philosophy, " Everyman's Ed., pp. 147, 148.

that the civilization and the culture of a nation are regulated by the degree in which true philosophy flourishes in it."[1]

"The supreme good, considered by natural reason without the light of faith, is nothing more than the knowledge of truth through its first cause."[2]

"Thus all philosophy is like a tree, of which metaphysics is the root, physics the trunk, and all the other sciences the branches that grow out of this trunk, which are reduced to three principles, namely: medicine, mechanics, and ethics. By the science of morals I understand the highest and most perfect, which presupposing an entire knowledge of the other sciences, is the last degree of wisdom."[3]

And in another place, when he spoke of some of his generalizations respecting physics, he said:

"By them I perceived it to be possible to arrive at knowledge highly useful in life; and in room of the speculative philosophy usually taught in the schools, to discover a practical, by means of which, knowing the force and action of fire, water, air, the stars, and the heavens, and all the other bodies that surround us, as distinctly as we know the various crafts of our artisans, we might also apply them in the same way to all the uses to which they are adapted, and thus render ourselves the lords and possessors of nature. And this is a result to be desired, not only in order to the invention of an infinity of arts, by which we might be enabled to enjoy without any trouble the fruits of the earth, and all of its comforts, but also and especially for the preservation of health, which is without doubt, of all the blessings of this life, the first and fundamental one."[4]

Thus Descartes' aim was to give man a new philosophy, which, if completed, would contain the fundamental

1 Descartes, "The Principles of Philosophy," Everyman's Ed., p. 148.
2 *Id.*, p. 149.
3 *Id.*, pp. 156, 157.
4 Descartes, "Discourse on Method," Everyman's Ed., p. 49.

principles of all branches of human knowledge, and would give mankind all the satisfactions, both intellectual and practical. He thought that he had made a good start and hoped that posterity would continue his work. He said :

" The height of my wish is, that posterity may sometime behold the happy issue of it, etc." [1]

That " posterity may sometimes behold the happy issue " is the essential faith of progressivism.

(6) Bacon's Motivation for Power

Thus Descartes first taught man to seek for increase of knowledge, and through it, for increase of power. There was another philosopher who taught man to seek increase of power, and for the sake of power, to seek increase of knowledge. He was Bacon. Just as Descartes opened his " Discourse on Method " by appealing to man's natural good sense, Bacon opened his " Great Instauration " with the same statement. He said :

" Being convinced that the human intellect makes its own difficulties, and not using the true helps which are at man's disposal soberly and judiciously ; whence follows manifold ignorance of things, and by reason of that ignorance mischiefs innumerable ; he [Bacon himself] thought all trial should be made, whether that commerce between the mind of man and the nature of things, which is more precious than anything on earth, or at least anything that is of the earth, might by any means be restored to its perfect and original

[1] Descartes, " The Principles of Philosophy, " Everyman's Ed., p. 161.

condition, or if that may not be, yet reduced to a better condition than that in which it now is."[1]

"It seems to me that men do not rightly understand either their store or their strength, but overrate the one and underrate the other. Hence it follows that either from an extravagant estimate of the value of the arts which they possess, they seek no further, or else from too mean an estimate of their own powers, they spend their strength in small matters and never put it fairly to the trial in those which go to the main. These are as the pillars of fate set in the path of knowledge; for men have neither desire nor hope to encourage them to penetrate further."[2]

These statements are again to tell man that if he wants to improve the existing world, he should not underrate his own strength, and should not neglect the true helps that are at his own disposal. That is to say, from now on, man should stand on his own feet and establish his own empire.

In order to establish his own empire, he must first establish his power. In order to have his own power, he must first have his own knowledge. For "human knowledge and human power, those twin objects, do really meet in one; and it is from the ignorance of cause that operation fails."[3] Bacon said:

"And therefore it is not the pleasure of curiosity, nor the quiet of resolution, nor the raising of the spirit, nor the victory of wit, nor the faculty of speech, nor lucre of profession, nor ambition of honor or fame, not enablement for business, that are the true ends of knowledge; some of these things

1 Bacon, Francis, "Works," Popular Edition, Vol. I, "The Great Instauration," p. 17.

2 *Id.*, p. 25.

3 Bacon, "Works," Popular Ed., "Novum Organum," p. 53.

being more worthy than others, though all inferior and degenerate : but it is a restitution and reinvesting (in great part) of man to the sovereignty and power (for whensoever he shall be able to call the creatures by their true names he shall again command them) which he had in his first state of creation. "[1]

In other words the end of knowledge is to imitate God. Bacon said :

" Again discoveries are as it were new creations, and imitations of God's work ; as well sang the poet:

" 'To man's frail race great Athens long ago
First gave the seed whence waving harvests grow,
And *recreate* all our life below. '" [2]

From this passage we can also see how the Christian idea of creation influenced science. If God, as an individual, can create the world, why cannot man, also as an individual, create something at least in the world ? If he can create something in the world, he is God at least in the world. If he can recreate his life below, he is God at least in the life below.

(7) His Method

Having seen Bacon's motivation for power and thus for knowledge, we come to see what he considered as the right method to knowledge. One of the chief defects of Descartes' method is that he depended solely upon the subjective natural good sense. He thought that the natural good sense has " the power of judging aright and of distinguishing truth from error, " if only we " rightly apply it " and " fix our attention on the same subject." [3]

[1] Bacon, "Works," Popular Ed., "Of the Interpretation of Nature," p. 34.
[2] *Id.*, " Novum Organum, " p. 161.
[3] Descartes, " Discourse on Method, " Everyman's Ed., p. 3.

But, with innocent good sense, after he made the first discovery, he had no way to go from the subjective to the objective, except by what Bacon called the "anticipation of mind," that is, by forcing his old conception of God to objective reality in order to support it. In short, he started with a purely subjective method and ended with it.

Bacon, however, not only emphasized the natural force of understanding, but also the "help of the aids and instruments of logic."[1] He knew the fact that "neither the naked hand nor the understanding left to itself can effect much," and that "it is by instruments and helps that the work is done."[2] He also taught that in order that man may be the master of nature, man must first be the "servant and interpreter of nature";[3] that is to say, in order to control nature, man must first obey her. Therefore, the "anticipation of the mind" must be replaced by the "interpretation of nature." The old ideas, concepts, natural bias, and conventional belief, in short, all the idols of the mind, must be cleared away, so that the entire work may start afresh. In this new start, the understanding itself must be "from the very outset not left to take its own course, but guided at every step; and the business be done as if by machinery."[4] In this new start, the understanding must first go to experience, which is the foundation of all

1 Bacon, "Works," Popular Ed., "The Great Instauration," p. 17.
2 *Id.*, "Novum Organum," p. 67.
3 *Ibid.*
4 *Id.*, pp. 60, 61.

science.[1] The understanding must first seek information, evidence, and material in natural history. Then the understanding must arrange these materials according to what Bacon called "the tables of discovery" in order to investigate their true cause, which is the end of human knowledge. To use Bacon's metaphor, the business of philosophy is like the bee, that "gathers its material from the flowers of the garden and of the field, but transforms and digests it by a power of its own." [2]

But when the understanding has discovered the cause, how does it know that this is the true one? To Bacon, the true cause is distinguished from the false not by its being a clear idea, but by its being able to work. He said:

"That which in contemplation is as the cause is in operation as the rule." [3]

"What in operation is most useful, that in knowledge is most true." [4]

Thus Bacon's method is to start from the object and to end with it. This is one point that differentiates Bacon from Descartes.

(8) His Aim

Armed with this method, Bacon thought that we can know the cause of things and thus control them with certainty and liberty—with certainty when we can

[1] Bacon, "Works," Popular Ed., "Novum Organum," p. 133.
[2] *Id.*, p. 131.
[3] *Id.*, p. 68.
[4] *Id.*, p. 171.

control them not only sometime and somewhere, but all time and everywhere, with liberty when we can control them not only with one means, but with many means.[1] Thus the more we are advanced in knowledge, the more are we like God. Indeed, in comparison with barbarians, the civilized people are already God. Bacon said :

" Again, let a man only consider what a difference there is between the life of men in the most civilized province of Europe, and the wildest and most barbarous districts of New India ; he will feel it to be great enough to justify the saying that ' man is a god to man, ' not only in regard to aid and benefit, but also by a comparison of condition. And this difference comes not from soil, not from climate, not from race, but from the art. "[2]

Speaking of the three great inventions of his time, namely, printing, gunpowder, and the magnet, he said :

" These three have changed the whole face and the state of things throughout the world. It will not be amiss to distinguish the three kinds and, as it were, grades of ambition in mankind. The first is of those who desire to extend their own power in their native country ; which kind is vulgar and degenerate. The second is of those who labor to extend the power of their country and its dominion among men. This certainly has more dignity, though not less covetousness. But if a man endeavor to establish and to extend the dominion of the human race itself over the universe, his ambition (if ambition it can be called) is without doubt both a more wholesome thing and a more noble than the other two." [3]

Thus with the many discoveries and inventions we had already in hand, and with the increase of the higher

[1] Bacon, "Works," Popular Ed., "Of the Interpretation of Nature," p. 53; cp. " Novum Organum, " p. 170.

[2] *Id.*, " Novum Organum, " p. 162.

[3] *Ibid.*

ambition of mankind, may we not reasonably have a great hope of the most brilliant success of the future? Bacon did not think, as Descartes did, that in the future there would be one philosophy which would embody the fundamental principles of all the branches of human knowledge. He thought that there should be organization of scientists to do these works, and that it was the duty of the state to give it the highest honor. This organization is called in his "New Atlantis," "Solomon's House." As the Father of the House said:

"The end of our foundation is the knowledge of the Causes, and secret motions of things; and the enlarging of the bounds of Human Empire, to the effecting of all things possible."[1]

"To the effecting of all things possible" is another essential faith of progressivism.

(9) Fichte's Interest in Moral Progress

The hope of Bacon was also the hope of Fichte. Fichte said:

"Science, first called into existence by the pressure of necessity, shall afterwards calmly and carefully investigate the unchangeable laws of nature, review its power at large and learn to calculate their possible manifestations. . . . Thus Nature ever becomes more and more intelligible and transparent even in her most secret depths; human power, enlightened and armed by human invention, shall rule over her without difficulty, and the conquest, once made, shall be peacefully maintained. This domination of man over Nature shall be gradually extended until, at length, no further expenditure of mechanical labor shall be necessary than what the human body requires for its development,

[1] Bacon, "Works," Popular Ed., "New Atlantis," p. 398.

cultivation, and health and this labor shall cease to be a burden; for a reasonable being is not destined to be a bearer of burdens."[1]

This is just the prophecy of Bacon. The industrial revolution of the modern time is the reply of this prophecy. Since the industrial revolution, it is true that human empire has been gradually enlarged through the invasion of man into the mystery of nature. But has this solved the problem of life? No, not at all. Through the application of the new science, feudalism was doomed, but capitalism took its place. Production and commerce were carried on as if the new science had no moral lesson, but only the technical lessons for the strong to oppress the weak, for the few to oppress the many. What Bacon called the two lower grades of human ambition cannot be decreased with the increase of that of the third grade. There is still the new danger, the new wave, as Plato would say, that will destroy the human empire. Fichte foresaw it. He foresaw that the crudest enemy of man is after all but man himself. He foresaw the terrible warfare of the modern civilized nations. He said:

"Where culture has at length united these wild hordes under some social bond, they attack each other, as nations, with the power which law and function have given them. Defying toil and privation, their armies traverse peaceful plains and forests; they meet each other; and the sight of their brethren is the signal of slaughter. Equipped with the mightiest invention of human intellect, hostile fleets plow their way through the ocean; through storm and

[1] Fichte, "The Vocation of Man," Popular Works, pp. 331, 332.

tempest man rushes to meet his fellow man upon the lonely inhospitable sea;—they meet, and defy the fury of the elements that they may destroy each other with their own hands." [1]

This was Fichte's prophecy of the future evil, and this prophecy was fulfilled. But Fichte foresaw also that this state of war among the nations could not go on forever. As the savage tribes had gradually become the modern nations, so the modern nations will gradually be united into a great whole of humanity. With the improvement in moral education, man will no longer act according to what Bacon called the two lower grades of ambition, but only to the ambition of the third grade. Thus "man shall no longer be divided by selfish purposes, nor their powers exhausted in struggles towards each other." "Nothing will remain for them but to direct their united strength against the one common enemy, which still remains unsubdued—resisting uncultivated nature." [2] Thus "will the empire of civilization, freedom, and with it universal peace, gradually embrace the whole world." [3]

In the history of philosophy it is the dream of not a few people that *some time in the future* there *must be* a time when the individuals will spontaneously strive for the "greatest happiness of the greatest number." They will do it not because of religious, social, and political sanctions, as Mo-tse, Hobbes, and Bentham thought, but simply because of the fact that only in doing so can

[1] Fichte, "The Vocation of Man," Popular Works, p. 332.
[2] *Id.*, p. 339.
[3] *Id.*, p. 338.

they find the greatest satisfaction and the true good. Thus, besides Fichte, there was Comte who believed that through his positivistic philosophy "spontaneous morality" [1] would be established. There was Spencer who believed that through the natural process of evolution human nature would be modified in such a way that "what now characterizes the exceptional high may be expected eventually to characterize all." [2] All these philosophers had faith in progress and evolution. But among them Fichte was the one who expressed most clearly the spirit of progressivism. For, referring to his exposition of the highest state of human life, he said:

"Yes! it is attainable *in life* and *through life*, for reason commands me to live;—it is attainable, for I am." [3]

(10) His Assertion of Will

Why must the highest state be attainable? simply because of the fact that it is commanded by reason and that "I am"? To answer this question we must first know what Fichte meant when he spoke of reason and "I."

We have seen that Descartes and Bacon led man to a new type of life through the general reaction of their time against Christianity. It remains to be said that although they gave man a new idea of life, they had not

[1] Comte, Auguste, "A System of Positive Polity," London, 1875, 3 vols., Vol. I, p. 321.

[2] Spencer, Herbert, "Principle of Ethics," New York, 1898, p. 257.

[3] Fichte, "The Vocation of Man," Popular Works, p. 341.

yet given a new metaphysical justification of it. What they taught is indeed a rebellion against Christianity, yet they still tried to justify themselves in Christianity. Descartes said:

"For since God has endowed each of us with some light of reason by which to distinguish truth and error, I could not have believed that I ought for a single moment to rest satisfied with the opinions of another, unless I had resolved to exercise my own judgment in examining these whenever I should be only qualified for the task."[1]

And Bacon said:

"For it was not that pure and uncorrupted natural knowledge whereby Adam gave names to the creatures according to their propriety, which gave occasion to the fall. It was the ambitious and proud desire of moral knowledge to judge of good and evil, to the end that man may revolt from God and give laws to himself, which was the form and manner of the temptation. Whereas of the sciences which regard nature, the divine philosopher declares that 'it is the glory of God to conceal a thing, but it is the glory of the king to find the thing out.'"[2]

These passages are to be considered not so much as the pretended courtesy of the two philosophers towards Christianity as their self-rationalization for reconciling their inner conflict. This conflict was in fact the conflict of medieval and modern Europe; and this self-rationalization was no doubt made by most people at that time. But this reconciliation was obviously not very satisfactory. It was not accepted by the Church.

[1] Descartes, "Discourse on Method," Everyman's Ed., pp. 22, 23.

[2] Bacon, "Works," Pop. Ed., "The Great Instauration," pp. 35, 36.

So this new idea of life, in order to be valid in man's thought, must have a new metaphysical justification. This justification was given, consciously or unconsciously, by Fichte.

Fichte made the starting point of his philosophy the proposition, A = A, a proposition at once recognized by us as true. In affirming this proposition we also affirm our own existence, for the affirmation itself is our mental action. This proposition, therefore, may be changed into: Ego = Ego. Thus the Ego posited itself.[1] This was the same procedure as that of Descartes. But to Descartes, thinking is the essence of the Ego; while to Fichte, "thinking is not the essence, but merely a particular determination of the Ego; and there are many other determinations of the Ego."[2] To Fichte, the essence of the Ego is activity, which is synonymous with reality.[3] To Descartes, the existence of the objective world outside the Ego is guaranteed by the old God, the God who separates from, and transcends man and world. To Fichte, the objective world is the manifestation of the new God who is man's own *will* in its original whole. What he called reason is this will; what he called the "I," the finite Ego, is the will in the manifested world. So he said:

"I am a member of two orders:—the one purely spiritual, in which I rule by my will alone; the other sensuous, in which I operate by my deed. . . . The will is the living principle

[1] Fichte, "The Science of Knowledge," tr. by Kreoger, London, 1889, pp. 67, 69.
[2] *Id.*, p. 73.
[3] *Id.*, pp. 114, 115.

of reason—is itself reason, when purely and simply apprehended. . . . As surely as the reason is reason, must the will operate absolutely by itself, and independently of the natural laws by which material action is determined;—and hence the sensuous life of every finite being points towards a higher, into which the will, by itself alone, may open the way, and of which it may acquire possession,—a possession which we must indeed again sensuously conceive of as a state, and not a mere will."[1]

Thus the finite Ego should strive forward, because it is his essence to strive forward. His future success is guaranteed, because it is the Absolute Ego behind him that seeks possession. Thus the highest state must be attainable, because it is commanded by reason and because "I" am. Thus with this new metaphysics man is not only to imitate God on earth, his very subjective personality is elevated to the place of God. The Will is a God with His knowledge and his power, except that it did not create the world in six days and finish everything, but had to acquire possession now and to enjoy the fruits in the future. In this sense, it is not a God, but a would-be God.

Obviously there is a striking similarity between Fichte and Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer also considered the will as the thing-in-itself, and its manifestation as the sensuous world. He also considered the fact that the individual always strives forward to be due to the very nature of the will. The difference between these two philosophers is not in the vision of the fact, but simply in the evaluation of it. In the ever-struggling will,

[1] Fichte, "The Vocation of Man," Popular Works, pp 350, 351.

Schopenhauer found sorrow and despair, but Fichte found joy and hope. To Schopenhauer the will is something that leads man astray; to Fichte, it is the Father "who rulest all things for the best."[1] To Schopenhauer, as to the Buddhists, the continuous flux of life and death is the chief source of human suffering; to Fichte, "death and birth are but the struggle of life with itself to assume a more glorious and congenial form."[2] In short, what Schopenhauer considered as the blind will, Fichte considered as an enlightened reason. What Schopenhauer considered as devil, Fichte considered as God. Therefore Schopenhauer taught man the absolute denial of will, Fichte taught the absolute assertion of it; the philosophy of the former is an extreme idealization of nature, that of the latter is an extreme idealization of art.

(11) His Appeal to Faith

But what is the ground on which these philosophies passed the opposite judgments upon the will? The following quotation from Fichte will give the answer. Referring to the highest state of human life, Fichte said:

"This is not an object given to us only that we may strive after it for the mere purpose of exercising our power on something great, the real existence of which we may be compelled to doubt; it shall, it must be realized; there must be a time, in which it shall be accomplished, as surely as there is a sensible world and a race of reasonable beings existent in time

[1] Fichte, "The Vocation of Man," Popular Works, p. 365.
[2] *Id.*, p. 378.

with respect to which nothing earnest and rational is conceivable besides this purpose, and whose existence becomes intelligible only through this purpose. Unless all human life be metamorphosed into a mere theatrical display for the gratification of some malignant spirit, who has implanted in poor humanity this inextinguishable longing for the imperishable only to amuse himself with its ceaseless pursuit of that which it can never overtake—its ever-repeated efforts Ixion-like, to embrace that which still eludes its grasp—its restless hurrying onward in an ever-recurring circle—only to mock its earnest aspiration with an empty, insipid farce;—unless the wise man, seeing through this mockery, and feeling an irreprehensible disgust at continuing to play his part in it, is to cast life indignantly from him and make the moment of awakening to reason also that of his physical death ; unless these things are so, this purpose most assuredly must be attainable."[1]

Here Fichte argued in a circle. He insisted that if life is not to be a mere theatrical display, a mere farce, this highest purpose of human life must be attained, and that if it cannot be attained, life must be a mere theatrical display, a mere farce. He seemed to presuppose that it is intrinsically unreasonable to say that life is a mere farce. But this is exactly what Schopenhauer said. To him life *is* a farce, an illusion, a dream. It is so because we can see it only as an ever-repeated game, which tends to nothing and signifies nothing, and from our past experience, we cannot see that there will be something as *summum bonum*, which can satisfy the will once for all. Therefore, the wise man should see "through this mockery." He should feel disgust

[1] Fichte, "The Vocation of Man," Popular Works, pp. 340, 341.

at continuing to play this meaningless game. Besides, in casting away life, he needs something more than physical death, because physical death is only the death of the sensible, but not that of the spiritual world. He needs the absolute denial of will and thus to return to the "nothing" which is his lost paradise. The reason for which Schopenhauer taught the absolute denial of will is the conviction that there cannot be a final goal for the will; while that for which Fichte taught the absolute assertion of will is the opposite conviction that there must be a final goal.

But what is Fichte's argument for his conviction? He had no argument; he appealed to faith. He appealed to faith that the will must have a "spiritual world plan";[1] that there must be a "great moral empire"[2] and "that there is one world possible—a thoroughly good world."[3] The present state of this world is "a means towards a better and the transition point to a higher world and more perfect state."[4] He felt satisfied to be the "instrument of this progress," "the instrument for carrying out the purpose of reason."[5] He felt satisfied to have faith in a "law, a rule, absolutely without exception, according to which a will determined by duty must have consequences."[6] He felt satisfied that he knew "that they must be, although he did not know 'how they

1 Fichte, "The Vocation of Man," Popular Works, p. 366.
2 *Id.*, p. 367.
3 *Id.*, p. 368.
4 *Id.*, p. 329.
5 *Id.*, p. 373.
6 *Id.*, p. 356.

shall be.'" [1] He felt satisfied that "all that happens belongs to the plan of the eternal world, and is good in its place," although he did not know "what in this plan is pure gain, what is only a means for the removal of some existing evil." [2] In short, he felt satisfied to act according to the command of reason that sets before man the purpose, for the "infallible attainment" of which she is also the "pledge and security." [3]

(12) Concluding Remarks

We have made a brief survey of progressivism. Being different from the teaching of passive adaptation to nature as taught by hedonism and utilitarianism, progressivism teaches man to strive for a new state in which all that is bad and ugly in nature is converted into the good and the beautiful; a new state, in short, in which human art reaches its climax. In contrast with nihilism that teaches man to return to the state of "nothing," progressivism teaches man to strive for the state of the fullest and the richest of all human experience.

In his "Reconstruction of Philosophy," Professor Dewey says:

"Francis Bacon of the Elizabethan age is the great forerunner of the spirit of modern life. Though slight in accomplishment, as a prophet of new tendencies, he is an outstanding figure of the world of intellectual life. Like many other prophets he suffered from confused intermingling of old and new. What is most significant in him has been rendered more

[1] Fichte, "The Vocation of Man," Popular Works, p. 357.
[2] *Id.*, p. 372.
[3] *Id.*, p. 340.

or less familiar by the course of events. But page after page is filled with matter which belongs to the past from which Bacon thought he had escaped. Caught between these two sources of easy disparagement, Bacon hardly receives his due as the real founder of modern thought, while he is praised for merits which scarcely belong to him, such as the alleged authorship of the specific method of induction pursued by science. What makes Bacon memorable is that breezes blowing from a new world caught and filled his sails and stirred him to adventure in new seas. He never himself discovered the land of promise, but he proclaimed the new goal and with faith he descried its features from afar." [1]

What is true of Bacon is also true of Descartes. These two philosophers did not give man new good, but only a new idea of good. Fichte gave this new idea of good a metaphysical justification, and with this justification progressivism in Germany had its full expression, both of its excellence and of its defects. Without further remarks, I shall conclude my brief exposition of progressivism with a passage from the " Lieh-tse " :

" [There are] two mountains, T'ai-hsing and Wang-wu, which cover an area of seven hundred square *li*, and rise to an enormous altitude. . . . The Simpleton of the North Mountain, a man of ninety, dwelt opposite these mountains, and was vexed in spirit because their northern flanks blocked the way to travelers, who had to go all the way round. So he called all his family together and broached a plan. ' Let us, ' he said, ' put forth our utmost strength to clear away this obstacle, and cut right through the mountains.' . . . So the old man, followed by his son and grandson, sallied forth with their pickaxes, and the three of them began hewing away at the rocks, and cutting up the soil, and carting it away in baskets to the promontory of P'o-hai. . . . Engrossed in their toil, they never went home except once at

[1] Dewey, John, " Reconstruction of Philosophy, " New York, 1920, p. 28.

the turn of the season. The Wise Old Man of the River-bend burst out laughing and urged them to stop. 'Great indeed is your witlessness!' he said. 'With the poor remaining strength of your declining years you will not succeed in removing a hair's breadth of the mountain, much less the whole vast mass of rock and soil.' With a sigh, the Simpleton of the North Mountain replied: 'Surely it is you who are narrow-minded and unreasonable. . . . Though I myself must die, I shall leave a son behind me, and through him a grandson. That grandson will beget sons in his turn, and those sons will also have sons and grandsons. With all this posterity, my line will not die out, while on the other hand the mountain will receive no increment or addition. Why then should I despair of leveling it to the ground at last?' The Wise Old Man of the River-bend had nothing to say in reply. One of the serpent-brandishing deities heard of the undertaking and, fearing that it might never be finished, went and told God Almighty, who was touched by the old man's simple faith, and commanded the two sons of K'ua O to transport the mountains. . . . Ever since then the region lying between Chi in the north and Han in the south has been an unbroken plain."[1]

It is clear that Bacon and Descartes were members of the Family of Fools. Fichte, being also a member of the family and fearing that his sons and grandsons might be discouraged by the great task on their hands, made a special appeal to God Almighty, whom he called the Absolute Ego.

[1] Giles, Lionel, "Taoist Teachings from the Book of Lieh Tzŭ," London, 1912, p. 86.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION OF PART II

The types of philosophy that we have considered above seem to have three common points; namely, hedonism, intellectualism, and egoism.

(1) Hedonism

Here we use the word "hedonism" in a broader sense than above to denote all the theories that teach man to seek the satisfaction of desires. The "nature" line of thought considered desire as responsible for the "fall" of man, but the "art" line of thought that there is no other good besides the satisfaction of desires. If we are in a state in which we can satisfy all or most of our desires, that state *is* our paradise. We have had no other paradise in the past. This is the common presupposition of the "art" line of thought. Of course, Fichte spoke of "reason," "conscience," and "duty" as emphatically as any idealistic philosopher did. But according to him, the living principle is the Absolute Will, and the obedience of reason is our duty. But what is that Absolute Will, if not the will in Schopenhauer? Pure will without desires is meaningless. Will is after all but a metaphysical rationalization of desires. The

net result of his philosophy is to us simply that we all should unite to satisfy the craving of the Absolute Will, but not that of the individual as such. To us he did not condemn desires; he simply condemned selfish desires.

(2) Intellectualism

The "nature" line of thought considered intellect as also something that is responsible for man's "fall." It is only through the denial of intellect that we can get truth and happiness. But according to the "art" line of thought, happiness and truth can be gained by us only through intellect. As to happiness, we have seen that even in hedonism (the first type of the "art" line of thought), that seeks nothing but the immediate pleasure, there is a strong need of intellect to make choices and especially to get rid of superstition and thus escape from the fear of death. In utilitarianism there is the need of intellect to foresee future consequences, to make calculations and to prepare the means. In progressivism the will, to use Schopenhauer's expression, is most asserted, and therefore intellect is most needed to do its service. Besides, according to the general presupposition of the "art" line of thought, man is to know the world from outside, if he can know it at all. So in the matter of truth, man needs precision, exactness, and above all, proof. These again must be furnished by intellect. So in the extreme type of the "art" line of thought, that is, progressivism, science, the flower of intellectualism, is produced.

(3) Egoism

By egoism I mean the antithesis of what Fichte called the ego and the non-ego, or what William James called the "me," and the "non-me."[1] This is in contrast to mysticism of the "nature" line of thought in which there is the union of the individual with the whole. According to the different types of the "art" line of thought the ego has different ranges, but the opposition of the ego and the non-ego remains always the same. About Fichte, Wallace said:

"But the associations which cling to the terms Fichte used gave this thought a one-sided direction. The 'I' is opposed to the 'thee,' and the 'them' and the 'it.' The 'thing'—or non-ego—is depreciated as compared with the thinker and the willer. It is postulated *ad majorem gloriam* of the ego: in order that I may work the full fruition of my being. It is what I ought to make out of it. It *is* nothing but what it will be—or will be if I do what I ought to do. The identity of the two sides therefore is left as the object of an endless task, an absolute imperative. The absolute is not yet,—it is only the forecast of a postulated result."[2]

The criticism is justified. But we should notice that it is not "the associations clinging to the terms" that gave Fichte's thought a one-sided direction; it is the one-sided direction of his thought that led him to use these terms. It is not simply by chance that Fichte called his would-be God the Absolute Ego.

1 James, William, "Psychology," 2 vols., Vol. I, p. 289.

2 Wallace, W., "The Logic of Hegel, Prolegomena," pp. 145, 146.

PART III

THE IDEALIZATION OF THE CONTINUITY OF NATURE AND ART AND THE GOOD OF ACTIVITY

It is not difficult to see that in spite of the diametrical opposition of the two main lines of thought analyzed above, there is, at least, one point in common between them. This point is that they are both impressed by the antagonism of the different factors in the world: the antagonism of nature versus art, of human versus divine, of ideal versus real, of infinite versus finite, of society versus individual, of authority versus liberty, and so forth. We are now going to study another line of thought. The philosophies belonging to this line of thought are either originally impressed, not by the antagonism, but by the continuity of the world, or, seeing the one-sidedness of the two extreme points of view, have attempted to reconcile them. The general position of this line of thought is the mean state of the "nature" and "art" lines of thought. In this state nature and art are no longer antagonistic to each other; they are simply a continuous whole. To this line of thought the divine is more human, and the human more divine; the real is more ideal, and the ideal more real.

The "nature" line and the "art" line of thought have another point in common which may be said to be both the cause and the consequence of the first point.

It is that they both try to hold something responsible for the present evil. They both try to "give a dog a bad name and hang it." The difference is only as to what should be the "dog." The line we are now considering offers another method of dealing with the evil. Hegel said:

"Our intellectual striving aims at realizing the conviction that what *is intended* by eternal wisdom, is actually *accomplished* in the domain of existent, active spirit, as well as in that of mere Nature. Our mode of treating the subject is, in this respect, a Theodicea—a justification of the ways of God—which Leibnitz attempted metaphysically, in his method, i. e., in indefinite abstract categories—so that the ill that is found in the world may be comprehended, and the thinking Spirit reconciled with the fact of the existence of evil. Indeed, nowhere is such a harmonizing view more pressingly demanded than Universal History; and it can be attained only by recognizing the *positive* existence, in which the negative element is a subordinate, and vanquished nullity." [1]

Evil is no longer evil, if only we no longer consider it as evil. Hence, this line of thought teaches neither the way of "increase" nor that of "decrease." According to it, activity is itself a good.

For illustrations of this line of thought, I have chosen the philosophy of Confucius, that of Aristotle, Neo-Confucianism, and the philosophy of Hegel. Each of them represents the reconciliation of one or more of the different factors analyzed in the above chapters. I do not mean that these philosophers all consciously and purposely made the reconciliation; they might, or they

[1] Hegel, G. W. F., "The Philosophy of History," tr. by J. Sibree in the World's Great Classics Series, p. 15.

might not have done so. They might originally have had the impression of the unity of the world and thus worked out a system themselves, but taking these systems at what William James called their "face value," in the following discussion I shall treat the philosophy of Confucius as an attempt to reconcile the state of nature and the state of art; that of Aristotle, to reconcile the world of ideal and the world of reality; that of Neo-Confucianism, to reconcile the thing and the "nothing"; and that of Hegel, to reconcile the ego and the non-ego. In other words, I shall treat the philosophy of Confucius as an attempt to make the Taoistic nature more in harmony with art; that of Aristotle, to make the Platonic ideal Heaven more in harmony with the actual earth; that of Neo-Confucianism, to make nihilism more human; that of Hegel, to make progressivism more divine. In the philosophy of Confucius and Aristotle we find also substitutes for extreme hedonism and utilitarianism.

CHAPTER X

CONFUCIUS

Confucius said :

" Transmitting but not inventing, believing in and loving the ancient, I venture to compare myself with Lao Peng." [1] Lao is said to be Lao-tse. Lao-tse was the official historian in the court of the Chow dynasty ; some, if not most, of the passages in his book are said to be records of ancient sayings and proverbs. Lao-tse was such a man as Confucius here described. According to tradition, Confucius once visited Lao-tse and " asked him questions " about " rite." [2] But so far as we know, in Lao-tse's book there is nothing but the exaltation of Tao at the expense of rite. He said :

1 " The Analects of Confucius," tr. by James Legge in the " Four Books," Chap. VII, Sec. 1.

2 By " rite " I mean the most comprehensive Chinese word " li. " This Chinese word is so comprehensive that one French translator said: " Autant que possible, je l'ai traduit par le mot Rite, dont le sens est susceptible d'une grande étendus; mais il faut convenir que, suivant les circonstances où il est employè, il peut signifier 'Cérémonial, Cérémonies, Pratiques Cérémonials, L'étiquette, Politesse, Urbanité, Courtoisie, Honnêteté, Bonnes Manièrs, Égards, Bonne Éducation, Bienséance, Les Formes, Les Converenances, Savoir-vivre, Décorum, Décence, Dignité Personnelle, Moralité dé Conduite, Ordre Social, Devoir de Société, Lois Sociales, Devoirs, Droit, Morale, Lois Hiérarchiques, Offrand, Usage, Coutumes.' " * In the following I render " li " with " rite " but we should remember that it means much more than " rite. " It means all regulations that arise from the relation between man and man.

* J. M. Callery, Introduction to his translation of the " Li Ki, Memoirè des Rites," Paries, 1852, p. XVI.

" How all-pervading is the great Tao, it can be on the left and it can be on the right. All things depend upon it for their life, and it refuses them not. When its achievement is accomplished, it assumes not the name. Lovingly nourishing all things, it plays not the rôle of their Lord. Ever desireless it can be classed with the small. All things converge in it and it plays not the rôle of their Lord ; it can be classed with the great." [1]

" Tao begets unity ; unity begets duality ; duality begets trinity ; and trinity begets all things. All things are sustained by Yin and Yang and are living harmoniously in the harmonious atmosphere." [2]

As to culture, he said :

" Abandon your saintliness ; put away your prudence : and the people will gain a hundredfold. Abandon your benevolence ; put away your justice ; and the people will return to filial piety and paternal love. Abandon skill ; give up utility ; and the thieves and robbers will no longer exist. These are the three things which show the insufficiency of culture. Therefore it is said : Hold fast that which will endure ; show yourself simple, preserve the pure ; lessen the self with fewer desires." [3]

His philosophy, as the forerunner of that of Chuang-tse, is an idealization of nature and a depreciation of art. Most probably Confucius was influenced by it. But to Confucius, Tao is not confined in the state of nature ; it also includes the state of art.

(1) The " Yi "

It has long been an established fact that the most important literature of Confucianism is the " Yi King,"

1 Lao-tse, " Tao Teh King, " Sec. 34.

2 *Id.*, Sec. 42.

3 *Id.*, Sec. 19.

usually called in translations, "The Book of Change." Truly following the example of Lao Peng, Confucius did not make the book himself, but transmitted it from the ancients. Before Confucius, this book was used for divination. It did not receive its meaning and significance until Confucius added to it the "Ten Wings," or the ten appendixes. The system of the book has as its basis the eight trigrams, which were supposed to be the symbolic representative of the eight fundamental elements or factors of the universe and the different abstract attributes which should be suggested and associated with them. Then the eight trigrams were added each to itself and to all the others until there were sixty-four hexagrams. Each hexagram was supposed to be the symbolic representative of one or more phenomena of the universe, either natural or human. All the hexagrams put together were supposed to represent symbolically all that had happened in the universe, from heaven and earth to the complexity of human affairs. The book is indeed a remarkable treatise in the history of philosophy. Although Hegel said "that not a particle of the Notion is to be found in it," [1] it is in fact the "Phenomenology of Mind" of Confucius. Like the "Phenomenology of Mind" it treated "tracts of experience which have each formed, from time to time, the subject of separate discussion, and have engaged the undivided interest of different thinkers of Mind" "as but fragments of a single system." Like the "Phenomenology

[1] Hegel, G. W. F., "Lecture on the History of Philosophy," tr. by E. S. Haldane and F. H. Simson, 3 vols., 1892–1896, Vol. I, p. 123.

of Mind" it looked upon "movements of human history which have marked epochs in the development of the human race" "as but typical or prominent embodiments of principles at work in the spirit of man" and discussed them "in shadowy, schematic form, through which the historical reality referred to is only dimly visible." [1] Only a glance at this book, and we know that in the mind of Confucius, the universe is a united whole. (See below, p. 173.)

(2) Confucius's Conception of "Tao"

The word "Yi" primarily means change. In the "Yi King," "Yi" is used interchangeably with "Tao," since "Tao" is life, spontaneity, evolution, or, in one word, change, itself. In the "Analects" we read:

"As he stood by a stream, Confucius said: 'Ah! that which is passing is just like this, never ceasing day or night.'" [2]

In the Great Appendix to the "Yi King" Confucius said:

"The successive movement of Yin (the passive element, the 'matter') and Yang (the active element, the 'form') is called Tao. All that follows it is good. That which ensues from it is the nature of things. When the benevolent sees It, he calles it benevolence. When the wise sees it, he calls it wisdom. The common people, acting daily according to it, are yet not conscious of it. Thus the Tao, as seen by the superior man, is seen by few. It is manifested in love, and

[1] Baillie, I. B. Introduction to his translation of Hegel's "Phenomenology of Mind," London, 1910, Vol. I, p. 5.
[2] "The Analects of Confucius," Chap. IX, Sec. 16.

is immanent in operation. It gives all things their spontaneity without being anxious about their future like the sages. How perfect is its virtue! How great is its achievement! The rich evolution is its great achievement; the daily renovation is its great virtue. That which gives form is called Kien (Yang); that which imitates the form is called Kuen (Yin). . . . That which is unfathomable in the movement is called the mystery." [1]

In another place he said:

"Yi has the Grand Terminus, which generates the Primeval Pair. The Primeval Pair produce the Four Forms, from which are derived the eight trigrams. The eight trigrams determine the good and the evil. The good and the evil produce the great achievement." [2]

"Yi has no thought, no action. It is in itself still and calm. Yet in its function it embraces all phenomena and events in the universe. Is not this the great mystery?" [3]

If we compare these passages with that of Lao-tse and reflect upon what Chuang-tse said about Tao, we see at once how similar is Confucius's conception of Tao to that of Taoism. In the "Analects" Confucius also said that Heaven speaks nothing, but the four seasons pursue their course and all things are being continuously produced.[4] Tao is a great spontaneous stream of life, "doing nothing, but there is nothing that is not done." But according to Lao-tse, and afterward to Chuang-tse, although Tao does all things by doing nothing, in that "all things," civilization and human art, are not included. They idealized the state of nature and attributed

1 "Yi King," tr. by James Legge, London, 1882, Appendix III, Sec. I, Chap. 24.
2 *Id.*, Sec. I, Chap. 70.
3 *Id.*, Sec. I, Chap. 62.
4 "The Analects of Confucius," Chap. XVII, Sec. 19.

all the evil to the state of art. According to Confucius, however, the history of the universe is a continuous whole. There is no demarcation between the state of nature and the state of art. He said :

" For the universe, the most essential is Life. For the sages, the most important is state. That which maintains the state is love. That which maintains the people is wealth. The production of wealth, the education of the people, and the prohibition of wrongdoing are called justice." [1]

Nature is Life ; state, wealth, education, prohibition, are to make life better. Art is to help nature ; hence, it is in one sense natural.

(3) The Origin of Useful Art

In the Great Appendix to the " Yi King," Confucius said :

" It is heaven and earth that furnish models and patterns. It is Time that changes and evolves. It is the sun and moon that are the most bright. It is wealth and nobility that are the most exalted. It is the sages that prepare things for practical use, and invent instruments for the benefit of the world." [2]

" They [the sages] all understand the ways of nature and know the needs of man. They thus made the skillful things for the use of the people." [3]

This shows the purpose of art. All kinds of art are for the utility of the people and the benefit of the world.

1 " Yi King, " Appendix IV, Sec. II, Chap. 10.
2 *Id.*, Appendix III, Sec. 1, Chap. 72.
3 *Ibid.*

They are all for the advancement of life. They are not produced by the artisans at random, but are devised by the sages with definite purpose and profound wisdom.

The purpose of art is the utility of man; the origin of art is the imitation of nature. According to Confucius, the "Yi King" is "a book of symbols" and "the origin of symbols is imitation." [1] He said:

"The sages have seen the complexity of the universe. They used the symbols to represent the different forms and to symbolize the different characteristics thereof." [2]

"When conceived, they are called symbols. When materially embodied, they are called 'utensils.' When instituted for general use, they are called laws. When wrought into the everyday life of all the people, they are called the works of the gods." [3]

"What manifest themselves above are called the ways of nature. What are embodied on earth below are called 'utensils.' . . . When brought to the people and practiced by them, they are called achievements." [4]

Thus the different kinds of art are the material embodiment of the symbols which the sages conceived in the complexity of nature. They are the imitation or the realization of the different symbols represented by the trigrams and hexagrams. Confucius said:

"The Book of Yi contains four ways of the sages. Its judgment serves as the models of their argument. Its change serves as the model of their activity. Its symbol serves as the model of the invention of the arts." [5]

1 "Yi King," Appendix III, Sec. II, Chap. 2.
2 *Id.*, Sec. I, Chap. 12.
3 *Id.*, Chap. 11.
4 *Id.*, Chap. 12.
5 *Id.*, Chap. 10.

In one chapter of the Great Appendix, Confucius tried to show that the trigrams originated in the symbolization of nature. He said:

"In the ancient [time] when Pao-hsi became the philosopher king, he observed the phenomena of heaven above and the forms on earth below. He noted the manners of birds and beasts and the products of the soil. Receiving suggestions both inwardly from his own self and externally from distant objects, he first invented the eight trigrams in order to penetrate the mysteries of nature and to describe the reality of all things."[1]

Following this passage Confucius went on to show that the more important inventions of the ancients all originated under the suggestion of the different symbols represented by the varied combinations of the trigrams, that is, the hexagrams. He said:

"When Pao-hsi died, Shen-nung flourished. He fashioned the wood to form shares, and bent the wood to make the plow handle. The advantage of plowing and weeding were then taught through the world. The symbol of this was taken, probably, from the hexagram 'Ye.'"[2]

The hexagram "Ye" ䷭ is formed by the combination of the trigram ☴ meaning wind, wood, and penetration, and the trigram ☳ meaning thunder, motion, and growth. Hence, the hexagram represents the symbol of penetrating of wood from above and the growth below. From this Shen-nung invented the art of agriculture.

[1] "Yi King," Appendix IV, Sec. II, Chap. 11.
[2] *Id.*, Chap. 13.

"He [Huang-ti] hollowed the trees to make canoes, and cut the trees to make oars. By using them man could cross what was formerly considered as impassable. By using them the most distant places were reached and the world was benefited. The symbol of this was taken probably from the hexagram 'Hwan.'" [1]

The hexagram "Hwan" ䷺ is formed by the combination of the trigram ☴ meaning wood, and the trigram ☵ meaning water. The phenomena of wood flowing on water obviously suggested the idea of constructing a boat.

"He also domesticated the oxen and horses to carry cargoes to the distant places. The world was much benefited. The symbol of this was probably taken from the hexagram 'Sui.'" [2]

The hexagram "Sui" ䷐ is formed by the combination of the trigram ☱ meaning lake, pleasure, and satisfaction, and the trigram ☳ meaning motion. The combination of the symbol of satisfaction above and the movement below led Huang-ti to utilize animals to work for man. This was the origin of the useful arts. There are many other passages equally interesting; but we need not quote all of them. Art is after all not so much the conqueror of nature as her humble imitator.

(4) Rites and Music

Besides the useful arts there are other kinds of art, the main purpose of which is not to make life possible, but to make it better. These latter kinds are the fine arts and what I may call social art. Referring to the previous quotation, useful art is for "the production of

[1] "Yi King," Chap. 16.

[2] *Id.*, Chap. 17.

wealth," fine art and social art are for "the education of the people." In "The Doctrine of the Mean and the Common" (the title of this treatise is usually translated as "The Doctrine of the Mean") it is said:

> "What Nature confers is the nature of things; the pursuance of this nature is the way of life; the cultivation of this way is education." [1]

Obviously the nature of things mentioned here is exactly what Chuang-tse called "virtue" (cp. above, p. 16). Confucius on the one hand taught the pursuance of nature, and on the other hand emphasized the value of education. According to him, the virtuous life is the production neither of nature as such, nor of art as such. It is the proper pursuance of nature through the help of art. The above-quoted treatise, as shown by its title, is a systematic exposition of the mean and the common. The exposition of the common shows that the virtuous life is a proper *pursuance of nature*. The exposition of the mean shows that it is the *proper* pursuance of nature. In other words, it is the mean in the common. In order to secure the mean in the common, the sage devised social art and fine art. They are the rites and music (including poetry). In Confucius's system, these twin sisters are even more important than gymnastics and music in Plato's and Aristotle's systems. There is some difference between the function of rites and that of music. But the difference is not so great and obvious

[1] "The Doctrine of the Mean," tr. by James Legge in the "Four Books," Chap. I, Sec. 1.

as that between the function of gymnastics and that of music. Generally speaking, the function of rites is to secure the mean in desires, the most natural and common aspect of human nature. Confucius said :

" The strongest desires of man are [for] food and sex. The strongest aversion of man is [to] death and poverty. Desire and aversion are the fundamental elements of man's mind. If it be wished to give a uniform measure to these elements, there is no other way besides rite." [1]

In another place we read :

" The Master said : ' Sze, you live by excess, and Shang by defect ! ' Tse Kung crossed the mat and asked : ' May I ask by what means the mean can be secured ? ' The Master said : ' By rite ; it is rite that defines and determines the mean.' " [2]

The function of music is to secure the mean in sentiment and passion, another most natural and common aspect of human nature. In the " Discourse on Music, " we read :

" Therefore, it is said : ' Music is joy. ' The superior man rejoices that the expression of passion is in accordance with the right way. The vulgar rejoices that there is the expression of passion. When men regulate passion in the right way, there is joy, but no disorder. When they let passion go and forget the right way, there is delusion, but no joy." [3]

" Music is produced by the modulation of sound, and has its source in the emotion of the mind when the mind is affected by external things. When the mind is moved to sorrow, the

1 " Li Chi, " Book VII, Sec. II, Chap. 20.
2 *Id.*, Book XX, Sec. 4.
3 *Id.*, Book VII, Sec. I, Chap. 19.

sound is sharp and fading away; when it is moved to joy, the sound is slow and gentle; when it is moved to pleasure, the sound is exclamatory and soon disappears; when it is moved to anger, the sound is coarse and fierce; when it is moved to reverence, the sound is straightforward and humble; when it is moved to love, the sound is fine and soft. These sentiments cannot be reproduced by mind itself, but by the affection of the external things. Therefore the ancient philosopher kings were careful about the things that might affect the mind. They instituted rite to direct man's desire, and music to harmonize man's sentiment." [1]

The purpose of both rite and music is one and the same, that is, to secure the mean in the common.

"Thus the ancient kings, in their institution of rite and music, were not to give the extreme satisfaction of desires and appetites. They were to teach people to moderate their likes and dislikes and thus to return to the norm of humanity." [2]

As to society as a whole,

"Music establishes union and harmony; rite maintains difference and distinction. From union comes mutual affection; from distinction, mutual respect." [3]

"Therefore the ancient philosopher kings instituted rite and music to give measure to everybody. . . .

"Rite is to regulate man's mind; music is to harmonize man's sentiment; government is to promote their performance; law is to guard against their violation. When rite, music, government, and law have everywhere the full course without irregularity and collision, the rule of the philosopher kings is complete." [4]

[1] "Li Chi," Book VII, Sec. I, Chap. 2.
[2] *Id.*, Chap. 10.
[3] *Id.*, Chap. 15.
[4] *Id.*, Chap. 14.

"When music is perfect and attains its full result, there will be no dissatisfaction of the mind. When rite is perfect and attain its full result, there will be no quarrel among the people. Thus when we say the philosopher kings govern the world with bowing and courtesy, we mean that they govern with rite and music." [1]

This is Confucius's "Utopia"; this is the great function of rites and music. According to Confucius, these two kinds of art or institutions also originated in the imitation of nature.

"Music imitates the harmony of the universe; rite imitates the order of the universe. There are heaven above and earth below, and between them there are the various things with different ranks and dignity. This gives man the pattern of rite. There is the unceasing stream of evolution, in which all things are in harmony and in accordance. This gives man the model of music. In the spring all things burst forth; in the summer all things grow. This is benevolence. In the autumn all things mature; in the winter, all things rest. This is justice. Benevolence is akin to music; justice is akin to rite." [2]

How good and beautiful is the world! The purpose of art is simply to make it better and more beautiful.

(5) The Origin of State

Thus according to Confucius the things most important to the community are music and rite. In comparison with them, government and law are but secondary. The main function of government and law is but to provide the conditions that make rite and music possible.

[1] "Li Chi," Book VII, Sec. I, Chap. 18.
[2] *Id.*, Chap. 28.

But why is it that "to the sages the most important is the state"? The answer is that with the authority of the state the sage can put into practice the proper rite and proper music and lead the people to the proper way of life. He can perform the function of a teacher to full extent only by being a king. It is natural for him to govern, and it is no less natural for the people to follow. Whenever there is a sage, the people naturally follow him. With this action of the people, the state is spontaneously originated. This theory of the origin of state may be seen in the hexagram "Kien" in the "Yi King." We have said that the hexagram is formed by the combination of two trigrams. Thus each hexagram has six lines. While the hexagram represents symbolically some phenomena of the universe, in the hexagram itself, each of the lines represents symbolically some detailed change of the phenomena. The hexagram "Kien" ䷀ is the trigram "Kien" ☰ combined with itself. The trigram "Kien" "means heaven, circle, king, and father."[1] Thus the hexagram "Kien" represents heaven embracing all things in the natural world and the king ruling all people in the human world. Each line represents a specific activity of the philosopher who rises from the ranks of the common people to the position of the king. About the first line (starting below) Confucius said:

"This is he who, with the virtue of a dragon (the symbol of the king), is yet lying hid. He does not change his conduct

[1] "Yi King," Appendix V, Chap. 11.

to conform to the ways of the vulgar. He does not care about the fame of the world. He has no regret, even if he is disconnected entirely from the world. He is not sorry, even if he experiences the whole world's disapproval. What he considers as delightful to his reason, he does; what is opposite, he refuses. He is firm in his conviction and cannot be shaken. This is the dragon lying hid." [1]

About the second line Confucius said:

"This is he who, with the virtue of a dragon, yet occupies an ordinary place. He is sincere in his common sayings and earnest in his common conduct. He guards against depravity and preserves his perfection. He has already influenced the world, but he is not proud. His virtue is extensively displayed and transformation and reformation ensue. This is the virtue of a king." [2]

With the ascending of every line the influence of the philosopher increases, till in the fifth line, he becomes the "flying dragon in heaven," that is, he becomes the king and rules the world. About this line Confucius said:

"Musical notes of the same kind respond to each other; things of the same kind seek one another. Water flows to the damp; fire rises to the dry. . . . When the sage appears, all people of the world fix their eyes on him. Things that have their origin from heaven move upwards; things that have their origin on earth move downwards;—so everything follows its kind." [3]

When all the people follow him, he becomes the king, and the state is thus formed. It is formed not for the

[1] "Yi King," Appendix IV, Sec. II, Chap. 4.
[2] *Id.*, Chap. 5.
[3] *Id.*, Chap. 8.

interest of the stronger, nor for that of the weak. It is simply man's nature to go together and to obey him who is superior in virtue.

(6) The Evolution of the World

How about the sixth line of the hexagram? This line is "the dragon in extreme." About it Confucius said:

"When things have been carried to extreme, calamity ensues."

"The phrase 'in extreme' refers to him who knows progression, but does not know that progression involves regression. He knows life, but does not know that life involves death. He knows possession, but does not know that possession involves loss. It is only the sage who knows both progression and regression, both life and death, both possession and loss, and thus always maintains the mean. He only is the sage." [1]

This is the doctrine of the "Yi King" and is also the doctrine of Lao-tse. He said:

"Misery, alas! rests upon happiness. Happiness, alas! underlies misery. Who knows the end of this circle? What is ordinary becomes again extraordinary. What is good becomes again unpropitious. This bewilders people, and it has happened constantly since time immemorial. Therefore the sage is square, but not sharp, strict but not obnoxious, upright but not unrestraining, bright but not dazzling." [2]

This is not only true of human affairs, but is the very process of the evolution of the world. Lao-tse said:

[1] "Yi King," Appendix IV, Sec. II, Chaps. 35, 36.
[2] Lao-tse, "Tao Teh King," Sec. 58.

" Is not the way of Nature like stretching a bow ? The high it brings down ; the low it lifts up. Those who have abundance it depleteth ; those who are deficient it augmenteth." [1]

In the " Yi King " this is not only made clear in the lines of the hexagram, but also in the order of the hexagrams.

The order of the hexagrams is of great significance. It is supposed to represent the natural process of the evolution of the world. In the " Yi King " one of the Confucian " Ten Wings " is " On the Order of the Hexagrams. " In that Appendix there are three fundamental points. In the introductory remarks of the second section of the Appendix we read :

" Following the existence of heaven and earth, there is the existence of all things. Following the existence of all things, there is the distinction of sex. Following the distinction of sex, there is the relation between husband and wife. Following the relation between husband and wife, there is the relation between father and son. Following the relation between father and son there is the relation between the king and the people. Following the relation between the king and the people, there is the distinction of superiority and inferiority. Following the distinction of superiority and inferiority, there are social order and justice." [2]

The point is that all that happens in the universe, natural and human, is a continuous whole like a chain of natural sequences. This is in fact what we have seen from the beginning of our discussion of Confucianism. This is the first point.

[1] Lao-tse, " Tao Teh King," p. 77.
[2] " Yi King," Appendix VI, Chaps. 31, 32.

The second point is that in the process of evolution, every phenomenon involves its own negation. So one hexagram is usually followed by its opposite. Thus:

"When there is order, there is prosperity. Hence the hexagram 'Li' (order) is followed by 'Tai' (prosperity). But things cannot be forever in the state of prosperity. Hence 'Tai' is followed by 'Pi' (ill fortune)." [1]

"When cultivation has been carried to the utmost, its progress comes to an end. Hence, 'Pen' (cultivation, decoration) is followed by the hexagram 'Po' (decline). Things cannot be forever in the state of decline. When decline has reached its extreme in the one end, reintegration commences in the other. Hence, the hexagram 'Po' is followed by the hexagram 'Fu' (return)." [2]

"The hexagram 'Tsen' means motion. Things cannot be forever in the state of motion. Hence, 'Tsen' is followed by the hexagram 'Ken' which means rest. Things cannot be forever in the state of rest. Hence 'Ken' is followed by 'Kien' which means progression or advance." [3]

From these passages we see how in the process of the evolution of the world, evil is a necessary counterpart of good. Confucius said:

"The 'Yao' (the single line of each hexagram) is an imitation of the activity of the world. Because of activity, there is the manifestation of good and evil, of repentance and regret." [4]

"Good and evil are the indication of gain and loss. Repentance and regret are the indication of sorrow and fear." [5]

[1] "Yi King," Appendix VI, Chaps. 8–11.
[2] *Id.*, Chaps. 19–23.
[3] *Id.*, Chaps. 44–48.
[4] *Id.*, Appendix III, Sec. II, Chap. 2.
[5] *Id.*, Sec. I, Chap. 11.

"Good and evil, repentance and fear, are produced by activity." [1]

Since good and evil are always connected with activity, and since the evolution of the world is a great activity, we cannot expect that in the universe there is absolutely no evil. "The eight trigrams determine the good and the evil; the good and the evil produce the great achievement." [2] The great achievement must be accompanied by good and evil. This is what Schopenhauer called "the eternal justice."

The third point is that there can never be a state, in which everything is absolutely completed or finished. This may be shown by quoting the first and the last sentence of this Appendix. They read:

"Following the existence of heaven and earth, there is the existence of all things. That which fills up heaven and earth is nothing but these things. Hence, the first two hexagrams 'Kien' and 'Kuen' (heaven and earth) are followed by the hexagram 'Tun.' 'Tun' means things in their first production. When so produced, they are necessarily in an undeveloped condition. Hence, the hexagram 'Tun' is followed by the hexagram 'Mung.' 'Mung' means things undeveloped." [3]

"Those that are better than the existing things are certainly accomplishments, hence, the hexagram 'Hsiao Kwo' (a little better) is followed by the hexagram 'Chi Zi' (something accomplished). But there cannot be an end of things. Hence, the hexagram 'Chi Zi' is followed by the hexagram 'Wei Zi' (something not yet accomplished). With this hexagram the 'Book of Change' comes to a close." [4]

1 "Yi King," Appendix III, Sec. I, Chap. 1.
2 *Id.*, Sec. I, Chap. 70.
3 *Id.*, Appendix VI, Chaps. 1–3.
4 *Id.*, Chaps. 62–64.

Obviously, all these three fundamental points are different from the "nature" line of thought on one side and from the "art" line of thought on the other. There is no end of things. There is no *summum bonum*. This is also what Schopenhauer called "the eternal justice." It is the revolt against the eternal justice that leads nihilism to abandon the "great achievement," to return to the infinite past, and progressivism to assume the endless task of working for the infinite future. The method of these two lines of thought is diametrically opposite, but their aim is fundamentally the same. They both wish to attain to a condition which is absolutely good, and in which man can stop once for all.

(7) The Good of Activity

But according to Confucius we cannot stop, nor do we need to stop. The perfection of nature is not that it will produce a perfect end in the process of evolution, but is exactly that it produces an endless evolution. Its perfection is exactly its eternal activity. "To the most perfect there is no stop."[1] The meaning of its activity is not in the external accomplishment, but in the activity itself. Tao "has no thought" and "gives all things spontaneity without anxiety as the sages." She works not for something, but for nothing. She produced all things in the universe, but it is not for them that her eternal activity takes place. She is "doing *by* doing nothing" and is doing *for* nothing. These

[1] "The Doctrine of the Mean," Chap. XXVI, Sec. 1.

may be said to be the two characteristics of nature. As the Taoists were impressed by her doing *by* doing nothing, Confucius was impressed by her doing *for* nothing. In order to be "doing" "*by* doing nothing," the Taoists advised man to abolish all that is done by doing. They denounced civilization and intellect, and exalted primitivity and instinct. But according to Confucius what is important is that Tao does *for* nothing. In doing, we must utilize our ability and consciously do something. *For* nothing, we must enjoy the doing itself, and disregard the external success or failure. In the "Yi King" it is said:

"The activity of nature is energetic. In accordance with this, the superior man encourages himself and never ceases to be active." [1]

In another place it is said:

"It is said in the 'Book of Poetry': 'The ordinance of Nature, how profound and unceasing!' This shows that it is thus that Nature is Nature. 'The virtue of King Wen, how illustrious and pure!' This shows that it is thus that King Wen is King Wen. He is pure and is unceasingly active." [2]

Thus the life of activity is also an imitation of nature. Confucius's own life is certainly a good example of this aspect of his teaching. Flourishing in a time of great social and political disorder, he tried his best to reform. He traveled everywhere and, like Socrates, talked with everybody. Although his efforts were in vain, he was

[1] "Yi King," Appendix II, Sec. I, Chap. 1.
[2] "The Doctrine of the Mean," Chap. XXVI, Sec. 10.

not disappointed. He was much ridiculed by his contemporary Taoists and Epicureans. For instance, in the "Analects" we read:

"Chang-tseu and Kee-ni were at work in the field together, when Confucius passed by and sent Tse-lu to inquire for the ford. . . . Kee-ni said to him: 'Disorder, like a swelling flood, spreads over the whole world. Who can change it? You are following one who simply withdraws from this one man and that one man. 'Would it be not better for you to follow those who withdraw from the world altogether?' Tse-lu went and reported these remarks to the Master. The Master said with a sigh: 'It is impossible to associate with birds and beasts, as if they were the same with us. If I associate, not with mankind, with whom shall I associate? If right principle prevailed through the world, there would be no use for me to change its state." [1]

On another similar occasion, Tse-lu said to an Epicurean on behalf of Confucius:

"Wishing to maintain your personal purity, you neglect the great relations of mankind. The superior man tries to take part in politics, because it is his duty to do so. The fact that he is bound to fail, he knows already." [2]

Another passage reads:

"Tse-lu happened to pass the night in Shi-men. The gatekeeper said to him: 'Whom do you come from?' Tse-lu said: 'From Mr. Kung.' 'Is it not he who knows that what he does is in vain, yet still does it?'" [3]

The last sentence is a concrete picture of Confucius.

[1] "Analects of Confucius," Book XVII, Chap. 6.
[2] *Id.*, Chap. 7.
[3] *Id.*, Book XIV, Chap. 41.

(8) The Rational Happiness

The good consists in activity. The external success of activity is not in our control; it is a matter of Fate or fortune. While Confucius made the best effort to realize his ideal, at the same time he said:

"If my philosophy is to prevail in the world, it is Fate. If my philosophy is to fall to the ground, it is also Fate." [1]

Generally speaking, Fate means the existent conditions of the whole universe. For the external success of our activity, the coöperation of these conditions is always needed. But this coöperation is wholly beyond our control. If we consider activity as simply a means for the result, and the meaning of it as wholly in the latter, our life will not be self-sufficient and self-independent. We have either to assume the endless task of searching for the good in the infinite future, or to remain melancholy and wait the coming of death. The "art" line of thought involves Epicureanism, which is its own negation. According to Confucius, in order to maintain the good completely in the activity itself, we must "know Fate." He said:

"Those who do not know Fate cannot be superior men." [2]

"When I was fifty years old, I knew Fate." [3]

To know Fate means to acknowledge the necessity of the world and thus to disregard the external success or failure. As Mencius afterwards said:

[1] "Analects of Confucius," Book XIV, Chap. 38.
[2] *Id.*, Book XX, Chap. 2.
[3] *Id.*, Book II, Chap. 4.

"To weep for the dead is not for display. To lead the virtuous life is not for the honor of the state. To speak sincere words is not for the trust of others."[1]

If we do not put our activity on a utilitarian basis, we can never fail. In other words, if we do not care for external success, we must always succeed. Thus the good of activity leads to rational happiness. In the "Analects" we read:

"The master said: 'The wise are free from superstition; the virtuous, from anxiety; the brave, from fear.'"[2]

"The Master said: 'The superior man is always happy; the mean man is always sad.'"[3]

As to himself he said:

"Living on coarse rice and water, with bent arm for pillow, I am still happy. Ill-gotten wealth and honors are to me as wandering clouds."[4]

"I murmur not against Nature, nor grumble against man. Learning from the lowest, I cleave to the heights."[5]

In the "Yi King" there is a more concrete picture of a sage. It reads:

"He is similar to heaven and earth and therefore there is no antagonism between him and them. His wisdom embraces all things and his doctrine gives salvation to the world, and therefore he falls into no error. He acts according to the exigencies of the circumstances without being

[1] Mencius, "Works," tr. by James Legge in the "Four Books," Book VII, Part II, Chap. 33.
[2] *Id.*, Book IX, Chap. 28.
[3] *Id.*, Book VII, Chap. 36.
[4] *Id.*, Chap. 15.
[5] *Id.*, Book XIV, Chap. 37.

carried away by their currents. He rejoices in Nature and knows Fate. Hence he has no sorrow." [1]

(9) The Union of the Internal and the External

Although for Nature there is no end of evolution, and for man there is no end of activity, yet for man as man there is a state something like a final completion or *summum bonum*. This is not a state of nonactivity, in which everything is negated or finished. It is a state in which, though there are still things and activities, the distinction between the internal and external no longer exists. This union of the external and internal is called "perfection." "Tao" or Nature is perfection itself, since in its very nature there is no distinction between the internal and external. Thus it is said:

"Perfection is the beginning and end of things. Without perfection there can be nothing. Therefore the superior man considers the attainment of perfection as the most excellent." [2]

"Perfection is the way of Nature; to become perfect is the way of human (or art)." [3]

"From perfection to enlightenment is Nature; from enlightenment to perfection is education. When there is perfection, there is enlightenment; when, then, there is enlightenment, there is perfection." [4]

"He who tries to become perfect not only completes himself, but also completes others. The completion of himself is his virtue, the completion of others is his wisdom. Both

1 "Yi King," Appendix III, Sec. I, Chap. 22.
2 "The Doctrine of the Mean," Chap. 25.
3 *Id.*, Chap. 20.
4 *Id.*, Chap. 21.

of these are the attributes of human nature, and this is the way of the union of the internal and the external. Therefore this way is good at all times." [1]

The union of the internal and the external is attained with what Schopenhauer called "the works of love." Here we see the sharp contrast between nature and education. But the function of education is not to add to human nature some alien element, but simply to give the full development of "the attributes of human nature." This full development of nature is technically called in Confucianism the "exhaustion of nature." Thus it is said:

"It is only he who is most perfect that can exhaust his own nature. Being able to exhaust his own nature, he can exhaust the nature of others. Being able to exhaust the nature of others, he can exhaust the nature of all things. Being able to exhaust the nature of all things, he can take part in the life and activity of heaven and earth. Being able to take part in the life and activity of heaven and earth, he can with heaven and earth form a ternion." [2]

Such a man would be the "flying dragon in heaven" and rule the world. He will discuss rites, fix the laws, and determine the measure of education.[3]

"The institutions he made have their basis on his own personal experience and the attestation of the people. He examines his institutions by comparison with those of the three philosopher kings, and finds them without mistake. He sets them up before heaven and earth, and finds nothing in them contrary to them. He presents them to the gods

[1] "The Doctrine of the Mean," Chap. 25.
[2] *Id.*, Chap. 22.
[3] *Id.*, Chap. 28.

and spirits, and no doubt about them arises. He maintains them to wait for the future sages, a hundred ages after, and they would also find in them no misgiving. He presents his institutions to the gods and the spirits, and no doubt about them arises, because he knows Nature. He maintains them to wait for the future sages, a hundred ages after, and they would also find in them no misgiving, because he knows man." [1]

In such a state and in such a world

"all things live together without injuring one another. All courses are pursued without collision with one another. The small evolves like river currents; the great manifests in mighty transformation. It is because of this that the universe is great." [2]

(10) Concluding Remarks

This is the Confucian ideal state of the world. It is not merely a state of nature nor is it merely a state of art. It is the full development of nature, or of human nature at least, through the help of art. State, society, education, and virtue are all necessary parts to constitute this best and the most beautiful whole. According to this view, romantic Taoism is right in conceiving the universe as a harmonious whole, but it is wrong in excluding from it the state of art.

Like hedonistic Taoism, Confucianism was in favor of the expression of passion and the satisfaction of desires. But at the same time it insisted on their mean state. Rite and music both exist for this purpose. Like hedonistic Taoism, Confucianism was in favor of

1 "The Doctrine of the Mean," Chap. 29.
2 *Id.*, Chap. 30.

enjoyment of the present and disregard of the future. But according to Confucianism, the enjoyment of the present is neither in the immediate pleasure, which, strictly speaking, is itself in the future, no matter how immediate it is, nor in the present passive or negative state, but solely in the present activity; the disregard of the future is the disregard of it as the external result, not as the meaning, of the present activity. Confucianism surrendered the future consequence of activity to Fate, but not the activity itself. According to Confucianism, in the present activity, there is already enough good for us to enjoy. In this respect Confucianism was more like Stoicism then Epicureanism. Stoicism taught man to "serve the god within" and disregard anything else. Marcus Aurelius said:

> "In action, do nothing at random, or at variance with the ways of justice: all outward circumstances, remember, are either chance or Providence; you cannot quarrel with chance, and you cannot arraign Providence." [1]

Stoicism also taught the good of activity. But in it there is too much tension and seriousness. It lacked the ease and naturalness which gives Confucianism the Taoistic atmosphere.

[1] Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, "Thought," Book XII, Sec. 24.

CHAPTER XI

ARISTOTLE

(1) The Difference Between Plato and Aristotle

In his "Metaphysics," Aristotle said:

"And all thinkers are confounded by the necessary consequence that there is something contrary to Wisdom, i. e., to the highest knowledge, but *we* are not." [1]

According to the Platonic two worlds system, there is not only something contrary to knowledge and Wisdom, but this world itself is that something. He established the supersensible world for those who are tired of this world to return to, but he left nothing in this world to enjoy for those who are not tired. The main attempt of Artistotle was to reconcile these two worlds in such a way that the ideal might be more real, and the real, more ideal. "Plato's weakness as well as greatness, lay in his theory of the two worlds. The fundamental thought of Aristotle was that the supersensible world of ideas and the sensible world are identical." [2] From Aristotle's dialogue "Concerning Philosophy" Cicero preserved a paragraph of some length, which reads:

"Imagine men who have always dwelt beneath the earth in good and well-illuminated habitations, habitations adorned with statues and paintings and well furnished with everything

[1] Aristotle, "Metaphysics," tr. by W. D. Ross, Oxford, 1908, 1075 b, 20.

[2] Windelband, W., "History of Ancient Philosophy," tr. by H. E. Cushman, 3d ed., New York, 1910, p. 247.

which is usually at the command of those who are deemed fortunate. Suppose these men never to have come up to the surface of the earth, but to have gathered from an obscure legend that a Deity and divine powers exist. If the earth were once to be opened for these men, so that they could ascend out of their concealed abodes to the regions inhabited by us, and they were to step forth and suddenly see before them the earth and the sea, and skies, and perceive the masses of the clouds and the violence of the winds ; and if they were to look up at the sun and become cognizant of its magnitude and also of its workings, that he is the author of the day, in that he sheds his light over the entire heavens, . . . truly they would then believe that Gods really exist, and that these works originate with them." [1]

How similar is this passage with Plato's metaphor of the cave in "The Republic." There is, however, one difference and it is great. According to Plato, "the prison is the world of sight."[2] But according to Aristotle, the world of sight is the world of the ideal. Instead of the Platonic two worlds system, there is but one world ; it is the best world. This is the fundamental difference between Plato and Aristotle.

(2) The Place of Ideas in Aristotle

The main controversy between Plato and Aristotle centered in the latter's criticism of the theory of ideas. The difference between these two philosophers, however, is not so great as it appears to be. What Plato called the "ideas" Aristotle called the "essences," "substances," or "forms." In the first place, Aristotle said that essence only is nature in the strict sense.

[1] Cicero, "De Natura Deorum," Book II, 37, 95.

[2] Plato, "The Republic," 517 b.

" From what has been said, then, it is plain that nature is the primacy, and in the strict sense, the essence of things which have themselves, as such, a source of movement, for the matter is called nature because it is qualified to receive this, and the processes of becoming and growing are called nature because they are movements proceeding from this. And nature in this sense is the source of movement of natural objects, being present in them somehow, either potentially or actually." [1]

In the second place he said that substances have no generation nor destruction, and that

" obviously then the form also, or whatever we ought to call the shape of the sensible thing, is not produced, nor does production relate to it, i. e., the essence is not produced." [2]

" Since substance is of two kinds, the concrete thing and the formula (I mean that one kind of substance is the formula taken with matter, while another kind is the formula in its generality), substances in the former sense are capable of destruction (for they are capable also of generation), but there is no destruction of the formula in the sense that it is ever in course of being destroyed ; for there is no generation of it (the being of house is not generated, but only the being of *this* house), but without generation and destruction formula are and are not ; for it has been shown that no one produces nor makes these." [3]

In the third place he claimed that the forms were unmovable. He said :

" But the forms and the affections and the place which are the terminals of the movement of moving things, are unmovable, e. g., knowledge or heat ; it is not heat that is a movement, but heating." [4]

[1] Aristotle, " Metaphysics, " 1015 a, 10.
[2] *Id.*, 1033 a, 5.
[3] *Id.*, 1039 b, 20.
[4] *Id.*, 1067 b, 10.

In the fourth place, he claimed that the substance was prior to the individual things. He said:

"Now there are several senses in which a thing is said to be first; but substance is first in every sense—(1) in formula, (2) in order of knowledge, (3) in time." [1]

Thus soul is the essence of body (see below, p. 196), but it is prior to body. Aristotle said:

"Perfect realization is a word used in two senses: it may be understood either as an implicit state corresponding to knowledge possessed, or as an explicitly exercised process corresponding to active observation. . . . Now in reference to the same object, it is the implicit knowledge of scientific principles which stand prior. Soul is therefore the earlier or implicit perfection of a natural body possessed potentially of life." [2]

In the same way, although historically household and individual are prior to State, "in the order of nature the State is prior to the household or the individual." [3] Indeed since the form is also "the end in view of which" the things move, [4] it must be prior to the things.

If the form exists implicitly prior to the individual things, it may be said to exist apart from the individual things. This is the fifth point. Aristotle said:

"There are three kinds of substance—the matter, . . . the nature (i. e., the individual character), that it moves towards, which is a positive state; and again, thirdly, the particular substance which is composed of these two. . . .

[1] Aristotle, "Metaphysics," 1028 a, 30.
[2] Aristotle, "Psychology," tr. by E. Wallace, Cambridge, 1882, 412 a, 20.
[3] Aristotle, "Politics," tr. by J. E. C. Welldon, 7th ed., London, 1912, I, III, p. 6.
[4] Aristotle, "Physics," tr. into French by Barthelemy Saint-Hillaire, 2 vols., Paris, 1862, II, VII, Vol. I, p. 70.

Now in some cases the individual character does not exist apart from the composite substance, e. g., the form of house does not exist so, unless the art of building exists apart (nor is there generation and destruction of these forms, but it is in another way that the house, apart from its matter, and health, and all ideals of art, exists and does not exist); but if the individual character exists apart from the concrete thing, it is only in the case of natural objects."[1]

Although Aristotle did not make this point very clear, he seemed to be bound to say that at least some of the forms exist apart from the individual.

If all these characteristics are granted to the forms we wonder why Aristotle persisted in his polemic against the Platonic theory of ideas. In fact he was not against the ideas as such, but only against the theory that these ideas are solely in the ideal world, while the individual things in this world are only " copies " or " imitations " of them. According to his theory, the *essences* of things, though indestructible, etc., are nevertheless the essences of *things*. So they cannot remain aloof in Heaven and have nothing to do with this world. If they are in Heaven as Plato supposed, the essences of *things*, " the posterior substance,"[2] or what the Platonic Parmenides called " the notions in our mind," [3] will be " severed " from the " prior substance, " or what the Platonic Parmenides called the absolute knowledge of God, that is, the absolute ideas in Heaven. Then

(1) " there will be no knowledge of the former (the things themselves or ideas) and (2) the latter (the essence) will

1 Aristotle, " Metaphysics, " 1070 a, 10.
2 *Id.*, 1031 b, 5.
3 Plato "Parmenides," 133 c.

have no being. (By 'severed' I mean, if the idea of good has not the essence of good, and the latter has not the property of being good). For (1) there is knowledge of each thing only when we know its essence. And (2) the case is the same for other things as for good; so that if the essence of good is not good, neither is the essence of reality real, nor the essence of unity one."[1]

Then this world would be a dreaming image of the waking reality. And the reality is, alas! completely beyond our human knowledge. It was against this position that Aristotle directed his polemic. It was the Platonic depreciation of this world that Aristotle attacked. So in his own system the ideas are only the "implicit perfection"; they "are and are not." They are still the ideals, but they must be *in* this world.

(3) Love and the Final Cause

In criticizing the Platonists, Aristotle said:

"They at the same time treat the ideas as universal substance and again as separable and individual. . . . The reason why those who say the ideas are universal combined these two views in one is that they did not make the ideas substances identical with the sensible things. They thought that the sensible things were in a state of flux and none of them remained, but the universal was apart from these and different."[2]

Plato considered the world as one of change and flux; he also considered it as bad. He preferred eternity to time, and the unchanging to the changing. But the more he elevated the ideas to Heaven, the more the worldly flux becomes purposeless and meaningless.

[1] Aristotle, "Metaphysics," 1031 b, 5.
[2] *Id.*, 1086 a, 35.

According to Aristotle, the world is a flux, but not a purposeless flux. Nature is movement. Movement is "the act, realization or entelechy of the beings, which are in potentiality, with different distinctions which they can present." [1] Things do not move without a purpose. They have their end in view and strive to realize the good, good to themselves at least. The good is the idea, the formal as well as the final cause. It is compared with the "object of desires and the object of thought. They move without being moved." [2] "The final cause is (*a*) something for whose good the action is done, and (*b*) something at which the action aims. . . . The final cause, then, produces motion by being loved, and by that which it moves, it moves all other things." [3] This is Aristotle's theory of love. He agreed with Plato that "he who loves the good desires the possession of the good." [4] But, according to Plato, the absolute good is not in this world. It is only by return to the ideal "fatherland" that the real good and the real forms of the things can be seen and be possessed. According to Aristotle, this world *is* the ideal "fatherland." The eternal motion and the eternal flux, which worried Plato, are exactly the manifestation of love that links the potentiality with the actuality, the potentially good with the actually good. The final cause of things is "the reason, and the reason forms the starting point,

1 Aristotle, "Physics," III, I,
2 Aristotle, "Metaphysics," 1072 a, 25.
3 *Id.*, 1072 b, 1.
4 Plato, "Symposium," 204 c.

alike in works of art and in works of nature." [1] Reason is the beginning of things as well as their end. Ideas are not solely in the ideal world, and the individual things are not mere "copies" of them. Ideas are the very forms of things, and the very ends of their becoming and growth. Thus by projecting the forms into Heaven, Plato separated the real from the ideal; by calling them back to earth, Aristotle made the real the ideal, or the ideal the real. With the ideas, even matter itself becomes good.

Aristotle said:

"And if, as we said, that matter is that which is potentially each thing, e. g., that of actual fire is that which is potentially fire, the bad will be just the potentially good." [2]

There is nothing contrary to Wisdom. "The order of things is the best possible in nature." [3]

In his "Metaphysics," Aristotle pointed out that none of his predecessors had said anything about final cause. He said:

"That which is the end for which actions and changes and movements take place, they assert it to be a cause in a way, but not in this way, i. e., not in the way in which it is its *nature* to be a cause. For those who speak of reason or friendship class these causes as goods; they do not speak, however, as if anything that exists either existed or came into being for the sake of these, but as if movement started from these. In the same way those who say the One or the existent is the good, say that it is the cause of substance,

[1] Aristotle, "De Partibus Animalium," tr. by W. Ogle, Oxford, 1911, 639 b, 15.
[2] Aristotle, "Metaphysics," 1092 a, 1.
[3] Aristotle, "Nichomachean Ethics," tr. by J. E. C. Welldon, 7th ed., 1920, I, X, p. 3.

but not that substance either is, or comes to be for the sake of this. Therefore, it turns out that in a sense they both say and do not say the good is a cause; for they do not call it a cause *qua* good, but only incidentally." [1]

They did not say final cause, because they did not attempt to justify this world.

(4) The God

Although everything in this world has its final cause, it does not follow that everything exists absolutely for its own sake, and is independent of others. On the contrary, in this world "plants are intended for the use of animals and all other animals for the service of man, domestic animals for employment and food alike, wild animals all or almost all for food and other purposes, e. g., for the supply of clothing and other instruments." [2]

"It is a constant rule equally conspicuous in the realm of Art and Nature that the lower is for the sake of the higher." Obviously in the world things are not such "that one has nothing to do with another, but all are ordered together to one end." [3] This one end is the common good of things, the final case, the idea, of the world as a whole. This is God.

There is much dispute in regard to the nature of God in Aristotle and His relation to the world. But, according to Aristotle's "theology" as shown in the "Metaphysics" and the general spirit of his philosophy,

1 Aristotle, "Metaphysics," 988 a, 15, 988 b, 15.
2 Aristotle, "Politics," Welldon's translation, I, IX, p. 20.
3 Aristotle, "Metaphysics," 1075 a, 15.

it seems to be perfectly clear that by God he meant the formal, and hence, the final cause of the world, and His relation to the world is just like the final or formal cause of any individual thing to that individual thing. People often emphasize the fact that Aristotle considered God as the first mover of the world, but in fact He is the first mover only because He is the first final cause. Aristotle said:

"And thought is moved by the object of thought, and one side of the list of opposites is itself the object of thought; and in this, substance is first, and in substance, that which is simple and exists actually. (The one and the simple are not the same, for one means a measure, but simply means that a thing itself has a certain nature.) But the good, also, and those which are in themselves desirable are on this same side of the list; and the first in any class is always the best, or analogous to the best." [1]

Substance here must mean the "essence, the formula of which is a definition." [2] This passage seems to show that God is the most simple and the most actual of the substances and is the first on the side of the good. The first is always the best; He is the best of the good. All other substances are essence or form only in the relative sense. The same thing can be, in one respect, matter and potentiality, and in another, form and actuality. The animal is the former in relation to man; the latter in relation to the plant. The essence of the lower is always the matter of the higher. But there is nothing

[1] Aristotle, "Metaphysics," 1072 a, 30.
[2] *Id.*, 1017 b, 23.

higher than the essence of the world as a whole. Hence, it is the simplest and the most actual. There is nothing for it to realize but itself. Hence, it has no object of thought, but only thinks itself. "Its thinking is a thinking on thinking." [1] It has no object of thought, hence, it is not moved; it is the object of all thought, hence, it is the mover of all by its "being loved." In one sense all forms are immovable in relation to their matter. But since they are themselves relative, their immobility is also relative. But God, the form of the world, is absolutely immovable.

To call Aristotle's "theology" theistic is not correct. To him, God is simply "a principle" upon which "depend the heavens and the world of nature." [2] He is not a person. In regard to this point Aristotle clearly said:

> "Our forefathers in the most remote ages have handed down to us their posterity a tradition in the form of a myth, that these substances (the heavenly substances) are gods and the divine encloses the whole of nature. The rest of the tradition has been added later in mythical form with a view to the persuasion of the multitude and its legal and utilitarian expediency; they say these gods are in the form of men, or like some of the animals. . . . But if we were to separate the first point from these additions . . . we must regard this as an inspired utterance, . . . like relics of the ancient treasure." [3]

From this passage, may we not say that the concrete heavenly bodies are the gods, while the divine that

[1] Aristotle, "Metaphysics," 1074 b, 30.
[2] *Id.*, 1072 b, 14.
[3] *Id.*, 1074 b, 10.

incloses the whole of nature is God ? After calling back to the earth the different ideas, Aristotle attempted to call back also the Idea of Good from the Platonic Heaven. According to Plato, this world has as its governor only the "child of the good." [1] But according to Aristotle, the good of the good is itself the final cause of the world. It is like a leader and the world is like an army. "The good or the highest good" which "the nature of the universe contains is found both in the order and the leader." [2] It is because of this common final cause, this leader, that all things in the world are bound together and become a harmonious unity, and a connected whole.

(5) Soul and Body

God may be said to be the soul of the world, and His relation to the world is just like that of soul to the body.

Aristotle said :

> "The soul must necessarily be a real substance, as the form which determines a natural body possessed potentially of life. The reality, however, of an object is contained in its perfect realization. Soul therefore will be a perfect realization of a body such as has been described." [3]

Following this he showed that the relation between soul and body is just like that between the wax and the figure

[1] Plato, "The Republic," 506 d.
[2] *Id.*, 1075 a, 10.
[3] Aristotle, "Psychology," 412 a, 20.

impressed upon it, that between the ax and axhood, or that between the eye and the vision. He again said:

"It [the soul] is a real substance which expresses an idea. Such substance is the manifestation of the inner meaning of such and such a body."[1]

"The soul, then, is the cause of the body as alive; and is so in each of the three senses in which the word 'cause' is used: that is to say, it is so both as the efficient cause from which movement springs, as the end and final cause and as the real or essential substance of the animate bodies."[2]

What more do we need for the soul of the man and the soul of the world? Following this analogy we may say that God is the manifestation of the inner meaning, the expression of the idea, of the world. He may be called the worldhood.

Only in this sense is everything in the world, bound up with God, through and through. He is the whole; other things are parts. The parts simply cannot separate from the whole. If the hand is separated from the body, it is no longer a hand.[3] It is also in this sense that the world is a real unity.

The analogy we made between Aristotle's theory of macrocosm and microcosm is not unjustifiable, for Aristotle made it himself. In his "Psychology" Aristotle said that reason, the highest part of the soul, "is not to be regarded as belonging to and governed by the things of sense (reason being a faculty independent

[1] Aristotle, "Psychology," 412 b, 10.
[2] *Ibid.*
[3] Aristotle, "Politics," Welldon's translation, I, III, p. 6.

of the matter of such objects), but the world of thought must be regarded as belonging to and regulated by reason." [1]

Following this he said:

"The same differences, however, as are found in nature, as a whole, must be characteristic also of the soul. Now in nature there is, on the one hand, that which acts as material substratum to each class of objects, this being that which is potentially of all of them: on the other hand, there is the element which is causal and creative in virtue of its producing all things, and which stands towards the other in the same relation as that in which art stands towards the materials on which it operates. Thus reason is, on the one hand, of such a nature as to *become* all things; on the other hand, of such a nature as to *create* all things, acting then much in the same way as some positive quality, such as for instance light: for light also creates actual out of potential color. This phase of reason is separated from and uncompounded with material conditions, and, being in its essential character fully and actually realized, it is not subject to impressions from without: for the creative is in every case more honorable than the passive, just as the originating principle is superior to the matter which it forms. . . . Further, this creative reason does not at one time think, at another time not think: (it thinks eternally) and when separated from the body it remains nothing but what it essentially is; and thus it is alone immortal and eternal." [2]

From this passage we can see why Aristotle said that God is "separable from sensible things." [3]

As shown above, all forms may be said, in one sense, to be apart from the individual. Here Aristotle only laid special emphasis on the highest aspect of the world and man.

[1] Aristotle, "Psychology," 430 a, 5.
[2] *Id.*, 10–25.
[3] Aristotle, "Metaphysics," 1073 a, 5.

Aristotle's theory of the relation of soul and body is significant, if we compare it with that of Plato. According to Plato, the soul is completely alien to the body and is imprisoned in it in its fall. As Aristotle said about Plato's theory:

"It is burdensome also for the soul to be united with the body without possibility of release from it: and not only so, but such union is to be, if possible, avoided, supposing it to be better for the reason to be independent of the body, as is usually said and widely believed."[1]

Aristotle's theory was apparently an attempt to overcome this dualism.

(6) The Origin of Evil

If all is good in nature, whence comes evil? In the discussion of the natural distinction of free man and slave, Aristotle said:

"But it frequently results contrary to the intention of nature that those who possess the bodies do not possess the souls of free men and vice versa."[2]

"It is assumed that, as the offspring of men are men, and of beasts, beasts, so the offspring of good men are good. And indeed it is Nature's object to bring about this result, although not infrequently she fails."[3]

In carrying out a plan, it often happens that the action requisite for the end in view has consequences that were not foreseen and had not entered into the consideration of the agent. This is true both in human affairs

[1] Aristotle, "Psychology," 407 b, 1.
[2] Aristotle, "Politics," Welldon's translation, I, VI, p. 13.
[3] *Id.*, Chap. VIII, pp. 15, 16.

and in the operation of Nature. When these unforeseen consequences happen in human affairs we say they are by chance; when they happen in the operation of Nature we say they are of spontaneity. Spontaneity is "that which is produced without appreciable cause," and is the phenomenon which "takes place against the law of Nature, and which is monstrous." [1] "One can say, with no less truth, that chance is something irrational; for reason appears in the things which are eternal or, at least, the most common in such and such a manner, while chance is found only in the things that are neither eternal, nor in the majority of the cases; and as the causes of the latter kind of things are undetermined, chance is as undetermined as the causes are." [2] Both spontaneity and chance are something exceptional. But since there are these exceptions, few men in the world can be happy in all respects, although the world is essentially good. "How evident it is that all men desire to live well and to be happy! But while some have it in their power to attain these objects, there are others who from some fault of Nature or Fortune have it not." [3] But this does not make the world less perfect. Aristotle said:

"But as chance and spontaneity are causes of phenomena which nature and intelligence could equally produce, and as chance and spontaneity can appear only in places where intelligence and nature act only accidentally and in an indirect manner, as, moreover, the accidental cannot be

[1] Aristotle, "Physics," II, VI.
[2] *Id.*, II, V.
[3] Aristotle, "Politics," Welldon's translation, IV, XIII, p. 199.

anterior and superior to what is in itself, it is clear also that the accidental cause cannot be superior to the essential cause. Then, spontaneity and chance come only after Intelligence and Nature. Even if one would go so far as to concede that chance can be the cause of heaven, nevertheless Intelligence and Nature still should be the superior causes of phenomena and of the whole universe." [1]

(7) The Purpose of Art

The frequent failure of nature, however, is a matter of fact. Thus art is needed. As Aristotle said :

" It is the purpose of all art and culture to supply the deficiencies of Nature." [2]

Man has intelligence, the mother of all arts. With intelligence, he can make up all that he has not in nature. He came to the world " barefooted, naked, and without weapon of which to avail himself. " But to him " numerous modes of defenses are open, and these, moreover, he may change at will ; as also he may adopt such weapons as he pleases, and at such time as suits him. For the hand is talon, hoof, and horn, at will. So it is spear and sword, and whatsoever other weapons or instruments you please. " [3] This is no doubt Nature's aim, and art helps to realize this aim. Nature also aims at producing health in all the living beings. All of them have been endowed with the instinctive capacity of self-curing. But disease often defeats Nature's aim. The art of medicine again comes to help her. Thus art is far from Nature's

[1] Aristotle, " Physics," II, VI.
[2] Aristotle, " Politics, " Welldon's translation, IV, XVII, p. 221.
[3] " De Partibus Animalium," 687 a, 20.

conqueror as the "art" line of thought supposed. On the contrary, art is always Nature's best ally in the realization of the beautiful and the good.

Moreover, art comes from intelligence; intelligence comes from Nature. In this sense art is simply a continuation of Nature. That men use spears and swords is just as natural as that the beasts use their hoofs and horns. That men build houses is just as natural as that the birds build their nests. All arts are simply the result of the natural development of man's nature. The power of man's intelligence is just the manifestation of Nature's wisdom.

(8) The Origin of State

There is also nothing arbitrary in the origin of State. "State is a natural institution" and "man is naturally a political animal." [1] The nature of man is such that they must go together and form some union. In the first place, "the male and female must combine for the procreation of children, nor is there anything deliberate or arbitrary in their doing so; on the contrary, the desire of leaving offspring like one's self is as natural to man as to the whole animal and vegetable world." [2] The association of man and woman forms the household; the association of households forms the village.

"Lastly [Aristotle said], the association composed of several villages in its complete form is the State, in which the goal of independence may be said to be first attained.

[1] Aristotle, "Politics," Welldon's translation, I, II, p. 5.
[2] *Id.*, p. 2.

For as the State was formed to make life possible, so it exists to make life good. Consequently, if it be allowed that the simple associations, i. e., the household and the village have a natural existence, so has the State in all cases ; for in the State they attain complete development, and Nature implies complete development, as the nature of anything, e. g., of man, a house, or a horse, may be defined to be its condition when the process of production is complete. Or the naturalness of the State may be proved in another way: the object proposed or the complete development of a thing is its highest Good ; but independence, which is first attained in the State, is a complete development of the highest Good and is therefore natural." [1]

Only in the State can man have full development. In this sense he is not a man if he is not in the State. The State is the whole, and no part can exist apart from the whole.

Obviously this theory is like that of Confucius, especially that as expounded in the chapter, " On the Order of the Hexagrams." (See above, p. 173.) Like Confucius, Aristotle also taught that the State should be governed by those who are superior in virtue and wisdom, that the most essential for the State is education, rather than law and punishment, and that music is one of the most efficient instruments in education, although he substituted gymnastics for rites. He also said :

"The best organized State is the one which offers the greatest happiness. " [2]

" And happiness is the *summum bonum ;* and happiness consists in a perfect activity and practice of virtue. " [3]

[1] Aristotle, "Politics," Welldon's translation, p. 5.
[2] *Id.*, IV, XIII, p. 199.
[3] *Id.*, p. 183.

"Virtue, then, is a state of deliberate moral purpose consisting in a mean that is relative to ourselves, the mean being determined by reason, or as a prudent man would determine it." [1]

As to the problem whether virtue is natural or conventional, he said:

"It is neither by nature, then, nor in defiance of nature that virtues are implanted in us. Nature gives us the capacity of receiving them, and that capacity is perfected by habit." [2]

All these points are in one way or another so much in common with Confucius that we cannot discuss them without repeating what we have already said. For the purpose of the present work, however, we need not discuss them further.

(9) The Problem of Pleasure

We should not, however, omit Aristotle's discussion of pleasure. Aristotle said:

"For some people say that the good is pleasure; others, on the contrary, that pleasure is utterly bad." [3]

Plato has been selected to represent the second view. In criticizing him, Aristotle said:

"But it is clear that if pleasure is not the good, neither can anything else be which is made more desirable by the addition of any absolute good. What is it, then, which is incapable

[1] Aristotle, "Nichomachean Ethics," Welldon's translation, II, VI, p. 47.

[2] *Id.*, I, II, I, p. 35.

[3] *Id.*, X, I, p. 315.

of such addition, but at the same time admits of our participating in it ? For it is a good of this kind which is the object of our research." [1]

According to him, pleasure is good, but he insisted on the theory of the qualitative difference of pleasure. With the introduction of this theory into ethics, he refined the crude utilitarianism or hedonism of the Sophists. In this respect, Aristotle was the ancient Mill. According to the theory which Aristotle said Plato criticized, pleasure is either a process of production or a process of motion. " Pain is the destruction of that of which pleasure is the production. It is said, too, that pain is a deficiency of the natural state, and pleasure, its satisfaction." [2] Both motion and the process of production are " descriptions " which are " appropriate " only to such things " as are divisible into parts and are not wholes." [3]

But according to Aristotle, pleasure is not a satisfaction of deficiency, for "the pleasures of mathematics, for example, have no such antecedent pain, nor among the pleasures of the senses have those of smell, nor again many sounds and sights, memories and hopes." [4] Nor is pleasure a motion. " Motions are apparently not complete in any and every period of time; on the contrary, most motions are incomplete and different in kind,

[1] Aristotle, " Nichomachean Ethics, " Welldon's translation, X, II, p. 318.

[2] *Id.*, X, II, p. 320.

[3] *Id.*, III, p. 325.

[4] *Id.*, II, p. 321.

in as much as the starting point and the goal constitute a difference of kind. Pleasure, on the other hand, seems to be complete or perfect of its kind, in any and every period of time." [1]

This shows that pleasure does not increase in time as motion or product increases, but "the pleasure of a moment is a whole." [2] Aristotle said:

"It seems that the act of sight is perfect or complete at any time; it does not lack anything which will afterwards be produced, and will make it perfect of its kind. Pleasure appears to resemble sight in this respect; it is a whole, nor is it possible at any time to find a pleasure which will be made perfect of its kind by increased duration." [3]

Every pleasure is unique in its kind, and is the whole at any time. So there can never be a quantitative difference of pleasure, but only a qualitative difference.

Where do we experience pleasures? "We experience them not in the process of acquiring certain powers, but in the exercise of the powers when acquired." It is wrong, therefore, to define pleasure as a "sensible process." It is better to define it as "activity of the natural state of one's being, and to call it not 'sensible' but 'unimpeded.'" [4] Aristotle said:

"So long as the object of thought or sensation and the critical or contemplative subjects are such as they ought

[1] Aristotle, "Nichomachean Ethics," Welldon's translation, X, III, p. 324.

[2] *Id.*, p. 324.

[3] *Id.*, II, p. 323.

[4] *Id.*, VII, XIII, p. 237.

to be, there will be pleasure in the exercise of the activity; for this is the natural result if the agent and patient remain in the same relation to each other." [1]

Thus "pleasure perfects activity." "It therefore perfects life, which is the aim of human desire." [2] "It is not as a state or quality inherent in the subject, but as a perfection superadded to it, like the bloom of youth to people in the prime of life." [3] Pleasure and life are so yoked together that we really do not know whether we desire life for pleasure or pleasure for life. "Pleasure is impossible without activity, and every activity is perfected by pleasure." [4]

As there are different kinds of activity, there are accordingly different kinds of pleasure. These pleasures are qualitatively different. The question is what kind of pleasure we should choose. Aristotle said:

"But in all these cases it seems that the thing really is what it appears to the virtuous man to be. But if this is a true statement of the case, as it seems to be, if virtue or the good man *qua good* is the measure of everything, it follows that it is such pleasures as appear pleasures to the good man that are really pleasures, and the things which afford him delight that are really pleasant." [5]

These are the pleasures that are "proper to man." [6]

[1] Aristotle, "Nichomachean Ethics," Welldon's translation, X, IV, p. 326.
[2] *Id.*, p. 327.
[3] *Id.*, p. 326.
[4] *Id.*, p. 327.
[5] *Id.*, X, V, p. 331.
[6] *Ibid.*

These are the essence of happiness, the highest good.[1]

(10) The Life of Contemplation

Aristotle said :

"If happiness consists in virtuous activity, it is only reasonable to suppose that it is the activity of the highest virtue, or in other words, of the best of our nature. . . .

"The speculative is the highest activity, as the intuitive reason is the highest of our faculties, and the objects with which the intuitive reason is concerned are the highest of things that can be known. It is also the most continuous; for our speculation can more easily be continuous than any kind of action. . . . At all events it appears that philosophy possesses pleasure of wonderful purity and certainty." [2]

The life of contemplation is also the best, because in the first place it is more self-sufficient and independent than other virtues.[3] In the second place, it has its end completely in itself. [4] In the third place, it is separated from the emotions.[5] In all respects the happiness of contemplation is akin to that of the Divine. The "perfection of God or the universe is that all their actions are self-contained and there are none which have an effect external to themselves." [6] The activity of God is thinking, and is "thinking on thinking." [7] He is also free from

[1] Aristotle, "Nichomachean Ethics," Welldon's translation, X, VII, p. 335.

[2] *Id.*, p. 335.

[3] *Id.*, p. 339.

[4] *Id.*, p. 336.

[5] *Id.*, p. 338.

[6] Aristotle, "Politics," Welldon's translation, IV, IV, p. 172.

[7] Aristotle, "Metaphysics," 1074 b, 30.

the emotions which are "the composite or material part of our nature." [1]

All these perfections are found in the life of contemplation. So Aristotle said :

"But such a life will be too good for man. He will enjoy such a life not in virtue of his humanity, but in virtue of some divine element within him, and the superiority of this activity to the activity of any other virtue will be proportionate to the superiority of this divine element in man to his composite or material nature." [2]

(11) Concluding Remarks

Aristotle certainly gave us a splendid picture of the happy life. According to him, "it is only in a secondary sense that the life which accords with others, i. e., non-speculative virtue, can be said to be happy ; for the activities of such virtue are human, they have no divine element." [3] They have to deal with human affairs.

If this is so, there are few people who can be really happy. Few people have leisure and peace at hand; most of them must engage in business for leisure and war for peace. It seems that with the introduction of the distinction of the speculative activity, and of the superiority of the former to the latter, Aristotle led himself in ethics, at least, to his Master's two worlds system, which he fought against. He knew that in order to enjoy the

[1] Aristotle, "Nichomachean Ethics," Welldon's translation, X, VIII, p. 339.

[2] *Id.*, p. 337.

[3] *Id.*, p. 338.

good of activity, the activity must be self-dependent and self-sufficient, without ulterior ends, and without passion. But he did not see how every activity could meet these requirements. Next we shall see that in Neo-Confucianism an attempt was made to find the leisure in business, the calm in emotion, and the divine speculation in human affairs.

CHAPTER XII

NEO-CONFUCIANISM

Neo-Confucianism is a new name given to a most influential type of modern Chinese philosophy usually known as the "Philosophy of Sung." Most of its representatives were in their early years believers in Taoism[1] and Buddhism, and only afterwards came back to Confucius. They claimed that their teaching was the genuine Confucianism, but in fact it was Confucianism with Buddhistic meaning. They also divided themselves into two rival branches; we may say, the left and the right. The left wing was nearer to the original Buddhism; the right wing, to the original Confucianism. The left accused the right of being too formal; the right accused the left of being too subjective. For our present purpose the left wing is important, because in it the influence of Buddhism is the most obvious. So in this chapter, Wang Yang-ming, the leader of the left, is our philosopher.

(1) The General System

Neo-Confucianism is in one sense the modern science of China. The similarity between it and modern

[1] Taoism mentioned in this chapter refers to the later Taoistic religion, which is different from the earlier Taoism as a philosophy.

European science is that besides theory it has a technical and applied side. The difference between it and modern European science is that while modern European science aims primarily to know and to control matter, the aim of Neo-Confucianism is primarily to know and to control the mind. In the following treatment of Wang Yang-ming's philosophy, I shall omit entirely the discussion of technic. The Neo-Confucian technic is hardly intelligible to the West without detailed elucidation which is, however, far beyond the purpose and the scope of the present work.

The general system of Wang Yang-ming's philosophy is based on his interpretation of "The Great Learning." The general principle of the "The Great Learning" is shown in its opening passage:

"The doctrine of 'The Great Learning' is: to enlighten the enlightened virtue, to love others, and to stop at the supreme good."[1]

Wang Yang-ming's interpretation of this passage is shown in the following dialogue:

"Referring to 'The Great Learning' a former scholar held that it is the learning of the Great Man. I venture to ask why the learning for the Great Man should consist in the enlightenment of the enlightened virtue.

"The Great Man is an all-pervading unity, one with heaven, earth, and all things. . . . The small man makes a cleavage between things and distinguishes between himself and others. The reason that the Great Man can be one with heaven, earth,

[1] "The Great Learning," Sec. I.

and all things, is not that he makes himself to be, but that the nature of his mind is so. The mind of the small man is just the same, only he makes it small. The small man sees the child about to fall into the well; he certainly will experience a feeling of alarm and distress. This proves that his love is one with the child. . . . When he hears the pitiful cry and sees the frightened appearance of the birds and the beasts that are about to be killed, he certainly will feel pain. This proves that his love is one with the birds and the beasts. . . . These show that the original unity is also in the small man. This nature of mind has its source in Nature and its light cannot be obscured. Therefore, it is called the enlightened virtue. But when the small man is moved by desires and obscured by selfishness, he will destroy things and do all evils . . . and at last the original unity is lost. . . . The learning of the Great Man is simply to clear away the obscuration of selfish desires and thus to enlighten the enlightened virtue so that he can restore the original unity of heaven, earth, and all other things. It is not possible to add anything to the original.

"But why does the learning of the Great Man consist in loving others?

"To enlighten the enlightened virtue is to establish the nature of the unity of heaven, earth, and all other things; to love others is to exercise the function of that unity. Therefore, the enlightenment of the enlightened virtue consists *in* loving others: to love others is *to* enlighten the enlightened virtue. . . . For this reason, if I love my own father, the fathers of others, and the fathers of all men, my love will be truly extended with my loving all these fathers. . . . From all these human relations up to mountains, rivers, spirits, gods, birds, animals, and plants, all should be truly loved in order to promote my natural love. Then there is nothing left unenlightened in my enlightened virtue; then I am really one with heaven, earth, and all things. . . .

"But why stop at the supreme good?

"The supreme good is the highest standard of enlightening virtue and loving others. Our original nature is purely good. What cannot be darkened in it is the supreme good, the nature of the enlightened virtue, and also intuitive

knowledge. When things come to it, right is right, wrong is wrong, important is important, inferior is inferior. It responds with all things and changes always, but it eternally maintains the *mean*. This is the highest standard of the action of man and of things, and nothing can be added or diminished. . . . Among the former scholars, there were some who attempted to enlighten their enlightened virtue. But, as they did not know enough to stop at the supreme good, they used their selfish purpose to excess and lost their mind in vacuous, lifeless and lonely contemplation, and could do nothing to the world. . . . There were others who loved others. But their motive is selfish, base, and trifling. They simply used power, strategy, and craft, but had no real love and genuine sympathy. . . . All these people were wrong, because they did not know to stop at the supreme good." [1]

In the original nature, all is unity. Man lost this unity in the false distinction in what Schopenhauer called the *principium individuationis*. The method of the restoration of the original nature is "the works of love" or "the enlargement of heart." [2] This is the most natural way of life; this is what intuitive knowledge tells us.

(2) The Criticism on Buddhism

But according to Schopenhauer the restoration of the original nature only assures us that in this world happiness is a real illusion and suffering is a solid reality. In the unity we really see "the eternal justice." In order to be happy we are bound to return to the original "nothing" with the complete denial of will. But as already seen in the above quotation, according to Wang

[1] Wang Yang-ming, "Works," Book XXVI, "Dialogue on the Great Learning,"

[2] See above, p. 62.

Yang-ming, this is exactly selfishness. The Buddhists are equally mistaken as are the utilitarians. Their teachings are based on calculation, not on intuitive knowledge. So they both lose the mean, either by excess or by deficiency. If Buddhism tried to secure the "nothing" by means of calculation, it simply adopted a wrong method. Wang Yang-ming said:

"When the Taoists speak of the 'non-real,' can the Confucian philosopher add to it a hair of real? When the Buddhists speak of 'nothing,' can the Confucian sage add to it a hair of thing? But when the Taoists speak of 'nonreal,' their motive is to preserve life. When the Buddhists speak of 'nothing,' their motive is to escape the bitterness and suffering of life and death. When they add these ideas to the original nature of mind, their original meaning of 'nonreal' and 'nothing' is somewhat lost and thereby the original nature of mind is not completely free from obscuration. The Confucian sage simply restores the original condition of intuitive knowledge and adds to it no idea whatsoever. Heaven, earth, and all things are all in the function and activity of our intuitive knowledge. How can anything be outside it and hinder or obstruct it?" [1]

"The fact that the Buddhists pay no attention to phenomena shows that they do pay attention to them. The fact that we Confucian philosophers pay attention to phenomena shows that we do not pay attention to them. The Buddhists are afraid of the trouble of the relation between father and son and hence avoid this relation. They are afraid of the trouble of the relation between sovereign and people and hence they avoid this relation. They are afraid of the relation between husband and wife and hence they avoid this relation. They must avoid these relations because they pay attention to them. But we Confucian philosophers

[1] Wang Yang-ming, "Works," Book III.

are different. If there is the relation between father and son, we respond to it with love. If there is the relation between sovereign and the people, we respond to it with justice. If there is the relation between husband and wife, we respond to it with mutual respect. We do not pay special attention to these relations."[1]

The real way to find the "nothing" is not to make the attempt. If one makes the attempt, the attempt itself is a thing. We all have the intuitive knowledge which gives all things the natural response. If we simply let it go and follow it, we can deal with things just as though we do not deal with them. The "nothing" is to be secured within life, not without life.

(3) The Mean in Love

According to Schopenhauer life itself is a contradiction. Our original nature makes us love others; but as a matter of fact we can maintain life only at the expense of others. At least we must eat vegetables. This means we must eat ourselves. How can we endure the eternal justice? Confucius said that the domestication of animals was good because it was useful to life, our life, certainly; but how about the life of the animal? According to the "nature" line of thought, this is something that fundamentally ought not to be. According to the "art" line of thought this is simply a case of the fact that might is right. But to those who want to justify both nature and art, and who consider the universe as a whole is a harmony rather than an antagonism, this contradiction is certainly

[1] Wang Yang-ming, "Works," Book III.

a very difficult problem. Aristotle gave an answer, but it is altogether too teleological for us to believe. But in the Confucian school, there was a theory of love with degrees. This theory was fully expounded by Mencius and accepted by the Neo-Confucianists. The following quotation shows how Wang Yang-ming met this contradiction of life. It reads:

"If the Great Man is one with all things, why did 'The Great Learning' say that we should treat some things better than others?

"In the natural reason, there is a difference in regard to the different things. The body, for instance, is a unity. But when one uses the arms to protect the head, one does not purposely treat the arms worse than the head. According to natural reason, it is so. We love both the animals and plants. But we give plants to feed the animals, and we can tolerate it. We love both men and the animals, but we butcher the animals to feed our parents, to offer sacrifice, to entertain guests, and we can also endure it. We love both our nearest relative and the unknown people. But suppose that there is only a little food, and that if the individual gets it he will live, otherwise he will die, and that it is absolutely impossible to save both our nearest relative and the unknown people, we must give this food to the nearest relative rather than to the unknown people, and we also tolerate it. This is in harmony with the natural reason. But among our own person and our nearest relatives, absolutely no distinction can be made; because here is the origin of our love. If we can tolerate here, there will be nothing we cannot tolerate." [1]

This theory seems to be like that of Aristotle, but is in fact different. It does not presuppose a teleological universe. It simply shows that in our intuitive knowledge

[1] Wang Yang-ming, "Works," Book IV.

there is a certain selfishness that can be justified, that is natural. The theory of love with degrees is a reconciliation of extreme altruism and extreme egoism. With this the contradiction of life is solved.

(4) Passion and the Natural Evil

Another main reason for Schopenhauer to escape from the world is that in the world there are the "infinite suffering," the natural evils, such as death, disease, etc. But according to Wang Yang-ming, there are no such evils. This may be shown in the following dialogue:

"When I was pulling the weeds from among the flowers, I said: In heaven and earth, how difficult it is to cultivate the good and to get rid of the evil.

"This is to make a distinction between good and evil from the human point of view, and this is a mistake. . . . The life of the universe is in the grass as well as in the flower. There is no distinction between good and evil. Because you like the flowers, you say that they are good and the grass is evil. But when you want to use the grass, you will in turn consider the grass as good. This kind of good and evil has its source in your mind, therefore I know it is a mistake.

"In that case there is neither good nor evil; is this not so?

"In the tranquillity and equilibrium of mind, there is neither good nor evil. Only with the stirring of passion, does the distinction between good and evil appear. If there are no stirrings of passion, there is neither good nor evil, and this is what is called the Supreme good.

"According to Buddhism the Supreme good is also the non-distinction between good and evil. In what way is it different from what you say?

"The Buddhists insist on the non-distinction between good and evil and then disregard all things. For this reason they

cannot enter matters of the world. The non-distinction between good and evil in the case of the Confucian philosopher implies that he does neither *make* like nor *make* dislike. . . .

"Since the grass is not bad, it should not be pulled up.

"That is the view of Buddhism. If the grass causes any hindrance, you can pluck it up.

"Then I make like and dislike?

"To make no like and dislike does not mean that there is no like and dislike. Without these, a man would be as if devoid of consciousness. When I say do not *make*, I mean simply to like and dislike according to the natural reason without making any purposed effort to like and dislike. Thus one likes and dislikes as though he does not like or dislike.

"How can weedings be construed in accordance with natural reason and as making no effort?

"If the grass causes any hindrance and you intuitively think that it should be uprooted, then uproot it. If you cannot pull it up, your mind is still not disturbed. If you make any conscious effort, the original nature of mind will be disturbed by the passion." [1]

In nature there is no good nor evil. Natural good and natural evil are simply due to human like and dislike. Of course to abolish like and dislike is certainly one way to do away with the evil. But according to Wang Yang-ming, this is not necessary. We need only not *make* like or dislike, that is, not insist on like and dislike. We will not insist, if we only know that in things themselves there is no evil, and that evil is only the product of our passion. Thus we disconnect the transitory passions from their permanent cause. "If you cannot pull it, your mind is not disturbed," because

[1] Wang Yang-ming, "Works," Book I.

the dislike is disconnected from the grass. In the latter part of the dialogue he concluded that one might be angry, but one should not have a *thing* about which one might be angry. One might like or dislike, but one should not have a *thing* that one likes and dislikes. This means the non-insistence. This means that one should not *make* like or dislike. In another place Wang Yang-ming said that there were passions, but we must not *have* them.[1] All these sayings mean the same thing.

(5) The Absolute Calm

A passion can no longer trouble our mind if we disconnect it from its cause. In the same way business and any kind of human activity can no longer trouble us if we disconnect them from their result. In doing a thing the mind is not so much troubled by the doing as by the calculation, the nervousness, the anxiety about the personal failure or success. All these are due to selfishness and should be avoided. If they are avoided, the mind will only enjoy the doing, but not be troubled by it. It will respond to all things, but at the same time be like "the Heavenly Prince in leisure, while the members carry out his will."[2] The popular illustrations given by the Neo-Confucianist are that the mind is like the sun, the passions like the clouds; the clouds pass and vanish but the sun is not disturbed. The mind

[1] Wang Yang-ming, "Works," Book II.
[2] *Id.*, Book I.

is like the mirror, human affairs are like the reflections; the reflections pass and vanish, but the mirror itself is not disturbed. But these are only popular illustrations. The mind is not outside the activity; it is the mind that is active. Only that it is still tranquil while it is active. This is the union of tranquillity and activity. This is the highest state and the best state of mind. The following is a picture of this state:

"The mind is neither tranquillity as such nor activity as such. Tranquillity refers to its nature; activity refers to its function. For this reason the learning of the superior man makes no distinction between tranquillity and activity. When it is tranquil, it is always awakening, and therefore is different from 'nothing.' Therefore, it can always respond. When it is active, it is always calm and therefore it is troubled by nothing. Therefore it is always quiet. . . . Thus it is calm when it is tranquil; it is also calm when it is active. The mind is one and undivided. Since tranquillity is its nature, he who seeks another tranquillity in this tranquillity destroys its very nature. Since activity is its function, he who is afraid of activity destroys its function! The very idea of seeking tranquillity is itself activity. The very idea of avoiding activity is itself not tranquillity. Then the mind is in disturbance both in tranquillity and activity. The disturbance is endless." [1]

The last sentence shows the defect of Buddhism. Another earlier Neo-Confucianist, Cheng Ming-tao, had a treatise "On Calm," which may be quoted in part as follows:

"What is called calm is the calm both in activity and in tranquillity. In it there is no anxiety about the future, no distinction between the internal and the external. If

[1] Wang Yang-ming, "Works," Book V.

some people consider the external things as the source of disturbance, he considers that in his nature there is a distinction between the internal and the external. . . . He has a conscious idea to avoid the external inducement, but he does not know that there is no distinction between the external and the internal. Keeping this dualism in mind, how can he know the real calm? The universe is unchanging, because its mind is in all things, yet of itself it has no mind. The sage is unchanging, because his feeling follows the nature of things, yet he himself has no feeling. Therefore the learning of the superior man is to keep the mind open and in response to all things. . . . Every man has his own one-sidedness and thus he is likely to miss the truth. The general trouble is that man is often too selfish and has too much calculation. Being too selfish, he cannot take activity as activity. Having too much calculation, he cannot take intuition as his natural guide. He has an idea of aversion towards outside things. With this mind he wants to enlighten the place of nothingness. This is just like seeking reflection in the back of a mirror. Than to disregard the outside as external and to regard only the internal, it is better to forget both the external and the internal. If both of them are forgotten, there is nothing left. If there is nothing, there is calm. If there is calm, there is light. If there is light, is there any more trouble in dealing with things?" [1]

The real "nothing" is to be found, not in the negation of activity and the external, but in the union of activity and tranquillity, of the external and the internal. This is what the Neo-Confucianists considered as far superior to Buddhism.

(6) Concluding Remarks

Concerning intuition or intuitive knowledge of which the Neo-Confucianists spoke, we need not take it to mean

[1] Huang Tsung-hsi, "Selections from the Philosophies of Sung and Yuang," Book XIII.

something mysterious. It means just natural feeling. We naturally have the feeling of sympathy towards others; we naturally have more sympathy towards man than towards the animals. These are our natural guides. According to the Neo-Confucianists, the first response in our mind to the external things is always the manifestation of the original good, the intuitive knowledge. The common illustration they used is that when a man sees a child about to fall into the well, his first response is to save it from falling. Other ideas, such as to show his bravery, to make friendship with the father of the child, come to the mind only afterwards. The first is the response of intuitive knowledge, the others are calculation and selfishness. Of course in a simple case like this, it istrue. But it is not infrequently true that the first response is something bad or fixed simply by habit or custom.

Anyway, the Neo-Confucianists certainly gave us a concrete picture of a kind of ideal life. They also embodied the picture in their own lives and told us the method of attaining it. Whether their method is really practicable or whether their theory is sound are questions still to be answered. It is hoped that the further development of what is called "deep psychology" may not fail to throw light upon this branch of man's thought. Whether this branch of man's thought is to be verified or rejected in the future, its attempt to reconcile the "nothing" with things must remain as a great event in the history of philosophy, and its literature must remain as a body of most interesting human documents.

CHAPTER XIII

HEGEL

(1) The Criticism of Kant and Fichte

The fundamental antagonism in the modern West is that of the ego against the whole alien world. Progressivism had its origin in man's rebellion against God. Immediately after the rebellion, man was conscious of his greatness as well as his smallness. He was conscious of his greatness, because he thought that there was a great alien world for him to conquer. He was conscious of his own smallness, because he thought that the world for him to conquer was a great alien world. All the same, he was conscious of the "self" in opposition to the non-self, the whole outside world. The self may know and conquer the outside world, but it must always remain an *outside* world. Kant tried to establish a noumenal world for God, immortality, and freedom. But at last he succeeded in establishing only a world beyond, the existence and content of which remain matters of faith. Fichte elevated the Ego to the place of God and thus made it itself the whole. But outside the Ego there is still the non-Ego. As the Ego gains in fullness, the non-Ego moves ever before it, like a ghost that cannot be laid. The Ego must assume the infinite task of conquering the non-Ego, but the final

success again remains a matter of faith. Speaking of Kant, Hegel said:

"The observations, made in the various stages of consciousness, culminate in the summary statement that the content of all we are acquainted with is only an appearance. . . . This stage of 'appearance,' however,—the phenomenal world,—is not the terminus of thought: there is another and a higher region. But that region was to Kantian philosophy an inaccessible 'other world.'" [1]

Speaking of Fichte, he said:

"Fichte, in consequence, never advanced beyond Kant's conclusion, that the finite only is knowable, while the infinite transcends the range of thought. What Kant called the-thing-by-itself, Fichte called the impulse from without—that abstraction of something else than 'I,' not otherwise describable or definable than as the negative or non-Ego in general. . . . And in this manner the 'I' is but the continuous act of self-liberation from this impulse, never gaining a real freedom, because with the surcease of the impulse the 'I,' whose being is its action, would also cease to be." [2]

The dualism, the opposition of the self to the outside, was not conquered; the divorce of the individual from the whole was not reconciled. This is the wound that man received in his rebellion against God. Hegel attempted to heal this wound. He attempted to restore the unity of the world, and, at the same time, to justify the antagonism. He attempted to restore the dignity of the whole and at the same time to keep the dignity of the ego.

[1] "The Logic of Hegel," Wallace's translation, London, 1892, p. 119.

[2] *Id.*, p. 120.

This he did with his theory that the universal Spirit must be self-conscious. The universal Spirit must scatter itself into individual selves, into diversity, and antagonism, simply because it wants to be, or needs to be, self-conscious.

(2) "AN SICH" AND "FÜR SICH"

The important idea in Hegel's philosophy is the self-consciousness. Confucius said:

"There is none who does not drink and eat, but few know the taste." [1]

It is the consciousness of the taste, that makes eating and drinking interesting. The romantic philosopher idealized the instinctive activity of primitive people, of children, of birds and beasts. But we really wonder how these agents themselves, who act unconsciously according to the dictate of their "virtue" enjoy the highest blessing which the romantic observer attributed to them. No doubt there is happiness, but probably most of the happiness is only "known to us," to use Hegel's phrase, but not known to the agents. There is truth in the romantic philosophy that the negation of civilization and intellect and the restoration of primitivity and instinct are desirable. But they forget that it is the *restoration* that is significant. As Hegel said, the old man may utter the same creed as the child, but for him "it is pregnant with the significance of a lifetime." [2]

[1] "The Doctrine of the Mean," Chap. IV, Sec. 2.
[2] "The Logic of Hegel," Wallace's translation, Oxford, 1892, p. 373.

The romantic philosopher can enjoy the simplicity of the state of nature, simply because he has been in the entanglement of the state of art. This seems to be a matter of fact. Based upon this fact Hegel built his system. No doubt in the original state of the world Spirit, there are harmony and unity, but this primal harmony and unity are only for the observer, not for the Spirit itself. "God is God only so far as he knows himself : his self-knowledge is, further, his self-consciousness in man, and man's knowledge *of* God, which proceeds to man's self-knowledge in God. "[1] " While the embryo is certainly, in itself, implicitly a human being, it is not so explicitly, it does not take itself to be a human being (*für sich*)." [2] The embryo is a man *an sich*, the man is a man *an und für sich*. The embryo is in essence already a man, but is only a man "known to us," to the observer, but not to itself. It is not self-conscious. In order to be self-conscious, it has to pass through the whole process of development, of opposition, and struggle. The result of the whole process is nothing more than what was already in the embryo. But now it " takes itself to be a human being. " It is self-conscious freedom. " [3] This is true of everything and also of God. God, in order to be *an und für sich*, must be self-conscious. In order to be self-conscious He must create the world. The

[1] Hegel, " Philosophy of Mind, " tr. from "The Encyclopedia of Philosophic Science " by W. Wallace, Oxford, 1894, p. 299.
[2] Hegel, " Phenomenology of Mind, " tr. by J. B. Baillie, London, 1910, p. 19.
[3] *Ibid.*

Platonic ideal, in order to be conscious of itself, must pass into the actual. The Buddhistic "nothing," in order to be conscious of itself, must pass over to things. There is no mistake either in God or in man in having an antagonistic world.

(3) The Interpretation of the "Creation"

The ultimate Being, in its immediate and primal unity, "is simple immediacy, the bare objective existence, but *qua* immediacy or existence is without Self." [1] "It has to become self-contained *for itself*, on its own account; it must get knowledge of spirit, and must be conscious of itself as spirit. This means, it must be presented to itself as an object." [2] "Merely eternal, or *abstract* Spirit, then, becomes an other to itself: it enters existence, and, in the first instance, enters *immediate* existence. It creates a World. This 'Creation' is the word which pictorial presentative thought uses to convey the absolute movement which the notion itself goes through." [3] The world is the other of the Spirit. The Spirit must go through the other, simply that it may be returned to itself. It must produce the diversity, simply because it wants to regain the unity, but when the unity is regained, it is no longer the "original primal unity as such, not an immediate unity as such." [4] It is an *unity-regained;* it is an unity with self-consciousness.

[1] Hegel, "Phenomenology of Mind," Baillie's translation, London, 1910, p. 781.
[2] *Id.*, p. 22.
[3] *Id.*, p. 781.
[4] *Id.*, p. 17.

So the Spirit must pass into the other, simply because it must transcend the other. It must transcend the other simply because it must be self-conscious. It must go over into space as Nature; it must go into Time as History. It must go through all the moments and stages. But it has only a very simple goal, "which is Absolute Knowledge or Spirit knowing itself as Spirit." [1]

(4) The Interpretation of the "Fall"

"The world, however, is not merely Spirit thus thrown scattered in all its plenitude with an external order imposed on it; for since Spirit is essentially simple Self, this self is likewise present therein. It is objectively existent spirit which is *individual* self, that has consciousness and distinguishes itself as other, as world, from itself." [2] At first the individual self is like a child who does not know himself. It has an innocence that is charming and attractive, but this charming and attractive innocence is again only for others, not for itself. "The harmoniousness of childhood is the gift from the hand of nature: the second harmony must spring from the labor and culture of the spirit." [3] So the self must become self-centered; it must oppose itself to nature. This is that the pictorial thought of religion represented as the "fall" of mankind. Adam and Eve fell when they ate the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of

[1] Hegel "Phenomenology of Mind," Baillie's translation, London, 1910, p. 822.

[2] *Id.*, p. 782.

[3] "The Logic of Hegel," Wallace's translation, Oxford, 1892, p. 55.

good and evil. Their first reflection after their eating the fruit was that they were naked. "The sense of shame bears the evidence to the separation of man from his natural and sensuous life." [1] And Hegel said:

> "The hour when men leave the path of mere natural being marks the difference between him, a self-conscious agent, and the natural world. But this schism, though it forms a necessary element in the very notion of spirit, is not the final goal of man. It is to this state of inward breach that the whole finite action of thought and will belongs. In that finite sphere man pursues ends of his own and draws from himself the material of his conduct. While he pursues these aims to the uttermost, while his knowledge and his will seek himself, his own narrow self apart from the universal, he is evil; and his evil is to be subjective." [2]

Thus in the world there is tragic division and antagonism of man against man, of man against nature, of finite against the infinite, and, in short, of Spirit against Spirit. But this is not to be regretted. Man must fall in order that he may return to his former state. The original harmony must be lost in order that it may be regained.

(5) The False and the Evil

There are many other evils. "The life of God and divine intelligence, can, then, if you like, be spoken of as love disporting with itself; but this idea falls into edification, and even sinks into insipidity, if it lacks the seriousness, the suffering, the patience, and the labor

[1] "The Logic of Hegel," Wallace's translation, Oxford, 1892, p. 56.
[2] *Id.*, p. 57.

of the negative." [1] In the process of the self-becoming and self-development of the Spirit, it "creates its own moments in its course, and goes through them all; and the whole of this movement constitutes its positive content and its truth. This movement includes, therefore, the negative factor as well, the element which would be named falsity, if it could be considered one from which we had to abstract." [2] All these moments together make the whole; they have meaning only with the whole. But our "thought, as *Understanding*, sticks to fixity of characters and their distinctness from one another." [3] It takes "such abstract forms as 'the same' and 'not the same,' 'identity' and 'non-identity' to be something true, fixed, real," and rests on them.[4] To it good is good, evil is evil, truth is truth, and falsity is falsity. It isolates the single moment from the whole and holds it fast, without knowing that to the whole process even the negative factor has the positive significance. "Against this view it must be pointed out that truth is not like stamped coin that is issued ready from the mint and so can be taken up and used. Nor, again, *is* there something false, any more than there *is* something evil." [5] There is not something false and evil, because in the process of the whole, even the so-called truth and good are not to be held as something fixed and immovable.

[1] Hegel, "Phenomenology of Mind," Baillie's translation, London, p. 17.
[2] *Id.*, pp. 43, 44.
[3] "The Logic of Hegel," Wallace's translation, Oxford, 1892, p. 143.
[4] Hegel, "Phenomenology of Mind," Baillie's translation, London, 1910, p. 790.
[5] *Id.*, p. 36.

The real truth is the process as a whole. To quote from Hegel at length:

"In this way truth is the bacchanalian revel, where not a soul is sober; and because every member is no sooner detached than it *eo ipso* collapses straightway, the revel is just as much a state of transparent unbroken calm. Judged by that movement, the particular shapes which mind assumes do not indeed subsist any more than do determinate thought or ideas; but they are, all the same, as much positive and necessary moments, as negative and transitory."[1]

From the point of view of the whole, "evil is inherently the same that goodness is. When evil is the *same* as goodness, then evil is just *not* evil, nor goodness, good; on the contrary, both are really done away with."[2]

(6) The Purpose of Culture

The process of human culture is the process of regaining the unity which was lost, not through some mistake either of God or of man, but with the purpose that it may be regained on a higher level. Reason passes itself into space and becomes the objective world in contrast with itself, the subject. It sets up this contrast not to rest therein. It simply wants to realize "explicitly the nullity of that contrast which it sees to be implicitly null."[3]

In order to realize this purpose, Reason assumes two kinds of activity: the theoretical and the practical. In its theoretical activity, Reason "observes" the external world and translates it into its own conceptual

[1] Hegel, "Phenomenology of Mind," Baillie's translation, London, 1910, p. 44.

[2] *Id.*, p. 789.

[3] "The Logic of Hegel," Wallace's translation, Oxford, 1892, p. 363.

thought. It delights itself in seeing that in the external world "what is universally normal is also universally valid: what *ought to be*, as a matter of fact *is* too; and what merely *should* be, and *is* not, has no real truth." [1] This is modern science.

In its theoretical activity, Reason only observes. In its practical activity Reason wants to realize something by itself. In its theoretical activity, Reason takes the objective world as real and true. It takes it as content with which to fill up "the abstract certitude of itself." [2] In its practical activity, Reason considers the objective world as "a mere semblance, a collection of contingencies and shapes, at bottom visionary. It modifies and informs that world by the inward nature of the subjective, which is here taken to be the genuine objective." [3] Reason now appears as will. It takes all the external and the already subsisting objectivity for the "external embodiment of the will." [4]

In the theoretical activity, Reason seeks Truth; in the practical activity, Reason seeks Good. In these activities there are many different stages and moments: "The length of the journey has to be borne with, for every moment is necessary." "The universal mind at work in the world (*Weltgeist*) has had the patience

1 Hegel, "Phenomenology of Mind," Baillie's translation, London, 1910, p. 242.

2 "The Logic of Hegel," Wallace's translation, Oxford, 1892, p. 363.

3 *Ibid.*

4 Hegel, "The Philosophy of Mind," Wallace's translation, Oxford, 1894, p. 240.

to go through these forms in the long stretch of time's extent, and to take upon itself the prodigious labor of the world's history, where it bodied forth in each form the entire content of itself, which each is capable of grasping; because by nothing less could the all-pervading mind ever manage to become conscious of what itself is." [1]

(7) The Absolute Knowledge

But in all these stages, Reason is only in its finite form. It starts with the presupposition of the contrast of the subject and object. In its theoretical activity, it presupposes " a world already in existence " and the knowing subject as a *tabula rasa*. " Reason is active here, but it is reason in the form of understanding. The truth which such cognition can reach will therefore be only finite; the infinite truth (the notion) is isolated and made an inaccessible goal in a world of its own." [2] In the practical activity, it tries to " mold the world it finds before it into a shape conformable to its purposed end." [3] It supposed the world to be independent of the good.[4] So the actualization of the good is again in a world beyond. It now has to assume the endless task of infinite progress for the purposed good or perfection. Fichte is an example of this type.

But when the theoretical reason and the practical reason once unite, the implicit nullity of the contrast

[1] Hegel, " Phenomenology of Mind, " Baillie's translation, London, 1910, p. 28.
[2] "The Logic of Hegel," Wallace's translation, Oxford, 1892, p. 364.
[3] *Id.*, p. 371.
[4] *Ibid.*

of the subject and object is at once explicitly realized. Reason knows that the subjective purpose is no longer subjective, and that the objective world is but its own truth and substantiality.[1] It now returns to itself. It is now the Speculative or Absolute Idea.[2] Its knowledge is Absolute Knowledge. It "at once gives its complete and true content the form of the self." It now is conscious of itself as a Self. "It is Ego, which is the concrete Ego and no other, and at the same time, from its very nature, is mediated or sublated universal Ego."[3] But the Spirit does not stop here. With all its previous moments preserved in its recollection, it enters the new age of existence, a new world, and becomes a new type and new mode of Spirit. As Hegel said:

"Here it has to begin all over again at its immediacy, as freshly as before, and thence rise once more to the measure of its stature, as if, for it, all that preceded were lost, and as if it has learned nothing from the experience of the spirits that preceded. But recollection (*Erinnerung*) has conserved that experience, and is the inner being, and, in fact, the higher form of the substance. While, then, this phase of Spirit begins all over again the formative development, apparently solely from itself, yet at the same time it commences at a higher level."[4]

(8) Concluding Remarks

Thus there must always be the Ego, the other, diversity, and antagonism. But with the arrangement of

[1] "The Logic of Hegel," Wallace's translation, Oxford, 1892, p. 372.
[2] *Id.*, p. 373.
[3] Hegel, "Phenomenology of Mind," Baillie's translation, London, 1910, p. 811.
[4] *Id.*, p. 822.

Hegel, all these were one, will be one, and are one. There must always be activity, struggle, and progress. But the final goal of all these were already attained, will be attained, and is attained. About this point something more will be said in the next chapter.

CHAPTER XIV

CONCLUSION OF PART III

There are three points which may be said to be the common characteristics of the third line of thought.

1. There is no end of the activity of the universe. The Spirit is always self-becoming; Tao is everlasting activity; universe is eternal motion. This is obvious in Confucius, in Aristotle, in Wang Yang-ming, and also in Hegel, as we have just seen.

2. The activity does not take place for any ulterior end. This is also obvious in Confucius, in Aristotle, and in Wang Yang-ming. According to Hegel, "reason is purposive activity."[1] But the purpose of reason is simply that reason may become conscious of what it already implicitly is. Hegel said:

"All work is directed at only the aim or end; and when it is attained, people are surprised to find nothing else but the very thing which they had wished for. The interest lies in the whole movement."[2]

"All unsatisfied endeavor ceases, when we recognize that the final purpose of the world is accomplished no less than ever accomplishing itself. Generally speaking, this is the man's way of looking; while the young imagine the world is utterly sunk in wickedness, and that the first thing needed

[1] Hegel, "Phenomenology of Mind," Baillie's translation, London, 1910, p. 19.

[2] "The Logic of Hegel," Wallace's translation, Oxford, 1892, p. 375.

is a thorough transformation. The religious mind, on the contrary, views the world as ruled by Divine Providence, and therefore corresponds with what ought to be. But this harmony between the 'is' and the 'ought to be' is not torpid and rigidly stationary. Good, the final cause of the world, has being, only when it constantly produces itself. And the world of Spirit and the world of Nature continue to have this distinction, that the latter moves only in a recurring cycle while the former certainly also makes progress." [1]

This is Hegel's criticism of both the "nature" and the "art" line of thought. To the "nature" line of thought, perfection is something already in the past. To the "art" line of thought, perfection is something to be accomplished in the future. But according to Hegel, the final good is something that is both accomplished and is accomplishing. It is already accomplished, because it is what the Spirit already implicitly is. It is accomplishing, because only in activity can Spirit become conscious of what itself is.

3. Although there is no cessation of activity, yet for the individual as well as for the universal Spirit, there is something like a final completion. the *summum bonum*. This is attained in the union of the external and the internal. Hegel said:

"The second sphere develops the relation of the differents to what it primarily is,—the contradiction in its own nature. That contradiction which is seen in the infinite progress is resolved into the end or terminus, where the differenced is explicitly stated as what it is in notion." [2]

[1] "The Logic of Hegel," Wallace's translation, Oxford, 1892, p. 373.

[2] *Id.*, p. 378.

There is a terminus when the individual is conscious of the whole, when the Spirit is conscious that all the differences are nothing but itself, that is, when the Spirit becomes self-conscious.

These are the common points with which the systems of the third line of thought reconciled the "nature" and the "art" line of thought. Both of the latter lines tried to get somewhere so that we could stop once for all. But according to the third line of thought, for the evolution of the universe there is no such thing as a final stop. Yet, besides the good of activity, there is something like the supreme good, which is the union of the individual with the whole, the union of the human with the divine.

For the three common points which characterize the "nature" line of thought in contrast with the other three common points which characterize the "art" line of thought, the third line of thought also offers compromises.

(1) Asceticism vs. Hedonism

These two extremes were reconciled by the Confucian and Aristotelian doctrine of the mean and the Aristotelian doctrine of the qualitative difference in pleasure.

(2) Anti-Intellectualism vs. Intellectualism

The compromise and reconciliation of these two extremes may be exemplified by Hegel. Hegel, on the one hand, attacked "God's beloved ones to whom He gives His wisdom in sleep."[1] On the other hand, he

attacked understanding in the form of mathematical science that isolates the moving factors from the process of Spirit as a whole, and that holds them fast as the solid truth. Intuition is afraid of mediation; understanding takes the single mediation as truth. True science, Speculative Philosophy, grasps both the movement as a whole and the mediation.

(3) Mysticism vs. Egoism

The compromise of these two extremes may also be exemplified by Hegel. When the self is united with the whole, the whole becomes self-conscious. Spirit, then, "is the Ego, the concrete Ego, and no other." Besides, in its Recollection or memory, all the past experience of any individual, indeed of anything in the world, is preserved. The individual never needs to be afraid of losing itself in the whole.

[1] Hegel, "Phenomenology of Mind," Baillie's translation, London, p. 10.

CHAPTER XV

GENERAL CONCLUSION

(1) The Blindness of the Philosophers

Criticizing the different philosophic systems of his own time, Suen-tse said:

"Mo-tse is blinded by utility, and does not know refinement. Sung-tse is blinded by desire, and does not know virtue. Sheng-tse is blinded by law, and does not know philosophy. Shen-tse is blinded by authority, and does not know wisdom. Hui-tse is blinded by words, and does not know facts. Chuang-tse is blinded by nature, and does not know art. Therefore from the point of view of utility, the way of life is nothing but to seek for profit. From the point of view of desire, the way of life is nothing but to seek for satisfaction. From the point of view of law, there is nothing but regulation. From the point of view of authority, there is nothing but caprice. From the point of view of words, there is nothing but argument. From the point of view of nature, there is nothing but '*laissez faire*.'" [1]

This formula of criticism can be applied to all the philosophic systems analyzed above. As we pointed out in the introduction, philosophy is an idealization of certain features of experience in order that it may become a standard of life as a whole. No wonder that philosophers were always blinded by that which they idealized.

The philosophers belonging to what I called the third line of thought, indeed, attempted to idealize experience

[1] Suen-tse, "Works," Chap. XXI.

as a whole. With the encyclopedic knowledge of these philosophers, they worked out the "Phenomenology of Mind" in which everything had its place. But as a matter of fact, of our experience as a whole, evil is not an insignificant part. The four great evils of life: birth, old age, sickness, and death, that motivated the founder of Buddhism to build his system, are most obvious and most universal. From time immemorial, man's aspiration has always been that, as the Chinese saying goes, "may the flower be forever in bloom; may the moon be forever full; may the beloved forever live!" How can these aspirations be compatible with the "four evils"? In order to idealize experience as a whole, the first thing for these philosophers to accomplish was, as Hegel said, the "justification of the ways of God." With the Confucian and Hegelian conception of dialectic, these philosophers pointed out that death is necessarily involved in life, and that old age is necessarily involved in youth. In short, according to these philosophers, evil is necessarily involved in good. Besides, if we see things from the point of view of the whole, we know that, as Aristotle said, good is the normal, evil is the exceptional, or, as Hegel said, good is the reality, evil is an illusion. Of course this is one way to deal with evil. But in analyzing these philosophers, we cannot but think that they were blinded by the justification of the evil, and did not know that certain evils cannot be justified, that they were blinded by the idea that good is normal, and did not know that evil is not altogether

exceptional, and that they were blinded by the idea that good is the only reality, and did not know that evil is not a mere appearance. As a result these philosophers also idealized but one feature of experience. They could justify evil, but they could not idealize evil. They could only say that evil was an illusion, but they could not say that this illusion was good.

(2) The Problem of Philosophy

In no other sphere of man's life is there so much dispute as in philosophy. The reason for this is that each system of philosophy holds one feature of experience which may be a good, to be *the* good. As a matter of fact, few people dispute about the *good*. The simplicity and innocence of the state of nature are good. The richness and the splendor of the state of art are also good. About these goods as such, few people will dispute. The dispute comes in when philosophers take some of these as *the* good, to which all others are to be subordinated. Only in so doing does the "nature" line of thought become, to use an expression which the Neo-Confucianists used to accuse Buddhism, "too empty," and the "art" line of thought becomes, to use an expression with which Chuang-tse criticized Mo-tse, "too hard." Only in so doing, does what William James called a "certain blindness of human beings" find its full expression in philosophy.

Why did philosophers insist on *the* good at all? An old Chinese story says that once upon a time four persons engaged in conversation and told each other their idea

of good and what they wished to be. The first person said that wealth was good and that he wished to be a millionaire. The second person said that nobility was good and that he wished to be a governor of a great city. The third person said that Heavenly life was good and that he wished to be an angel. The fourth person said that all these were good and that he wished that, with one million dollars in his pocket, he might ride on a flying crane's back (a thing only the angels can do), as he proceeded to assume the office of governorship of Yang-chow (a great city). If the aspiration of this fourth person could be realized, there perhaps could never be any dispute about *the* good at all. But as a matter of fact, this aspiration could not, cannot, and perhaps will not, be realized. Wealth is good; nobility is good; heavenly life is good. In order to secure an integration of activity, and to avoid the split of personality, man needs to have some goods as *the* good. The problem of philosophy is the search for *the* good, and its procedure is the idealization of some goods so that it may become *the* good.

It may be urged that we need not have *the* good at all. We may, as Yang Chu taught, act only for immediate goods. We may, as the philosophers of the third line of thought taught, act for the sake of activity and leave the realization of the good to chance or fate. We may not fix *the* good at all, since the circumstances always change. These are the better standards of action. But as a matter of fact, these standards them-

selves are *the* good. They are themselves the result of deliberate philosophic thought and the product of man's life of reason.

What is true of good is also true of evil. Every evil, taken in itself and as such, *is* evil. Poverty is evil; old age is evil; death is evil. People do not dispute about *evils*, but only about *the* evil. Positively the aim of philosophy is to find out *the* good for man to attain. Negatively, it is to find out *the* evil for man to avoid. The "nature" line of thought said that the state of nature was *the* good, and that the state of art was *the* evil. The "art" line of thought said that the state of art was *the* good, and that the state of nature was *the* evil. The third line of thought said that the good of activity was *the* good, and that the failure to enjoy this was *the* evil.

(3) Philosophy and Religion

With the exception of the extreme materialistic philosophy in the "art" line of thought, philosophers have been wont to hypostatize what they considered to be *the* good in Heaven and to call it the Absolute, the One, Tao, or God. Plato made it most plain that the Idea of Good is the ruler of the ideal world and that nothing can be good except by partaking of the Good. This is the procedure of religion. The philosophers like Plato are often said to be "religious." Indeed, their philosophies are religion in essence. The difference between these philosophies and religions is that in the former there are no authority, dogma, and formality, while in the

latter there are all of these. Religion also gives man a definite idea of good for the standard of his action. So far it is philosophy, but with its authority, dogma, and formality, it is philosophy stereotyped.

This is the reason that although many philosophers spoke of the Good, the One, the Absolute, Tao, or God, yet no two of them had the same conception of these. Chuang-tse considered Tao as including all things except the state of art; Confucius considered it as including both nature and art. Fichte considered the Absolute Ego as the striving force to conquer its other; Hegel considered the World Spirit as both in itself and in its other. There are also many religions, and in one religion there are many sects. Each has its own God, its own good.

Perhaps there is nothing more congenial to man's aspiration than thinking that *the* good is the eternal and the supreme factor in the world, while *the* evil is nothing but its negation, its other. In the Western world, therefore, in spite of the attack of science, God still has a place in man's mind, and the reconciliation of religion and science has become a great problem in philosophy.

(4) Philosophy and Science

It is often said that the purpose of philosophy is the search for truth as such. Let us see whether this statement is true or not in the history of philosophy. In the history of Asiatic philosophy there has been no system the purpose of which was the search for truth as such. This may be taken for granted. In the history of Greek

philosophy a contrast is often made between the naturalistic and humanistic movements as if there were a sharp demarcation between them. But as a matter of fact, no one can decide how far the pre-Socratic philosophers were non-humanistic. In the first place, we are not in a position to pass judgment upon any philosophy, if we know it only through the fragments of its literature and the reports of others. In the second place, even if we judge the pre-Socratic philosophers from the incomplete sources, we see that they also talked about gods and man, reason and soul. The Pythagoreans were even a school for ethical and religious reform. It seems that they were no less humanistic than the Socratic schools. Socrates' and Plato's interest in the good was obvious. Aristotle was usually considered the father of European science. But he still considered good as far more important than truth. According to him, "the most authoritative or architectonic science" is politics, the science for the supreme good. "It is the political science or faculty which determines what science is necessary in states, and what kind of science should be learned, and how far they should be learned by particular people."[1] It is true that he said: "For it is in their wonder that men both now begin and at first began to philosophize."[2] But that men should wonder at all is only because the wise legislators of the State found out that to wonder was good. That in the Hellenistic

[1] Aristotle, "Nichomachean Ethics," I, I, Welldon's translation, p. 2.
[2] Aristotle, "Metaphysics," 982 b, 10.

and the Roman world, the aim of philosophy was the search for the good is also obvious. In the Middle Ages it was often said that philosophy was the handmaid of religion. This simply meant that philosophy was bound to expound *the* good fixed by one philosophy in the form of Christian religion. Philosophy lost her liberty to search for the new good, but she still dealt with good. In the modern world, philosophy strove as usual in her search for *the* good or the defense of the objective existence of *the* good. Epistemology is a special feature of modern philosophy. Locke and Hume strove for it in order to solve some of the important human problems. Berkeley and Kant strove for it to prove the existence of God. Another special problem in modern philosophy is the reconciliation of religion and science. This is an attempt to defend the objective existence of *the* good represented by the Christian God. There have been two methods of making the reconciliation. One is that which was used by Kant and is now used by the present-day pragmatists. These philosophers said that scientific truth concerns only the phenomenal world, for practical purposes. It has no right, therefore, to say anything beyond that. The ultimate reality can be known only by moral consciousness, by intuition, or by the "will to believe." Another method is that which was used by Spinoza and is now used by the neo-realists. These philosophers admit the mechanism of science, but at the same time maintain that there are also God, or objective truth, objective beauty, and objective good.

It is science that seeks for truth as such. In the world's history every civilized nation has some germ of science. But it is the modern European people who began to make the search for truth, not for enjoyment in leisure and in peace as Aristotle did, but really as a serious business and even as a war against nature to force her to tell her secret. Their motivation for this we have seen already. We need only reiterate here what we have said before that modern European people were interested in the increase of knowledge and in the increase of power, because they adopted a philosophy that assumes it is good to have them. Philosophy determines the idea of good ; science helps to realize it.

So far as truth is also good, let science continue its work. At the same time let philosophy continue to search for *the* good. It may be said that in conceiving the latter in this way we humiliate philosophy. It is often said that the proper position for philosophy in man's life of reason should be the synthesis of all sciences. But, as we have seen in the above chapters, to determine *the* good is not an easy matter. In doing her work, philosophy needs to take everything into consideration. She needs to make an impartial review of all sciences. But she makes it for her own purpose. It is in this that her dignity consists. Otherwise, the synthesis of all sciences may not differ very much from an " outline of science. " It is better for people to get first-hand knowledge from sciences themselves than to get it through an " outline. "

(5) Philosophy and History

Plato said that the highest knowledge was the search for the idea of good. Aristotle said that the good was the final cause of all activity. Hegel said that history was the embodiment of reason. There would be no dispute about these statements, if Plato had not said that the Idea of Good was an eternal and unchanging idea in Heaven; if Aristotle had not said that good was the final cause both of the things of nature and the things of art; and if Hegel did not take reason for Reason. Whether nature is teleological or not, man is certainly teleological. In his life of reason, man has philosophy to determine *the* good, and science and art to realize *the* good. The accumulation of his activity, the embodiment of his philosophy, is his history.

(6) Philosophy and Fine Art

Plato uttered another truism, namely, that the actual always strives to attain the ideal, but always falls short of it. History, the actual realization of philosophy, cannot be as perfect as philosophy. In compensation, man tries to give Philosophy an imaginary realization, which is fine art. In its development fine art was closely connected with religion. Through fine art the ideal life of religion finds the full expression. In China, the Taoistic state of nature has never been, and perhaps will never be, realized in history. But it has been realized in fine art, that is, in Chinese poetry and Chinese painting.

(7) An Outlook

It may be said that philosophy is the soul of man's life of reason. Our time is the age when the different souls of the world meet in discussions. There have been some conflicts at these meetings and discussions and there will be more. What is hoped is that through these conflicts these souls may become more *für sich* and help to raise each other to some higher level. But this will be only "the little better" (see above, p. 172). Although the "little better" is a certain accomplishment, there must still be something that is not yet accomplished. "There is no end of things," and "with this hexagram the 'Book of Changes' comes to a close."

THE END

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